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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Interstate and international jurisdictional problems are often vexing.' They
are worse in matters of child custody. In the past, jurisdiction to obtain custody
or to modify a custody decree required only presence or domicile. The United
States population is transient and custody decisions are subject to modification.,
The volatility of child custody disputes and the tendency of parents to move to
different and separate jurisdictions traditionally caused and continuesto cause
difficult problems for children, parents, and the legal system. Before the
promulgation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), it was much worse.4 Courts were
usually aggressive in an atmosphere of virtually no jurisdictional limitations to
assert initial and modification child custody jurisdiction.5 This article will
Copyright 1998, by LouIlANA LAW REVIEW.
J.Y. Sanders Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Hebert Law Center. The bayou
perspective is good for many reasons. I have considered the law and problems on child custody
jurisdiction from the perspective of a mixed jurisdiction. I would like to thank Symeon Symeonides
for enlightening discussions and for his work Louisiana Civil Law System (1997); and Katherine
Spaht for similar discussions and for her work on Louisiana Family Law (1996). I would also like
to thank my research assistant Imelda Fisher for her excellent work. Also, thanks to Tabby Thomas,
Raful Neal, Buckwheat Zydeco, and Whisperin Smith for their inspiration.
I. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, in
International Criminal Law Ch. 3 (2d ed. 1997); Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody Jurisdiction
& Procedure, in Louisiana Family Law Ch. 13 (1996); Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, in Terrorism, Drugs, International Law & the Protection of Human Liberty Ch. 3
(1992).
2. See infra general history discussion. 2 Joseph H. Beale, Conflict of Laws § 144.3 (1935);
Herbert F. Gooldrich, Conflict of Laws § 132, at 358 (2d ed. 1983); Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 1717 (1934). But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and
Reason v. The Restatement, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (1953); Kenneth M. Murchison,
Jurisdiction Over Persons, Things and Status, 41 La. L. Rev. 1053, 1076 (1981); Dale F. Stansbury,
Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 Law & Contemp. Probs. 819, 820-25 (1944)
(arguing that the traditional approach and rationale did not even explain decisions, which were often
whimsical and chauvinistic).
3. Although this is made more difficult by the substantive law, because of the belief that too
much change, of itself, is harmful to the child. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 131-134; La. R.S.
9:291, 331-351, 361-369 (1991); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
4. Blakesley, Child Custody Jurisdiction, in Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, § 13.05, and
authority cited therein. See also infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text and authority.
5. E.g., State v. Stacy, 182 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Homer Clark, The Law of
Domestic Relations in the United States § 12.5, at 458 (2d Student ed. 1987); Barry 1. Baroni,
Conflict of Laws, Child Custody, Theory of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 12 Loy. L. Rev. 147 (1967);
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consider the law of child custody jurisdiction. I criticize quite vigorously the
conventional wisdom that the UCCJA does not have to meet substantive due
process standards. I will note situations in which it is extremely unfair, so that
principles of substantive due process ought to apply. Some excellent scholars,
Professor Bruch,6 for example, claim that the UCCJA provides a solution which
allows the -best possible place to litigate-a place with the most information
about the child and possible custodial arrangements. None of these propositions
is necessarily or always true: for instance, jurisdictional "tug of war" is not
always prevented; the best possible place to litigate child custody issues is often
avoided by a self-interestedparty, and in some circumstances the law is so unfair
as to be unconstitutional. Jurisdictional "tugs-of-war" are to be avoided to
protect children, but the current law does not always do this. Despite these
problems, child custody jurisdiction law in the United States is better than it used
to be and ought to apply internationally. Where the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction does not apply, the UCCJA and the PKPA should apply to interna-
tional circumstances. The UCCJA, despite some state court decisions to the
contrary, does apply internationally. It fills the gaps left by the Hague
Convention on Child Abduction.
A. Legislation & Treaties
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 7 and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act' are legislative responses to the child custody jurisdiction
problem. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction9 and its enabling legislation, the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA),'0 are incipient international responses. In addition,
where the Hague Convention does not apply, I argue that the principles and rules
of the UCCJA apply in child custody jurisdiction disputes in the international
setting. The purposes and policies of the UCCJA and the PKPA ought to apply
to a significant degree, with limitations indicated herein, to international
circumstances." Although these laws are far from perfect, and even cause
Brigitte Bodenheinier, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification of
Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 495 (1975).
6. Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe
to Family Law, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1047 (1995).
7. The UCCJA was a Model Act, found in 9 U.L.A. 115-335 (1988). In Louisiana, the
UCCJA is found in La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983).
8. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
9. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 19 i.L.M.
1501 (Oct. 25, 1980).
10. Pub. L. No. 100-300 § 1, 102 Stat. 437 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610
(1990)) (providing a set of procedures to implement the Hague Convention).
II. E.g., decisions applying UCCJA internationally: In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 713
(Cal. 1994); Zenide v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Ruppen v.
Ruppen, 614 N.E.2d 577, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Black v. Black, 657 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super.
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problems in some circumstances, they do provide a uniform mechanism to
resolve jurisdictional child custody disputes and have eliminated some of the
chaos that existed prior to their promulgation." We will study each. We will
also consider the likelihood-I believe the reality-that they are unconstitutional
as applied in some circumstances.
B. Brief History and Conceptual Background of Child Custody Jurisdiction
1. Substantive Child Custody: An Historical and Comparative Excursus
a. Conceptual and Historical Backdrop
Child custody proper must be understood before one can understand the
policies that underlie child custody jurisdiction. Child custody represents the
bundle of constituent rights and obligations pertaining to a child's domicile, care,
supervision, protection, and control. It includes the parental right and obligation
to make decisions about one's children's health, welfare and development."
It relates to the hotly-debated topic of "children's rights" versus parental
CL), app. denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 1995) (applying UCCJA to international child custody disputes
and construing the definition of "state" to encompass foreign nations); Dincer v. Dincer, 666 A.2d
281, 284 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d 1319 (NJ. 1996) (reversing lower court
and applying the UCCJA internationally). E.g., decisions refusing to do so: Koons v. Koons, 615
N.Y.S.2d 563, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
12. Greg Waller, Note, When the Rules Don't Fit the Game: Application of the Vniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Interstate Adoption
Proceedings, 33 Harv. J. On Legis. 271, 284 (1996).
13. La. Civ. Code arts. 216-218, 220, 235, 236. See La. Civ. Code arts. 131, 134, 135, 215-
237 (regarding legitimate children), 238-245 (concerning illegitimate children); see also La. Civ.
Code arts. 246-361 (relating to tutorship); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Function in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 228 n.10 (1975). During
the marriage of a child's parents in Louisiana law, child custody comes within the ambit of parental
authority. See generally Louisiana Civil Code, Title VII, Ch. 5, of Parental Authority, La. Civ. Code
arts. 99, 215-245, especially articles 216, 217, 218, 227. Louisiana Civil Code article 216 provides:
"A child remains under the authority of his father and mother until his majority or emancipation.
In case of difference between the parents, the authority of the father prevails." Article 217 states:
"As long as the child remains under the authority of his father and mother, he is bound to obey them
in every thing which is not contrary to good morals and the laws." Article 218 provides: "An
unemancipated minor can not quit the parental house without the permission of his father and mother,
who have the right to correct him, provided it be done in a reasonable manner." Article 227 states:
"Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting,
maintaining, and educating their children." Where the child's parents have either never married or
where the marriage has broken down, custody rights and obligations fall under the law of tutorship.
See generally Louisiana Civil Code, Title VIII, Ch. I, Of Tutorship, La. Civ. Code arts. 246-362,
and Louisiana Children's Code articles 309 (disputes over custody), 1432-1433 (mental
health-protective custody), and 1510-1523 (voluntary transfer of custody). For a discussion of these




authority over children and the right to rear them. The state traditionally has
been considered to have no right to control parents or to tell them how to raise
their children unless the children were found to be in immediate and serious
danger. Parental prerogative has been sacrosanct and not to be infringed,
especially in relation to teaching values and beliefs. It has even extended to
issues of dress and food. 4 This prerogative clearly is salutary for children and
society when the parents are good; it also contains opportunity for abuse. Thus,
tension and dissonance arise whereparenspatriae comes into play; where parents
are suspected of grossly endangering their children's well-being in the exercise
of their authority." This tension will be analyzed, focusing primarily on
jurisdiction, but jurisdictional decisions implicate and impact on substantive
interests. Analysis of substantive rights and interests of children and parents is
necessary.
First, a brief overview. Some social scientists have actually called for
licensing parents and for terminating the parental authority of potential
abusers and neglectors 6  The United States Constitution, however,
prevents this. The right to rear one's children is one of our basic liberty
interests, with which the state cannot interfere, unless there exists
compelling reasons and specific proof of the need to do so.' 7 This right
14. Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the Psychological Parenting
Theory, in Symposium: The Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision-Making,
12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 549, 553 (1983-84) (in the journal's Symposium: The Impact
of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision-Making, presenting several articles rigorously
criticizing the "best interest" standard and the psychological parent test). See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 638, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3040 (1979); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503-04, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1937-38 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1280 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573-74 (1925).
15. See the discussion of the tension between parental autonomy within the family and child
protection, in Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, Ch. 1.
16. See Hugh LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 182, 184-85 (1980); cf
Claudia P. Mangel, Licensing Parents: How Feasible?, 22 Fain. L.Q. 17, 18-22 (1988).
17. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); Bellotti, 443 U.S.
at 638, 99 S. Ct. at 3040; Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04, 99 S. Ct. at 1937-38; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
92 S. Ct. 1526; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639, 88 S. Ct. at 1280; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535, 45 S. Ct. at
573-74. See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Meyer v. Nebraska,
362 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1922); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990) (relating
to an unwed father's rights to block adoption of his illegitimate child). Although analytically, from
a constitutional law point of view, the early cases (Pierce and Meyer, for example) are not fulfilling,
because they were issued prior to the development of the strict scrutiny standard, subsequent
decisions, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965), cited the early
decisions, but provided no clear analytical framework and were influenced by other significant
interests, such as privacy in procreation, free exercise of religion, or free speech. But see People v.
Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Mich. 1993) (requiring teacher certification is not a violation of due
process, because "a parent's Fourteenth Amendment right to direct a child's education is not ...
fundamental, and, thus, the strict scrutiny test is unwarranted [unless the First Amendment is also
involved]"), reversed, People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993). In DeJonge, the Michigan
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belongs both to parent and child; each is generally better off with the
other.'"
These parent-child interests have been held variously to be grounded in
substantive due process, 9 equal protection," freedom of association, freedom
of religion,2 and generally in the Ninth Amendment.2 The Georgia Supreme
Court recently reiterated the due process interest: "[t]he freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the
U.S. Constitution, and that 'theright to the custody and control of one's child is
a fiercely guarded right in our society and in our law. It is a right that should be
infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances."' 23 Scholars and
courts currently are involved in a philosophical, often heated ideological, debate
over child rearing and custody.2' Some argue that these interests are based on
Supreme Court noted the following: "In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 881, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1601, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Court ruled that the 'Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constituitonal protections, such as... the right of parents
acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 LEd. 1070 (1925), to
direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 [92 S.Ct. 1526, 32
L.Ed.2d 15] (1972),' demands the application of strict scrutiny." DeJonge, 601 N.W.2d at 134-35.
See generally David E. Witte, Note, People v. Bennett. Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 183, 194 (1996).
Of course, the impact of this decision depends on what "education" means, as indicated by the
Court's reservation of First Amendment issues.
18. See, e.g., In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re Jack H., 165 Cal.
Rptr. 646, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("[l]nterference with the fundamental liberty of a child to be
raised by his or her parents cannot constitutionally be countenanced by a mere showing of neglect.");
In re B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
19. SantosAy, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388; Moore, 431 U.S. 494. 97 S. Ct. 1932 (presenting
the history of cases raising due process in relation to these interests); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct.
1274; Meyer, 362 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625. See, e.g., Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860, 861 (Ga.
1996).
20. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1766-69 (1979);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13 (1972).
21. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19, 92 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (Amish parental objection to
Wisconsin mandatory public education requirements); but cf. LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d I
(Neb. 1990) (ordering the father, a Jehovah's Witness, to refrain from exposing the children to
practices inconsistent with the mother's religion, Catholicism); In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981) (The child's parents belonged to a religion which did not permit medical treatment,
except for prayer and faith; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's placement of the
child into the custody of the State Children's Services Division, so that treatment for the child's
hydrocephalic condition could be provided over the parents' objection.).
22. Witte, supra note 17, at 193.
23. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d at 861 (Where there was no notice given in a divorce action that the
State might terminate parental rights, it violated due process.) (citing Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292
S.E.2d 821 (1982) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95); Brooks v. Parkerson,
454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
24. See. e.g., Martha Fineman & Isabel Karpin, Mother's in Law: Feminist Theory and the
Legal Regulation of Motherhood (1995); Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(1987); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (1991); Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,
98 Yale L.J. 293 (1988) (favors joint custody, because it promotes an ideology of shared
1998]
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the individual's constitutional right to privacy." Others argue that they are based
on a significant public or social policy to promote and protect the family as an
institution.2" Others consider them to be founded on communitarian or relation-
ship-based obligations.27 Some say we need to "redefine" or refocus the law; that
we must move from a parental or family system based on individual rights, which
are to promote parental possessivity and self-centeredness, to an "other-centric"
family system promoting notions of benevolence and responsibility, and intended
to reinforce parental dispositions toward generosity and "other directednes."
28
Some historical development may provide perspective on the debate.
responsibility for children by mothers and fathers); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and
Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (1994);
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1988) (hereinafter Dominant Discourse] (disfavoring joint
custody and arguing for primary parent custody, based on notions of fairness to mothers and what
is generally best for the children); Lino Graglia & Harry Jaffa, A Debate: God and Man in Court,
Nat'l Rev. 27 (Aug.14, 1995); Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 865
(1989); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Priva.
cy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 509 (1983) [hereinafter
Constitutional Status]; Bruce C. Hafen, Children 's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights. " 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605 (1976); Kenneth
L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624 (1980); Thomas B. McAffee, The
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990); Martha Minow,
Consider the Consequences, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 900, 914-15 (1986) (reviewing Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Divorce Revolution (1985)); Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14
Mich. L. Rev. 177 (1916); f Katherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 96-97 (1987) (arguing
that the right to privacy, as conceived in American liberal jurisprudence, is dangerous and oppressive
to women, because it ignores the brutal facts of oppression in women's lives; it ignores spousal rape
and marital domination and demands that women's bodies conform to the images of men's desires;
it ignores the fact that contraception and unwanted pregnancy are viewed as a female problem, not
as a societal or human problem),.as noted by Leslie P. Francis, Virtue and the American Family, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 469,485 (1988) (reviewing Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, supra).
See also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Ga. 1995); In re LH.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722
(Ga. 1984); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); In re. J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372-73
(Utah 1982).
25. Some commentators base these interests in the individual. See generally Karst, supra note
24; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 882-84, 985.90 (1979) (rights pertain to privacy
of the individual); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1418 (2d ed. 1988);
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1157, 1160, 1311,
1313-14 (1980) (pertain to individual privacy interests); cf Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in
Western Law, supra note 24; Francis, supra note 24, at 484-88 (warning that a wholesale adoption
of the communitarian and virtue based theory of the family is dangerous; Glendon's remedy, to move
away from rights, rather than to develop an expanded understanding of moral and constitutional rights
is dangerous). See also Glendon, Rights Talk, supra note 24.
26. Hafen, The Family s an Entity, supra note 24, at 866-67; see Hafen, Constitutional Status,
supra note 24 at 479-84, 509.
27. See generally Glendon, Rights Talk, supra note 24; Bartlett, supra note 24.
28. Bartlett, supra note 24, at 294. Compare Bartlett, supra note 24 with Janet L. Dolgin,
Status and Contract In Feminist Legal Theory of the Family: A Reply to Bartlett, 12 Women's Rts.
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b. In Antiquity and the Middle Ages
Child custody has been an issue of significant concern throughout history.
It was debated in Ancient Rome, among the Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, and Celtic
tribes, during the Middle Ages, and throughout "modern" and "post-modern"
times. Perspective requires a brief introductory backdrop. Under Ancient
Roman, Germanic, and Feudalistic regimes, parental authority was vested
absolutely in the patriarch. He had tremendous power. The Roman patria
potestas was a charter from "la patrie" (Family, Tribe, Kingdom, Republic,
Empire), giving rights and powers to the father, for the father and the family.
The similar and related Germanic mundium, which was applied in the Germanic
areas of Europe, in Anglo-Saxon England and central and northern France, was
an operational legal concept embedded in custom and administered by the kinship
group, and functioned as a guideline to protect children."
i. The Germanic Mund or Mundium
The Germanic mund or mundium provided paternal power over children
combined with a duty of protection. This law extended over the Continent,
except in the Pays du Droit tcrit (the Southern portion of France, where written
Roman Law obtained) to Anglo-Saxon England. The power of the patriarch was
tremendous, but was tempered. For example, at one point in England, the wife
was free to repudiate a marriage and to leave, taking her children and half of the
marital property."
ii. The French Adaptation
The Germanic trend developed in central France through the droit coutumier
(customary law) which evolved from the French concept of mainbournie,
meaning mundium.3 In southern France, on the other hand, where the written
L. Rep. 103. 106, 111-12 (1990). See also Randy F. Kandel. Mhich Came First: The Mother or
the Egg? A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 165, 239 (1994)
(indicating a middle ground); Katherine V. Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate Planning Consider-
ations of the New Procreation, 57 La. L. Rev. 27 (1996).
29. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, Ch. I (Family Autonomy); Samuel J.
Stoijar, Children. Parents and Guardians, IV International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Ch.
7, at 41 (1976).
30. Henry H. Foster & Dons J. Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11 Fam. L.Q. 321 n.2 (1978)
(citing Dooms of Aethelbert, Nos. 799-81, stating that "if she (the wife] wish to go away with her
children, let her have half of the property. If the husband wish to have them, (let her portion be) as
one child. If she bears no child, let paternal kindred have the 'fich' and the 'morgengyfe."').
Feudalism and "the church" later rendered the wife a "non-person." Id.
31. This term is a combination of main (ancient French for hand) and bourg or borg (ancient
word for surety). Stoijar, supra note 29, at 42. This notion can be traced clearly from antiquity
through the sixteenth century. The laws were initially codified in the twelfth century in a haphazard
1998)
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law ruled (le pays du droit 9crit), Roman law was followed. 2 In French
customary law, paternal authority or power (mundium or la puissancepaternelle)
belonged not only to the father, but also somewhat to the mother. Paternal
power ended when a child was expressly or tacitly emancipated. Under le droit
coutumier, paternal authority extended only to the child's person, not to his
patrimony. In fact, the child's patrimony not only remained his own personal
property, but the father, who had the right to administer the patrimony, did not
have the right to the usufruct or legal enjoyment of the patrimony. Eventually,
the French Code Civil incorporated the mundium form of child protection, as
influenced by Roman and Canon law.
Notwithstanding the general protective and tempering of the mundium,
the father, unless shown to have excessively abused his power, was free
to control his family as he wished.3 Paternal authority, however, was
checked. For example, the courts had the authority to require a father to
emancipate his children if he mistreated them, contributed to their
delinquency, or refused to support them. Thus, paternal authority in French droit
coutumier was essentially an authority to protect. This rule and emphasis was
later incorporated into the Civil Code. The Roman view, that parental authority
existed as the absolute right of the father for the protection of himself and the
family qua family, was never fully part of the French droit coutumier 4
Paternal power under both the droit coutumier and the written law prior to the
revolutionary reforms was, nevertheless, extensive. Yet, it took revolutionary
reforms to eliminate the paternal right to incarcerate his children as a measure
of paternal correction. The reforms prohibited incarceration, unless the father
received the approbation of a family council and the president of the district
court."
way. See generally Alex Weill & Francois Terr, Droit Civil: Les Personnes, La Famille, Les
Incapacitds 264-65 (mariage cum manu compared to mundium), 459-63, 466-67, 858-75 (5th ed.
1983); Hans J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction 207-17 (1951); Pierre Murat, La
puissance paternelle et la Revolution franfaise: essal de regeneration de I'autoriti des pires, in La
Famille, La Loi, l'Etat: de la l6volution au Code Civil at 390 (Thdry et Biet eds. 1989); Jacques
Mulliez, "Pater is est..." La source juridique de la puissance paternelle du droit rivolutionnaire
au Code Cvil, in La Famille, La Loi, L'ltat: de la Rdvolution au Code Civil at 412 (Thtry et Biet
eds. 1989), and authority cited therein, including: Projet de Code Civil, prisente par Jacqueminot,
au nom de la section de legislation. t) la Commission Legislative du Conseil des Cinq-Cents. 30
frimaire an VIII (21 novembre 1799), in P. Antoine Fenet, Traveaux Prdparatoires du Code Civil,
t. 1, p. 328; Louis Astruc, Traiti de Ia Puissance Patemelle, 167, 305 (Toulouse 1758); Jean Jacques
Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Liv. I, ch. 11; Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les
fondements de I'in6galit6 parmi les hommes 223, et seq. (ed. Garnie-Flammarion 1971); Jean Bodin,
Les Six Livres de la Rtpublique (Paris ed. 1577) at 49.
32. Stoljar, supra note 29, at 50.
33. Id. at 26.
34. See Weill & Terrt, supra note 31, at 459-62; Stoljar, supra note 29, at 50.
35. See Decree of August 1790, [17901 D. No. 16-24, tit. X, arts. 15-16, regarding judiciary
organization, cited in Weill & Terrt, supra note 31, at 695.
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iii. Early Anglo-Saxon England
The Germanic mundium also ruled in Anglo-Saxon England. It was more
protective of children than the early common law that arose with feudalism.
(a) Backsliding Under English Feudalism-Immense
Patriarchal Power
Paternal power actually increased during feudalism, aided by the increased
power of the church. 6 The father had more power than under the Germanic
mundium. The father was held to be his children's "natural guardian.""
Feudalism andthe Church allowed the father nearly absolute power, making him
the paterfamilias of the Common Law. The father was the symbol of and a
tool for maintaining the "king's peace" and for ensuring the continuation of the
structured property system.39 Patricide was equated to regicide and reaped the
concomitant penalty."0 The father's extensive authority over his wife and
children, including his right to custody, remained nearly absolute until the
36. See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth
Century America 235-239 (1985) (suggesting that paternal preference was based on some sort of best
interests of children). This really does not seem to be true.
37. Ernest Young, The Anglo-Saxon Family Law, In Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law 121, 151,153
(1876). Later cases continued to support this notion. Lee M. Friedman, The Parental Right to
Control the Religious Education ofthe Child, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485, 491 n.28 (1916) (citing Stourton
v. Stourton, 8 DeG. M. & G. 760, 771-72 (1857); Donohue v. Donohue, I S.R.D. I, 18 N.S.W.W.N.
14, 18 (1901). See also In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317, 337-38 (1883), where Lord Justice Bowen
states: "It is not the benefit of the infant as conceived by the court, but it must be the benefit of the
infant having regard to the natural law which points out that the father knows far better as a rule
what is good for his children than a Court of Justice can."). In re Meades, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 98 (1870),
holds that the authority of the father to guide and govern the education of his child "is not to be
abrogated or abridged without the most coercive reason." Friedman, supra, at 489 n.22. Lord
Justice Lindley in In re Newton [1896] I Ch. 740, 748 states: "In no case, however, that I am aware
of, where the father has been alive, has the court disregarded his wishes concerning the religious
education of his children, unless, as in this case, he has been himself a man so ill-conditioned and
of such bad conduct that the court thought fit altogether to deprive him of the custody of his
children." Id. See also In re McGrath [1893] I Ch. 143; In re Scanlan, L.R. 40 Ch. D. 200 (1889);
Skinner v. Orde, L.R. 4 P.C. 60 (1871); F. v. F. [1902 1 Ch. 688; In re Montagu, L.R. 28 Ch. D.
82 (1884); In re Walsh, 13 L.R. Ir. 269 (1884)).
38. Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 325.
39. Certainly, in this regard, the common law failed to respect, in any significant way, human
dignity, freedom, equality or social cooperative action. See Address by Robert Pascal, The Civil Law
and Its Study, Louisiana State University Law School, Student Orientation (Sept. 12, 1967), printed
in Syrneon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Civil Law System 179-86 (LSU Publications 1991).
40. See Anonymous, Hanging not Punishment Enough (1701); Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs,
International Law & the Protection of Human Liberty, supra note I, Chs. I, 4; Le Peletier de St.
Fargaux, Archives Parlementaires XXVI, 3 June 1791, at 720, cited and discussed with others and
analysis of cases, In Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison 12-14 (1975)
[Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison].
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celebrated Shelley's Case."' Blackstone noted that the father had a "natural
right" to the custody of his children, while the mother was "entitled to no power,
but only to reverence and respect."42 The mother exercised authority, but only
derivatively through the "empire of the father."'43 The father had the "natural,"
primary right of association with his children, to control their "upbringing," and
to benefit from their services." "Subject to certain exceptions, the father had
absolute right both at common law and equity to determine the form of his
children's education and religious training. His wishes had to be respected even
after his death."3
(b) The Fall of the "Paternal Preference Rule" and the
Rise of the "Maternal Preference Rule"
The immensity of this paternal power began to "break down" somewhat in
cases like Rex v. Deleval," and Blissits Case,"7 where Lord Mansfield was
able to exert some limiting common sense.4" Lord Mansfield began to break
the yoke of the "paternal empire," in cases of clear and shocking abuse. In
Deleval, Mansfield approved a writ of habeas corpus where a father had totally
neglected his daughter and apparently had apprenticed her for prostitution.49
This troubled Lord Mansfield, who was prepared to act as parens patriae for the
child, because of his belief that the father had conspired to place the daughter
into prostitution.S
Mansfield's inroads notwithstanding, the power continued with a vengeance.
In Rex v. de Manneville, for example, the court reaffirmed the father's paramount
41. See Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1B17), cited in Foster & Freed, supra
note 30, at 325 n.21. In this case, the poet Shelley lost custody of his children because of his
atheistic and immoral lifestyle and attitude. Id.
42. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 453 (facsimile Isted., 1979),
cited in Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 325 n.22.
43. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 446, 542-53 (17th ed. 1830);
R. Collin Mangrum, Religious Constraints During Visitation: Under What Circumstances are they
Constitutional?, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 445, 453 (1991).
44. See Andrews v. Salt, 8 Ch. App. 622 (1873), cited and quoted in Foster & Freed, supra
note 30, at 322 n.4.
45. Id.; see I Blackstone, supra note 42, at 438, 456, 462; Grossberg, supra note 36, at 236.
See generally Richard Morris, Studies in the History of American Law 126-200 (1930). The mother
awarded custody of an illegitimate child currently has this power in Louisiana law. La. Civ. Code
arts. 257, 261.
46. Rex v. Deleval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763).
47. Blissits Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1773).
48. Rex v. Deleval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913, 914-15 (K.B. 1763).
49. Id. See also Blisset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 879 (K.B. 1773), cited in Foster & Freed, supra
note 30, at 325 nn.23, 24, wherein Lord Mansfield anticipates "the best interests of the child" test.
See also In re Clarke, L.R. 21 Ch. D. 817 (1882); In re O'Malleys, 8 It. Ch. 291 (1858); In re
Grimes, I Ir. R. Eq. 465 (1877).
50. Rex v. Deleval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763).
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right to custody,"' denying the mother's habeas corpus request for her eight-
month-old daughter and giving the father custody, despite evidence that the father
had abused and neglected the mother and the child. 2 The father simply, par
noblesse oblige, "was entitled by law to the custody of his child." The court so
held, even though the father, a French "enemy alien," had beat the mother and
forced her away from the still-suckling child. He was awarded custody, despite
his brutality and the fact that he was incarcerated at the time and the child would
have to live with his mistress.53 Notwithstanding all of this, custody was
awarded to the father.
(c) The Rise of Industrialization and the Fall of "Paternal
Preference "and Concomitant Rise of the Maternal
Preference Rule
Shelley's Case and the Industrial Revolution signified the demise of such
massive paternal preference in England.34 Although Chancery slowly began to
recognize the mother as "natural guardian" of her children, it was not until 1839
that Parliament took note. In 1839, Talford's [or Talfourd's] Act, culminating
in a series of laws, modified the nearly absolute rule of paternal preference for
legitimate children by providing that mothers had the right to custody of infants
under seven years of age.55 In 1873, this law was further amended to give the
mother the right to custody of children until majority.'6 The maternal prefer-
ence rule evolved from being a recognition of a child's interest, to a right and
burden of the mother.
As we have seen, nations of the Roman-Germanic tradition have long
recognized the parent's "natural right" to the custody of his or her children."
51. Rex v. De Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
52. Id. at 1055. Other important cases showing the immense power of the father and his right
to custody include: Rex v. Greenhill, I I I Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836); Ex parte Skinner, 27 Rev. R.
710 (C.P. 1824).
53. Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 326 n.25. See also Leonre J. Weitzman & Ruth B.
Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody Support
and Visitation Afler Divorce, 12 U.C. Davis L Rev. 471 (1979).
54. See Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 341. Absolute paternal preference did not obtain in
the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15, 256);
Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 519 (Pa. 1813); McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462 (R.l. 1879),
cited in Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 326 n.27.
55. Mnookin, supra note 13, at 234 n.34 (citing An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the
Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54).
56. See Mnookin, supra note 13, at 234 n.34 (citing An Act to Amend the Law as to the
Custody of Infants, 1878, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12). See also Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals & Pilgrims: The
American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750-1800 (1982); H. Jay Folberg & Marva
Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 523, 531 n.49 (1979).
An extensive collection of cases regarding the tender years presumption is cited in Allan Roth, The
Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 1. Fain. L. 423, 432-33 (1975).
57. See supra discussion of the mundium in the text accompanying notes 29-30.
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Historically, this meant that the father ruled. The Louisiana Civil Code, in its
custody articles [both in former Article 146 and current Article 216], mandated
a preference in favor of the father.5" This paternal preference, which was a
legacy of Louisiana's Romanist heritage via France and Spain, was based on the
notion that the father as patriarch of his family was the proper person, during the
ongoing marriage, to decide disputes regarding child rearing.59 In 1888,
however, the Louisiana Legislature, amending Louisiana Civil Code article 146,
accorded the mother legislative preference over the father in custody disputes
after legal separation or divorce. The evolution from a paternal to a maternal
preference in custody proceedings was grounded in the religious and cultural
perception that the correct person to care for a child was the child's mother.60
The United States Supreme Court noted that a man's abilities to rear
children were inferior to a woman's."' Custody was seen as part of the
"essential nature of [a mother's] maternal role."'2 The Court, in Bradwell v.
Illinois, affirmed the maternal preference rule: "[T]he constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood... . The paramount destiny and mission
of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator."' Thus, during much of United States legal history,
the maternal preference rule prevailed. Barring proof of unfitness or incapacity,
the mother was deemed the person best suited by temperament, biology, and
situation to care for her children, especially when they were of tender years.
This "presumption" became a matter of convenience for men and courts. In
1888, the Louisiana Legislature accorded the biological mother legislative
preference over the biological father in custody disputes."
58. La. Civ. Code art. 216; former La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1888).-
59. Paternal preference and control was also part of the Anglo-American and Germanic
traditions. See Lila Tritico, Note, Child Custody: Preference to the Mother, 34 La. L. Rev. 881
(1974). For more on the "modern" history of presumptions in matters of child custody, see, e.g.,
Ramsey L. Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 335, 337-43 (1982);
Mnookin, supra note 13, at 233-37; Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis
of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 235, 235-36 (1982).
60. See, e.g., Ullman v. Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912); Osterhoudt v.
Osterhoudt, 59 N.Y.S. 797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd, 62 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900).
61. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140 (1872).
62. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140 (1872); Gates v. Renfroe, 7 La.
Ann. 569 (1852); Osterhoudt, 59 N.Y.S. 797; Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080. Patemal.preference and
control was also part of the Anglo-American and Germanic traditions. Klaff, supra note 59, at 337-
43; Foster & Freed, supra note 30, at 325. Cf. Ronald Warburg, Child Custody, A Comparative
Analysis, 14 Israel L. Rev. 480, 483-84 (1979).
63. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1888). For additional analysis of the role of gender in custody
determinations over history, see Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, Ch. 12; N. Basch,
In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-Century New York (1982);
Grossberg, supra note 36, at 283-84.
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Thus, the mother was considered to be the "proper person" to raise children.
The mother was considered to have a right and an obligation to have custody.
Preference for the mother articulated in the pre-1977 Louisiana Civil Code,6"
for example, extended to all custody proceedings. The presumption tracked the
French presumption that the welfare of the children was best served by granting
custody to the mother." Accordingly, Louisiana courts consistently awarded
custody to the mother, unless she was found unfit.6
Occasionally, the preference for the mother's right was favored over the
child's need for stability.6 For example, in Estes v. Estes,69 a mother sought
to obtain custody of her children from the father, who had them in his care for
a while. Although the trial court did not determine that such a change would
serve the better interests of the children, the Louisiana Supreme Court approved,
noting that the mother had a greater right.7 Today, some insist that there is an
essential difference between men and women and argue that this difference makes
women better for custody.7 Much of the literature on child custody is not
useful. Studies on the consequences of separation and the "broken home" do not
provide much guidance of what to do for a given child." Many studies are
dogmatically ideological.73
65. Prior to its amendment in 1979, former Louisiana Civil Code article 146 (now 131)
provided: "If there are any children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
the husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the wife...
unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her of it, either in whole or in part."
66. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 1127, 254 So. 2d 603, 605 (La. 1971); Vidrine v.
Demourelle, 363 So. 2d 943, 944 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236,
238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (noting that it is not "unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary" to give
custody to the mother, because of the "simple fact that the day-to-day care of minor children has
traditionally, in our society, been in the hands of the mother rather than the father .. ." and the
"obvious biological connexity" between the mother and child creates a relationship which "gives...
a biological basis for the historical legal preference given the mother.").
67. Fulco, 259 La. at 1127, 254 So. 2d at 605.
68. See Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 24,258 So. 2d 857, 859 (La. 1972); Tritico, supra note 59,
at 883-84.
69. Estes, 261 La. at 24, 258 So. 2d at 859.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., -Phyllis Chesler, Mothers on Trial (1985); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
supra note 24, at 765-68; Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal
Presumption Revisited, I Harv. Women's L.J. 107 (1978).
72. Homer Harrison Clark & Carol Glowinsky, Domestic Relations: Cases & Problems 1034
(5th ed. 1995), citing. e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984); Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History:
Reflections Upon "'In the Best Interests of the Child," 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1096 (1988).
73. Consider and compare Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (2d
ed. 1979) with Judith Wallerstein & Steven Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children
a Decade After Divorce (1989), cited and discussed in Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 72, at 1034
and Judith Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope
with Divorce 310, 311 (1980). Also compare Albert J. Solnit, Psychological Dimensions in Child




B. Child Custody Jurisdiction: History, Conceptual Background, and
Introduction of Some Problems
Custody determinations traditionally have comprised a subcategory of
litigation under the Pennoyer v. Neff4 exception for proceedings relating to
status." The United States Supreme Court, in Pennoyer, held that Due Process
(Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, section 1) and the Full Faith &
Credit Clause (Article IV, section 2) established limits to a given state's authority
to assert in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident.76 Pennoyer
simultaneously announced the "status" exception for an exparte divorce." The
term, "status," in this context, has been defined as "a personal quality or
relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the
parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned."' '  Similarly,
"[t]he attributes and qualities attached to a person by operation of law, regardless
of his own wishes, constitute his status in law.179 Status is "merely a conve-
nient term to describe a combination of legal relations which may result from a
fact situation, such as marriage or the legitimate birth of a child."'" The status
exception arose because of the harshness of our domicile, marriage and divorce
law: "[ilt would be a reproach to our legislation if a faithless husband ... could,
by leaving the State, deprive his abandoned wife of a power of obtaining a
divorce at home."8 ' Neither the development of, nor the rationales for, the
"status exception" properly apply to many family law matters, especially
regarding child custody jurisdiction. Indeed, the opposite is true, if we are to
take seriously the constitutionally fundamental right a parent has to rear his or
her children. The Pennoyer court was concerned about fairness to the wife, who
faced a serious incapacity to obtain a divorce. Indeed, she functionally was
denied the ability to obtain one, as the husband had all the money and, thus,
power and access to the legal system. So this concern was appropriate and
salutary.
74. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
75. Id. at 734 ("jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status... of all
its inhabitants" extends to that status vis-a-vis nonresidents); Murchison, supra note 2, at 1076. This
categorization is necessary if one accepts Pennoyer's structure. If custody cases are to fit into
Pennoyer's unified theory of state court jurisdiction, refusal to place custody within the status
exception would require that it be placed within the principles relating to in personam or in rem
jurisdiction. Id. at 1076 n.109.
76. E.g., id. at 722, 733 (notice required and service required while party is present physically
within the state or that the party come voluntarily).
77. Id. at 734-35.
78. 2 Beale, supra note 2, § 119.1; Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 119 (1934).
79. Raleigh C. Minor, Conflict of Laws; or, Private International Law § 68 (1901).
80. George W. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 298 (1937).
81. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 162, 21 S. Ct. 544, 546 (1901) (citing and quoting
Rhyms v. Rhyms, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 316 (1870)); see also 2 Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law
of Marriage § 161 (4th ed. 1864).
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The due process clause protects against fundamental unfairness."2 In perso-
nam jurisdiction is one means to accomplish this. What is fundamentally unfair
is not easy to determine, but the point of the due process clause in relation to in
personam jurisdiction is or ought to be that one should not be required to litigate
issues of significant import to any liberty interest, including those noted in
International Shoe"3 and Kulko," before courts where the context (including
distance, lack of contacts, or other indicators of unfairness to the defendant)
makes it so difficult such that it is fundamentally unfair.'" The right to rear
one's child certainly fits this category.
The law on child custody jurisdiction has evolved. States have always had
the authority to decide issues relating to the status of their domiciliaries." It
was natural, therefore, for courts and scholars of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to consider domicile the sole basis of jurisdiction in custody
matters.' 7 Gradually, courts began to apply other bases, such as the child's
presence in the state or personal jurisdiction over both parents."' One commen-
tator suggested that the "true rule" with regard to custody jurisdiction "is the
court's discretion exclusively governed by the child's welfare." 9
A child's role in a custody dispute is a further complication. The child is
particularly passive and vulnerable, with a fate ultimately connected to the
82. See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. III. L. Rev.
813, 819-23 nn. 23-41 and authority cited therein.
83. Intemational Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
84. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-92, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1696-97 (1978).
85. See Wasserman, supra note 82, at 819-23 nn. 23-41 and authority cited.
86. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877); Murchison, supra note 2, at 1076; Leonard 0.
Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795-96 (1964); see also Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303, 63 S. Ct. 207, 215 (1942) (Williams 1) ("(W]hen a court of one
state acting in accord with the requirements of procedural due process alters the marital status of one
domiciled in that state... we cannot say its decree should be excepted from the full faith and credit
clause . . . ."); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (Williams 11) (regarding sister
state's divorce decree, court not bound by, but must give proper weight to, sister state's determination
that a person is a domiciliary thereof). For general discussion of this, see Blakesley, Louisiana
Family Law, supra note 1, Chs. 4, 13, 15.
87. 2 Beale, supra note 2, § 144.3; Goodrich, supra note 2, § 117. But see Ehrenzweig, supra
note 2, at 347-48; Stansbury, supra note 2, at 820-25 (arguing that the traditional perception failed
to explain the decisions).
88. E.g., In re Paul, 304 P.2d 641, 643 (Idaho 1956) (issuing a temporary protective order per
child's physical presence); State ex rel. Jaroszewski v. Prestidge, 81 N.W. 2d 705 (Minn. 1957)
(power to award custody based on presence of children in state); see also 2 Beale, supra note 2, §
144.3; Clark, supra note 5, § 11.5, at 320-21; Russel M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711, 717 nn.37-38 (1982); Murchison,
supra note 2, at 1076-77. For additional cases and commentary supporting this proposition, see
generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 2; Ratner, supra note 86, at 797 & nn.37-38; Stansbury, supra note
2, at 824 nn.32-35; George Wilfred Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 42, 55-56 nn.39-40 (1940). Note, Jurisdictional Bases of Custody Decrees, 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 1024, 1025 n.8 (1940).
89. Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 357.
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fortunes of the litigants."o Vulnerability is heightened where the parties are
impassioned and adversarial. The child's vulnerability and lack of freedom of
choice or movement, combined with the pain of separation and the significant
parental interests, cause us to question the rules of jurisdiction. Serious harm
may result from ongoing litigious strife, uncertainty, and, especially, abduc-
tion.9"
Ironically, the importance of children to parents and parents to children, the
hard issues presented in custody cases, the combination of factors, and the
traditional wide-open jurisdictional approach inevitably led to chaos, rampant
child abduction, and unending litigious strife. This became endemic as courts of
different states issued contradictory custody orders.92 Estimates ranged from
25,000 to 100,000 incidents of abduction per year.93 The "rule of seize and
run" prevailed;94 hence, the impetus for a uniform approach and standard for
jurisdiction in custody cases.
On the other hand, sometimes application of the UCCJA causes extremely
unfair results and harm to children. It is worth asking whether it always
comports with due process. It is surprising, and a source of dismay, that this
issue has rarely been debated seriously or in any depth. Paradoxically, and
notwithstanding its claimed purpose, ambiguities in the UCCJA in its variation
90. While his or her parents are parties to the suit for dissolution and custody, the child has
been described as "the subject of the custody dispute." Kim J. Landsman, Note, Lawyering for the
Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87
Yale L.J. 1126, 1129 (1978). "Empirical studies show great variation in the responses of children
to the divorce of their parents, but the threat to a child's welfare inlroduced by divorce is not
disputed." Id. at 1129-30 (footnote omitted). For additional commentary describing what is at stake
for the child in a custody dispute as well as the need for independent representation, see Donald N.
Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. Fain.
L. 27 (1976-77).
91. E.g., Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717, 719 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (Florida courts
relinquished jurisdiction); same case, other issues, 653 So. 2d 707, 711 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995)
(awyer father held in contempt and denied visitation for vicious ongoing litigation that harmed the
children).
92. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 10 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
93. These estimates were made prior to the effective date of the PKPA. Arguments on the
PKPA, before a Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Se'ss. 113 (1980) (statement of Sara Keegan, former Coordinator
of the Single Parent Family Program, Dep'L of Community Affairs, Providence, Rhode Island), cited
in Lucy S. McGough & Anne R. Hughes, Charted Territory: The Louisiana Experience With the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 44 La. L. Rev. 19, 24 (1983). One commentator noted in
1981: "(A] completely accurate estimate of the extent of child-snatching is unavailable; but... [they
range from 25,000 to 100,000 times per year], and quite possibly more, since parents who abduct
their children do not advertise that information." Sanford Katz, Child Snatching: The Legal
Response to the Abduction of Children 11 (1981).
94. Ashbum v. Ashbum, 661 N.E.2d 39, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Preferatory Note,
UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 117 (1988)).
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among the states has allowed forum shopping," confusion, disputation, abuse
of one parent, and harm to children. Although the UCCJA is interpreted
differently by different states, the PKPA is quite clear. The PKPA, however,
may not always provide the best solution for parents or children in some
situations. We will explore these laws and their impact.
II. THE BASIC LAW ON CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION-A QUICK OVERVIEW
A. Purposes and Approach of the UCCJA & PKPA
1. General
The history and nature of child custody litigation made the need for a new
jurisdictional approach abundantly clear. Difficult cases and harsh results are
likely under whatever system or set of rules is adopted. Although parts are
confusing and ambiguous, they at least begin to provide a uniform mechanism
to resolve child custody jurisdiction disputes.96 Nevertheless, overall, they are
helpful, although some seem to regard the UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague
Convention as a panacea.97 These statutes, however, are far from perfect; they
sometimes cause serious harm. In Fuge v. Uiterwyk," they worked as they
should, when both Florida and Louisiana courts had a basis for jurisdiction, but
communicated and Florida relinquished jurisdiction. Had Florida refused to
relinquish jurisdiction, which it could have done under the law, it would have
been extremely unfair to one parent and could have caused even more serious
damage to the well-being of the children. In addition to judges doing what is
right in their discretion, more thought is required to make the law and process
less harsh.
The UCCJA began as a model act which became virtually universal state
law. The PKPA, on the other hand, is federal law. The UCCJA seems to create
a two-tier approach to determining jurisdiction." First, a general class of
jurisdiction is established for custody cases. Second, the law provides a
mechanism intended to "vest" jurisdiction in only one state at a time.' °° These
two propositions or issues of jurisdiction, 1) whether it exists, and 2) if so,
95. But blatant forum shopping was held to be not only a violation of Florida public policy
regarding shared custody, but also to violate at least two purposes of the UCCJA. Davidian v.
Kessler, 685 So. -2d 13, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Waller, supra note 12, at 284.
97. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 6.
98. Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
99. See Baumert v. Baumert, No. FA-960152535, 1997 WL 66500, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
28, 1997) (citing and quoting Muller v. Muller, 682 A.2d 1089 (1996) (interpreting the Connecticut
UCCJA in Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 46b-90 to 46b-I 15 (West 1995)).
100. Baumert, 1997 WL 66500, at 02; Conn. UCCJA § 46b-97. The court really means a
mechanism which vest primary or priority jurisdiction in one state.
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whether it should be declined, are separate and distinct.'O The UCCJA
envisages that where concurrent jurisdiction exists, only one state should exercise
that jurisdiction.' The PKPA reinforces and clarifies these rules and requires
full faith and credit. °3 The UCCJA and the PKPA supersede all conflicting
or contradictory laws.'0 '
The PKPA'03 is designed to prevent child snatching and "to prevent
interstate competition and conflicts" in custody disputes.'"' It has the same
purposes as the UCCJA. Being a federal law, covering the same subject matter
and having the same policies as the UCCJA, the PKPA predominates. It preempts
contrary state law and informs interpretation. °7
2. Purposes: The UCCJA and the PKPA Are to Limit, Not to Proliferate
Jurisdiction
Neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA grant jurisdiction. They were designed
actually to restrict a court's traditional jurisdiction to hear custody or related
matters.' Their express elemental purposes are: to "[a]void jurisdictional
competition and conflict" with other state courts, to promote cooperation among
states and expand exchange of information; to assure that litigation occurs
ordinarily in the state that has the more significant connection with the child and
family and the more substantial evidence about the child's welfare; discouraging
continuing litigation; and to deter forum shopping, jurisdictional competition, and
child abduction."109 They require all states to honor prior custody orders."*
The jurisdictional bases, therefore, should be read restrictively to limit jurisdic-
101. Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 486 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1985)).
102. Brown v. Brown, 486 A.2d It16 (Conn. 1985).
103. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2XE), (d) (1994).
104. For example, in Louisiana this includes Code of Civil Procedure articles 10(A) and 10(B)
(jurisdiction over status (adoption, emancipation, interdiction, tutorship, curatorship, custody, nullity
of marriage, divorce, proving paternity, etc.)). See Gusman v. Gusman, 598 So. 2d 1256, 1258 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1992) (regarding custody); see also La. R.S. 13:1705(B), (C) (1983); La. R.S. 13:1717
(1983) (taking testimony in another state); La. RS. 13:1718 (1983) (hearings and studies in another
state-orders to appear); La. R.S. 13:1719 (1983) (assistance to courts of other states); La. R.S.
13:1720 (1983) (preservation of documents for use in other states); La. R.S. 13:1721 (1983) (request
for court records of another state).
105. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
106. Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 1990).
107. E.g., D.B. v. P.B., 692 So. 2d 856 (Ala. App. 1997); Rivazfar v. Rivazfar, 653 N.Y.S.2d
760,762 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Preemption is discussed in text accompanying Infra notes 134-142.
108. E.g., Corothers v. Francis, 654 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
109. E.g., UCCJA, Preferatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1988); La. KS. 13:1700 (1983); Williams
v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. 1990); Ashburn v. Ashburn, 661 N.E.2d 39, 40-41 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996); Dubea v. Dubea, 609 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Martin v. Martin, 545
So. 2d 666, 668 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
110. Jones v. Shadwich, 601 So. 2d 371, 372 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Renno v. Evans, 580
So. 2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
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tion."' They are also supposed to promote the children's best interest, although
this makes them inherently schizophrenic in many specific applications." 2 They
attempt to allow custody determinations to be made by the state which has the best
perspective, best evidence and the most significant interest." 3
a. Deterring Child Abduction
The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction all
aim to prevent child abduction. Child abduction occurs when one parent
breaches another's right to custody by removing the child from his "home state"
or "habitual residence" and takes him to another jurisdiction, or when the parent
retains the child in contravention of another's custodial rights or interests. 114
b. Litigating Custody in the Most Ideal Place
The acts attempt to ensure that child custody or related litigation occurs in
the state that will best promote a proper decision. This is deemed to be the
home state, where it is assumed that one will find the maximum amount of
evidence on the child's interests. The "home state" is the place in which the
child has lived with her legal custodian for at least six months. If there is no
"home state," the second option is the state in which they have the most
significant connection and the best evidence." 5
c. Avoiding Forum Shopping and Conflicting or Duplicative
Litigation
These laws are also designed to avoid forum shopping, jurisdictional
competition, and duplicative litigation. They establish a formula for determining
which court among one or more state courts has jurisdiction, or, if more than one
has jurisdiction, which should assert it.
d. Facilitating Communication
The UCCJA and the PKPA are also designed to facilitate and promote
communication among courts which have or may have concurrent jurisdiction.
IIt. Tabuchi v. Lingo, 588 So. 2d 795, 798 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (reading significant
connection/substantial evidence basis). The jurisdictional bases are discussed Infra.
112. See my discussion of this schizophrenia in my article: Christopher L. Blakesley, Child
Custody: Jurisdiction & Procedure, 35 Emory L.J. 291, 357-381 (1986).
113. La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983).
114. See, e.g., Ashbum v. Ashburn, 661 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Miller v. Miller,
602 So. 2d 330, 334-35 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
115. UCCJA § 2(5), (6), 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). See infra
discussion in text accompanying notes 151-192.
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Each component part of the law should be construed to promote these goals.' 6
They require all states to honor prior custody orders. A state has an affirmative
duty to question its jurisdiction when it learns of an interstate dimension." 7
A registry of custody decrees is established in each state."' A court that
receives information on possible ongoing custody litigation in another state
should communicate with the appropriate court in the other state. "9 When
courts communicate to resolve conflicting jurisdiction they should keep a record,
preferably a verbatim transcript.'
C. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 US. C 1738A
1. The Need For and Promulgation of the PKPA
The United States Congress adopted the PKPA because the UCCJA had not
worked as well as intended.'' In addition, when the PKPA was promulgated,
only around fifty percent of the states had their own UCCJA.'22 The federal
law attempts to correct the problems, gaps, ambiguities, vagaries and inconsisten-
cies that arose from the various state versions and interpretations of the
UCCJA.123  Although several inconsistencies were resolved, some were not,
and other problems were created. In addition, some state court decisions still
ignore the PKPA or try to limit it to circumstances of child snatching.' 24
2. Application of the PKPA
The PKPA does not confer jurisdiction in federal court to decide which of
two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.'25 Nor does it confer a private
116. Jones v. Shadwich, 601 So. 2d 371, 372 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Renno v. Evans, 580 So.
2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); McGough & Hughes, supra note 93, at 28; Stuart v. Stuart, 516
So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Ingram v. Ingram, 463 So. 2d 932 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., authority in supra note 116. When this happens the law works quite well. See,
e.g., Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
118. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1715 (1983).
119. This has worked as intended in many cases as courts become accustomed to the Acts. See,
e.g., Kessenich v. Kessenich, No. FA-960532958, 1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11,
1996); Renno, 580 So. 2d 945; Janik v. Janik, 542 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
120. State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 558 (Utah. Ct. App. 1996).
121. Russel M. Coombs, Progress Under the PKPA, 6 J. Amer. Acad. of Matrim. Law. 59, 62
n.15 (1990) (providing examples ofvariations and conflicting decisions); Blakesley, supra note 112,
at 316-30.
122. Russell M. Coombs, Nuts & Bolts of the PKPA, 22 Colo. Lawyer 2397 (Nov. 1993).
123. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-403(A)(1), (2) (West 1989) (adding domicile to home state
jurisdiction). See variations and inconsistent interpretations in Blakesley, supra note 112; Coombs,
supra note 121, at 61 n.15.
124. See. e.g., Kean v. Kean, 577 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
125. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
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cause of action in federal court for this purpose.'26 It does determine
which state court custody decisions are entitled to full faith and credit
under Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution." 7 A
primary question is the extent to which the PKPA preempts the operation
of a given state's UCCJA. In addition, some state courts suggested in
dicta that the PKPA directly applies only to modification actions. 2 '
Whether true or not, the point is vacuous, because any judgment contrary
to the PKPA is not owed full faith and credit and thus is quite worth-
less.'29 There is a practical necessity to apply the PKPA to initial as
well as modification custody cases."'
Courts have sometimes incorrectly considered the PKPA to apply only
when the circumstances include child abduction or wrongful retention.' 3 '
The PKPA, however, has the same purposes as the UCCJA. It applies to
interstate child custody or related disputes just as the UCCJA. The PKPA
provides that a "child custody determination" is consistent with the PKPA
if: (1) the court rendering it has jurisdiction under its own laws; and (2)
one of the following conditions exist: "(A) such state (i) is the home state
of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or...
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) ......
Thus, if a state has jurisdiction under its own law [1738A(c)(1)], and has
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d), as required by
1738A(c)(2)(E), any order issued by that state is consistent with thePKPA,
and is entitled to full faith and credit."' Thus, the coverage and
application of the PKPA are concomitant to that of the UCCJA.
126. Id.
127. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 1738A (1994); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181, 108 S. CL at 517; Davidson
v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
128. See Columb v. Columb, 633 A.2d 689, 692 (Vt. 1993) (ultimately deciding the case
consistently with the PKPA, providing that home state predominates). See also Glanzer v. State
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App.1992) (PKPA governs only enforcement
and treatment of concurrent proceedings).
129. Sheila L. on Behalf of Ronald M.M. v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210,219 (W. Va.
1995).
130. Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478-79 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987); Sheila L, 465
S.E.2d at 220; Sams v. Boston, 384 S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1989): "[T]he ... PKPA gives
distinct priority to the state court exercising 'home-state' jurisdiction to enter an initial
custody decree [over a state that bases its jurisdiction on a 'significant connection' and
'substantial evidence' test]. Therefore, the [PKPA] makes it judicially imprudent for a state court
in one state to exercise jurisdiction to enter an initial custody decree when a state court in another
state has 'home-state' jurisdiction and has not declined to exercise that jurisdiction; if conflicting
decrees were issued, only the custody decree of the 'home-state' court would be entitled to full faith
and credit ......
131. Kean v. Kean, 577 So. 2d 1152 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
132. Michalik v. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Wis. 1992); cf. Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d
6 (Ky. 1991); Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
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3. The PKPA, the UCCJA, and Preemption: PKPA Preemption When
State Law is Inconsistent-Supremacy Clause, Article 6, Clause
2 of the United States Constitution
Correlation of the UCCJA and the PKPA has confused some courts. The
PKPA determines which state court custody decisions are entitled to full faith
and credit under Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution.'33 The
extent to which the PKPA preempts the operation of a given state's UCCJA
presents an important issue.' The Supremacy Clause controls when there is
conflict."' Generally, if a state family law provision interferes with or causes
major damage to clear and substantial federal interests, the federal law will
preempt the specific state law."" Thus, if a state law frustrates the overall
purpose of the PKPA to encourage comity among states, it will be found to
violate the Supremacy Clause. 37  The United States Supreme Court, in
Maryland v. Louisiana,' provided guidelines for inquiry concerning the
Supremacy Clause. When a federal and a state law cover the same subject, have
the same purpose, and conflict, federal law preempts state law wherever there is
a conflict.'39 Federal law, therefore, requires interpretation consistent with its
provisions. Whenever serious discrepancies in application or interpretation arise,
they should be reversed.
Preemption is intended in interstate custody disputes only when there are
contradictory provisions or contradictory interpretations. The PKPA and UCCJA
have congruent purposes, so operation of state statutes will not usually produce
results inconsistent with the objectives of the federal law. One can hardly say
that the UCCJA, in promoting its purpose to eliminate inconsistencies among
133. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 1738A (1994); Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513; Davidson v.
Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
134. For more detailed analysis of PKPA preemption, see Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law,
supra note 1, Ch. 13, § 13.15; Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child
Custody Jurisdiction Disputes, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 885, 904 (1993).
135. U.S. Const. art.VI, § 2. See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180-87, 103 S.
Ct. 513, 516-20 (1988); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Archarnbault v.
Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Mass. 1990).
136. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d at 205 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979) (quoting U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
137. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Archambault, 555 N.E.2d at 207 (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at
516-20, 108 S. Ct. at 180-87).
138. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2128-29 (1981).
139. Id.; Thompson, 484 U.S. at 176, 108 S. Ct. at 515; Rogers v. Rogers, 907 P.2d 469 (Alaska
1995). See also Doucette v. Murray, No. 01541490, 1997 WL.381389, at 010 (Conn. Super. July
1, 1997); Delk v. Gonzalez, 658 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1995); In re Mott, 653 N.Y.S.2d 760,762 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997); Justice v. Justice, No. 96CA 11, 1996 WL 682199, at 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20,
1996); In re Henry, Nos. CAA8911 I, SC S43648, 1997 WL 799550, at 005-8 (Ore. Dec. 18, 1997);
Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tenn. 1993) (home state predominates over significant
connection); Young v. Smith, 939 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); In re Michalik, 494
N.W.2d 391, 395 (Wis. 1993).
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former state child custody jurisdiction law, in preventing child-snatching and
duplicative and continuous litigation, could be an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the concomitant objectives of Congress in the PKPA. Indeed, the essential
purpose of the PKPA is to ensure that there are no inconsistencies. Naturally,
where there is a conflict the PKPA prevails.'O Generally, the problem of
preemption does not arise, but the preemption perspective would require the
PKPA to control in cases of inconsistency with state law. Most cases attempt to
reach a decision that is consistent with both statutes.
Thus, although it may be said that technically the PKPA does not always
preempt, it certainly does so functionally. Given the PKPA's relationship with
the various state UCCJAs, the overriding purpose of the federal and state
statutory framework is "to prevent interstate competition and conflicts" relating
to child custody and related matters, among the various United States jurisdic-
tions. Thus, a state is required by the terms of the PKPA to enforce a sister
state's custody determination rendered in accordance with the PKPA and its own
UCCJA. A state has no authority to modify such an order, unless the sister state
loses jurisdiction or declines to exercise it.'' Although the PKPA makes this
clear, this is also the proper interpretation of the UCCJA as indicated by many
state courts.' After we analyze the basic jurisdictional scheme, we will
consider whether in personam jurisdiction or other constitutional protections
apply or whether the UCCJA suffices.
III. THE BASIC JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME-SOME DETAIL
A. The Nature of Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA: The UCCJA Provides
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and is the Exclusive Method of Obtaining It in
Child Custody Cases
Subject matter jurisdiction is required and may not be conferred by consent
of the parties. It is a truism that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear any case or issue an order. Although a party may submit voluntarily to
a court's jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction is derived from the Constitu-
tion and substantive law, so it cannot be conferred by consent or waiver"3 and
140. E.g., D.B. v. P.B., 692 So. 2d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Rivazfar v. Rivazfar, 653
N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
141. See. e.g., Puhlman v. Turner, 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1994); PKPA. 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(cX2XE) & (e) (1994).
142. E.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1332
(Fla. 1990). See also authority in Infra notes 233-286.
143. Zirmerman v. Newton, 569 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 n.4 (N.D. 1997); Cordic v. Cordie, 538
N.W.2d 214, 217 (N.D. 1995). See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3; Ex pane Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301,
1302 (Ala. 1991); McBride v. McBride, 688 So. 2d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Hopson v. Hopson,
168 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423 (Cal. CL App. 1992); Zierenberg v. Zierenberg, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238 (Cal. Ct
App. 1992); Muller v. Muller, 682 A.2d 1089 (Conn. Ct. App. 1996); Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659
So. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Dyer v. Surratt, 466 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Ga. 1996)
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a judgment issued by a court without proper jurisdiction is null." The
UCCJA, as impacted by the federal PKPA, provides the exclusive state
law source and method of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in
interstate child custody cases."' It is a judicial duty to examine subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte when the issue is not raised by the
litigants.'46 Absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the
trial court or the parties at any stage of the proceedings."" The PKPA
nullifies any inconsistent legislation or interpretation. 4' Neither confers
jurisdiction by stipulation, agreement, or consent of the parties or the court." 9
(UCCJA is the sole determinant of subject matter jurisdiction in interstate custody cases, but not for
issues of contempt); In re Hatcher, 505 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1993); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945,
947-48 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Hunt v. Hunt, 629 So. 2d 548, 551 (Miss. 1992); Blanco v.
Tonniges, 511 N.W.2d 555 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Columb v. Columb, 633 A.2d 689 (Vt. 1993).
A very limited number ofjurisdictions, however, allow waiver ofjurisdiction. Williams v. Williams,
16 Fain. L. Rptr. 1406 (July 3, 1990) (allowing waiver of jurisdiction). On the other hand,
appearance only to contest UCCJA jurisdiction does not submit a person to the general jurisdiction
of the court. McBride, 688 So. 2d at 859.
144. Fazio v. Fazio, 587 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Renno, 58OSo. 2d at947; La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3.
145. E.g., McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
860, 107 S. Ct. 207 (1986); Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983); Larson v. Dunn, 474
N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D. 1991) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties'
agreement, consent or waiver... ."); Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
See Barbara Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 369, 373-76
(1991); Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous Custody Determination
Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCA) or Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 83 A.L.R. 4th 742, 748 (1991); but see, Williams v. Williams,
555 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. 1990). Cf Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 345; Zierenberg, 16 Cal. Rptr. at
241; Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So. 2d 239, 242 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Renno, 580 So. 2d at 947;
Counts v. Bracken, 494 So. 2d 1275, 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (and Zenide v. Superior Court,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)); Walters v. Walters, 519 So. 2d 427 (Miss. 1988);
Edwards v. Edwards, No. CA-802 1, 1983 WL 2414 (Ohio Ct. App. May 3, 1983); Kirylik v. Kirylik,
357 S.E.2d 449 (S.C. 1987); cf. Hache v. Riley, 451 A.2d 971, 972-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div,.
1982); Kasperv. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law,
supra note 1, Ch. 13; Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States 1993-94, 28 Fam. L.Q. 573,
609-35 (1995).
146. Renno, 580 So. 2d at 947.
147. Cordie v. Cordie, 538 N.W.2d 214, 216 (N.D. 1995).
148. Cf. Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 345;Zierenberg, 16 Cal. Rptr. at241; Atkins, 623 SO.,2d at
242; Renno, 580 So. 2d at 947; Counts, 494 So. 2d at 1277 (and Zenide, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705);
Walters, 519 So. 2d 427; Edwards, 1983 WL 2414; Kirylik, 357 S.E.2d 449; cf Kasper, 792 P.2d
at 126; Hache, 451 A.2d at 972-73; Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, Ch. 13; Elrod,
supra note 145, at 609.
149. E.g, In re Hatcher, 505 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1993); Cordie, 538 N.W.2d at 216; Long v.
Long, 439 N.W.2d 523 (N.D. 1989); cf Dunn v. Dunn, 454 N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D. 1991). A minority
of jurisdictions have a "refined" (perhaps strained) perception of jurisdiction, although not without
some appeal. It has been argued that viewing the UCCJA as providing subject matter jurisdiction
is wrong and that if both parents consent, it ought to obtain. See Atwood, supra note 145, at 401.
In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the UCCJA jurisdiction is not subject matter, but
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Estoppel is not an. acceptable basis to establish subject matter jurisdic-
tion.I
°
B. The Jurisdictional Bases
The UCCJA establishes a system of concurrent and potentially conflicting
jurisdiction. The bases are hierarchical and continuing jurisdiction prevails. 5'
The law resolves potentially unending custody litigation by placing the bases of
jurisdiction (except for emergency) in descending preferential order,'52 and by
providing for virtually exclusive continuing jurisdiction in the original decree
state. "' In addition, to accommodate fairness and cooperation, mechanisms for
communication'"4 and for declining jurisdiction were included. 5 The key
to resolving conflicts of jurisdiction is to have a rigid hierarchy, but also to
include a mechanism for a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction, even if it
a "refinement of the ancillary capacity of a trial court to exercise authority over a particular case ...
subject to waiver." Williams, 555 N.E.2d at 145. An Illinois Appellate Court held that UCCJA
jurisdiction refers to the "legislature's discretionary limit upon the exercise of existing jurisdiction
and not to due process limits of subject matter or personal jurisdiction." Atwood, supra note 145,
at 375 (discussing In re Marriage of Slate, 536 N.E.2d 894, 896 (111. App. Ct. 1989)). Proponents
of these views seem to think that they promote children's interests, but this is doubtful, unless one
adds due process precepts to the mix, as discussed above and below.
150. Martin v. Martin, 545 So. 2d 666, 670 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
151. E.g., UCCJA, §§ 2, 3,6,12,13, 14,9 U.L.A. 133, 143-44,219-20,274, 276,292 (1988);
La. R.S. 13:1701, 1702, 1705, 1712, 1713 (1983); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 1738A, §§ (a)-(g) (1994).
152. Home state jurisdiction predominates over significant connection jurisdiction. Emergency
will trump either of those bases, but it is temporary. Finally, if no state has jurisdiction on the basis
of UCCJA rules, the state in which the child and a party are domiciled may assert it. Some courts
have claimed that there is no hierarchy, but they are clearly wrong on the face of the UCCJA itself
and certainly when it is read along with the PKPA. See authority infra at notes 166, 173, 183-192.
153. UCCJA §§ 13, 14,9 U.L.A. 276, 292 (1988); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (d) (1994). See,
e.g., McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Alaska 1996) (a court may not modify another state's
custody decree if the latter court retains jurisdiction); Kessenich v. Kessenich, No. FA-960532958,
1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11, 1996) (The fact that Connecticut had become the home
state and had most significant connection and most evidence were not sufficient for Connecticut
courts to modify a Michigan custody decree, where former husband continued to live in Michi-
gan-Michigan graciously declined jurisdiction resolving the problem.); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So.
2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Wilson v.
Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. CL App. 1996); G.S. .v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65, 68-71 (Okla. 1990); In
re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash.
1994); Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1070 (Wyo. 1992) ("'[H]ome state' status alone is not
sufficient to confer modification jurisdiction on a state that was not the original decree state when
one of the parties continues to reside in the original decree state"). But cf In re Henry & Keppel,
922 P.2d 712, 713-14 (Or. App. 1996) (The residence of one of the parties and exercise of visitation
rights are not sufficient to retain jurisdiction.).
154. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988) (communication); La. R.S. 13:1705 (1983); see, e.g.,
Kessenich, 1996 WL 383353, at 01; Renno, 580 So. 2d 945; Janik v. Janik, 542 So. 2d 615 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1989).
155. UCCJA §§ 7, 8, 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. 233, 251, 276, 292 (1988).
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is primary.' 56 If courts do what they ought to do, they will ask the families
whether there is any ongoing child custody litigation or whether there is any
indication that another state might have jurisdiction. The court should
communicate with its counterpart in the other state. 57  "Inconvenient fo-
rum,""8 and "unclean hands" (when a parent improperly or illegally removes
a child from a state or commits some other wrongful act) are important features
of the UCCJA, but they are not bases of jurisdiction." 9 Courts should decide
together which of the two ought to hear the case.
The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention apply only to those who
have a right to custody.'" The UCCJA and the PKPA each prescribe four
bases of jurisdiction: (1) home state; (2) significant connection, plus evidence
regarding the best interest of the child; (3) emergency; and (4) default
jurisdiction (no other state has jurisdiction or has declined it).' 6 This article
will consider each of these bases in detail."62 The bases may overlap, so
concurrent jurisdiction is common and conflicts of jurisdiction occur, often
causing difficulties.' 63
Although some language in various state UCCJAs is ambiguous, the
inference of a specific hierarchy is easily drawn. The PKPA makes it
absolutely clear.'" Many courts have recognized this hierarchy."' The
first jurisdictional basis is the "home state."'" Second is "significant
connection and substantial evidence." Next, when the child is present and
no other state has jurisdiction based on a law substantially similar to that
of the forum state, the latter has jurisdiction by default. Each of these
is trumped by emergency jurisdiction, although emergency jurisdiction is
156. E.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
157. Kricr v. Krier, 676 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (trial judge properly "conferred with
the Kansas district court judge, and [the] judge had agreed to dismiss any civil actions pending in
Kansas and to defer to the Alabama court... ."); Bryant v. Bryant, No. 307677, 1996 WL 150159
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1996).
158. E.g., La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983).
159. E.g., La. R.S. 13:1707 (1983).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(3)(I)(A) (1994) (ICARA referrring to Hague convention); Johnson v.
Johnson, 493 S.E.2d 668 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (UCCJA and PKPA); Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
supra note 9; In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1995) (considering Hague convention).
161. UCCJA § 2, 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(cX2)(A) (1994).
162. This is in § Ill, infra.
163. E.g., the "home state" may not be the same state as the one in which the parties have
"significant connections" and where there is "substantial evidence" about the child's best interest.
La. R.S. 13:1702 (Supp. 1997). See, e.g, In re Joseph D., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
In re Marriage of Alexander, 623 N.E.2d 921 (111. App. Ct. 1993); In re A.L.H., 630 A.2d 1288 (Vt.
1993).
164. Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
165. Renno, 580 So. 2d at 948; Stuart v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
166. In Louisiana, defined by La. R.S. 13:1701(5) (1983)..
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rare, temporary," 7 and requires extraordinary circumstances.168
1. Home State Jurisdiction
UCCJA section 2(5) defines "home state" as the state in which the child has
lived with his parents, parent, or person acting as parent (rightful custodian) for
the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the custody action
or, in the case of a child less than six months old, the state in which the child
lived from birth with any of the indicated parties."' The date for measuring
whether a state is home state is the date of the filing for custody. 7 ' "Tempo-
rary absences" do not count against the timing for "home state" status.171 The
UCCJA does not define "temporary absence," but state court decisions have
taken three approaches to determining whether an absence is temporary: length
of time, intent of the parties, and totality of the circumstances.' 2 Home state
167. E.g., Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 638-39 (Del. 1993); In re Marriage of Alexander,
623 N.E.2d at 923; Coleman v. Coleman, 493 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. CL App. 1992); D'Agnesse
v. D'Agnesse, 468 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
168. E.g., Murphy v. Danforth, 915 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Ark. 1996) (no permanent modification
should be made on basis of emergency; only for so long as it takes to travel with the child to proper
forum) (trial court corectly refused emergency jurisdiction); Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570, 575
(La. 1982); In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 726 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So.
2d 239 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Renno, 580 So. 2d at 949; In re J.L.H., 507 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1993); In re A.L.H. 630 A.2d 1288, 1291 (VL 1993) (permanent custody should not be
determined on the basis of emergency jurisdiction); Sheila L. on Behalf of Ronald M.M. v. Ronald
P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210 (W Va. 1995). See also Shook v. Shook, 651 So. 2d 6 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994);
McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1996) (emergency jurisdiction reserved for
extraordinary circumstances); Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 638 (Del. 1993); Benda v. Benda,
565 A.2d 1121, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 127, 128 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fain. L.Q. 203, 225-26 (1981) ("This special power to take
protective measures does not encompass jurisdiction to make permanent custody determinations or
to modify the custody decree of a court with continuing jurisdiction.") (Professor Bodenheier was
the rapporteur for the UCCJA).
169. UCCJA § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1702(AXI) (1983); Copas v. Copas, 687
So. 2d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
170. Bryant v. Bryant, No. 307677, 1996 WL 150159 (Conn. Super. CL Mar. 12, 1996)
(Connecticut court holds that Florida is now home state, where child has been gone from Connecticut
and is in Florida for several years); Lopez v. Lopez, 661 So. 2d 665, 667 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
171. UCCJA § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 133 (1988); see also S.M. v. A.S., 938 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App.
Ct. 1997) (holding that the court should apply a "totality of the circumstances" test to decide whether
the absence was temporary or not).
172. The three approaches are: (1) simply the length of absence (e.g., Marriage of Schoeffel,
644 N.E.2d 827, 829 (111. App. Ct. 1994)); (2) whether the parties intended the absence to be
temporary or permanent (Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Koons v.
Koons, 615 N.Y.S.2d 563, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994)); (3) whether the totality of the circumstances
indicate that the absence was temporary or permanent (S.M., 938 S.W.2d at 917; Jones v. Jones, 456
So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. Cir. App. 1984); Joselit v. Joselit, 544 A.2d 59, 63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
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jurisdiction is primary; it predominates over "significant connection" jurisdic-
tion. 7 ' On the other hand, home state jurisdiction does not arise if one parent
removes a child and fails to apprise the other parent of their whereabouts in




2. Significant Connection and Substantial Evidence: Second in
Preferential Rank
a. General
Physical presence of the child, although desirable, is not necessary to support
home state or significant connection jurisdiction.' Significant connection
jurisdiction applies only when maximum, rather than minimum, contacts
exist.'76 It is secondary to home state jurisdiction;177 if there is a home state,
significant connection jurisdiction may be asserted only if the home state
declines.' If, however, there is no home state and the state which rendered
the original custody decree has lost jurisdiction, the state with the most
significant connection and most substantial evidence will have jurisdiction. 79
The purpose of the. "significant connection" basis is to allow jurisdiction in a
state in which there is substantial contact with the child and evidence related to
the child's well-being. Thus, a home state may decline jurisdiction if it sees that
another state has more connection and better evidence to serve the decision and
the best interest of the child; or significant connection jurisdiction might obtain
in a previous home state, when a child has been moving around frequently and
there is no current home state; 80 or the child may have been in the forum state
for six months or more, but not with a person to whom the child's custody has
been awarded."8 ' But if the state which rendered the original custody decree
173. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 1783A (1994); La. R.S. 13:1702 (1983); Paulsen v. Paulsen, 928 P.2d
40, 42 (Idaho 1996); Ashburn v. Ashburn, 661 N.E.2d 39, 40-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Renno v.
Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); cf Fazio v. Fazio, 587 So. 2d 91, 95-96 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
174. Ashburn, 661 N.E.2d at 42; Miller v. Miller, 602 So. 2d 330, 334-35 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992).
175. La. R.S. 13:1702(AXI), (2) (1983).
176. Renno, 580 So. 2d at 948.
177. This is clear in the PKPA; see Bryant v. Bryant, No. 307677, 1996 WL 150159 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1996) (this basis is clearly second in rank); Renno, 580 So. 2d at 948 (citing §
1702(A)(2) and its Comment)..
. 178. See, e.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995) (Arizona declining jurisdiction and
Florida taking it).
179. Lalond v. Monschein, 673 So. 2d 1075, 1078 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (grandparents had
cared for the child for two years, no party lived in original decree state, and both significant
connection and substantial evidence were in Louisiana).
180. See, e.g., Guardianship of Gabriel W., 666 A.2d 505,508-09 (Me. 1995); Brown v. Brown,
847 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tenn. 1993).
18 1. See, e.g., Douglas v. Douglas, 528 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (child had been in
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has lost jurisdiction and no other state is home state, the state with the most
significant connection and most substantial evidence will have jurisdiction." 2
b. Home State Jurisdiction is Primary
The "significant connection" basis only applies when there is no "home
state.""' 3 Thus, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal was wrong to hold
that when both home state and significant connection jurisdiction obtain, a state
with the latter need not defer to the home state."' In this case, Louisiana was
the home state, but both Maine and Louisiana had "significant connections and
substantial evidence" regarding the child's best interest. Although it is quite
right that a court may decline jurisdiction under such circumstances and to defer
to the other state," it is incorrect to suggest that home state jurisdiction is not
predominant. Neither Maine law nor its courts could require Louisiana to
decline jurisdiction. The PKPA makes it clear that home state prevails, unless
that state defers to the other." 6 On the other hand, if the state which rendered
the original custody decree has lost or declined jurisdiction and no other state is
home state, the state with the most significant connection and most substantial
evidence will have jurisdiction." 7
The PKPA leaves no doubt that "home state jurisdiction" has priority. The
only exceptions are emergency jurisdiction and continuing jurisdiction, which is
retained by the state that rendered the original custody order,"' as long as one
party remains in that state, it has not relinquished jurisdiction, and its law
provides jurisdiction under the facts." 9 "Significant connection" jurisdiction
Louisiana for a significant amount of time, but with her grandmother, who had not been awarded
custody; Louisiana was not home state); La. R.S. 13:1701 (5) (1983). Guardianship of Gabriel W.,
666 A.2d at 508-09; Brown, 847 S.W.2d at 500; cf Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (UCCJA not applicable in custody dispute between parent and non-parent-this, of course,
must be only when the non-parent has no custodial interest).
182. Lalond v. Monschein, 673 So. 2d 1075. 1077 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (Grandparents had
cared for the child for two years, no party lived in original decree state, and both significant
connection and substantial evidence were in Louisiana.).
183. E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871 (N.J. 1982). cert. denied sub. nom. Angle v. Bowen, 459
U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 1203 (1983). See also Ashburn v. Ashbum, 661 N.E.2d 39,42 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996); Horlander v. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Renno v. Evans, 480 So.
2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
184. See Devillier v. Smith, 665 So. 2d 71, 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
185. See, e.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
186. Refer to the discussion of PKPA preemption and home state predominance accompanying
supra notes 133-142 and 183-192.
187. Lalond v. Monschein, 673 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (Grandparents had
cared for the child for two years, no party lived in original decree state, and both significant
connection and substantial evidence were in Louisiana.). "Default jurisdiction" is discussed in § Ill
B(4), infra.
188. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2)(E), (d) (1994); UCCJA §§ 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. 276, 292
(1988). See further discussion infra accompanying notes 189-192, 234-286 (continuing jurisdiction).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2)(E), (d) (1994). See, e.g., Brossoit v. Brossoit, 36 Cal. Ct. Rptr.
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is expressly available only when there is no home state or the decree state
declines or loses jurisdiction.'"e On this point, the West Virginia Supreme
Court noted:
[t]he Federal [PKPA]i gives distinct priority to the state court
exercising "home-state" jurisdiction to enter an initial custody
decree [over a state that bases its jurisdiction on a "significant
connection" and "substantial evidence" test].... Therefore, the
[PKPA] makes it judicially imprudent for a state court in one
state to exercise jurisdiction to enter an initial custody decree
when a state court in another state has "home-state" jurisdiction
and has not declined to exercise that jurisdiction; if conflicting
decrees were issued, only the custody decree of the "home-state"
court would be entitled to full faith and credit.... 9'
Where a child is living in a state with a person who has physical,
but not legal, custody, the state with the more substantial evidence about
the child's well-being is not the home state and does not have jurisdic-
tion. Although it might be the better place to decide custody, it would
not be able to take jurisdiction, unless the home state declines or has lost
it and there is no other state with jurisdiction.'92 This is one of the
circumstances in which the UCCJA and the PKPA may be unfair, unjust, and
harmful to the child.
2d 919,927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (abuse of discretion for trial court to decline to exercise jurisdiction
on the basis of California UCCJA); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993);
Cronin v. Camilleri, 648 A.2d 694 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1994) (court may decline jurisdiction on the
basis of the UCCJA.); Watkins v. Watkins, 462 S.E.2d 687, 688 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (The trial
court properly considered issues relating to parties' conduct, but findings did not support its decision
to relinquish jurisdiction.). But see recent incorrect interpretation (albeit dictum) of the Georgia
Supreme Court, in Garrett v. Garrett, 478 S.E.2d 584, 584-85 (Ga. 1996), which strained and
incorrectly read the PKPA and the UCCJA, because of the unjust and inappropriate results that derive
therefrom).
190. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (cX2XA), (E), (D) (1994); see, e.g., Blanco v. Tonniges, 511
N.W.2d 555 (Neb. 1994) (continuing jurisdiction of the original awarding state is exclusive and a
defect in the law does not allow parties unilaterally to waive jurisdiction, unless the court in the
decree state relinquishes it); Bowen v. Shurtliff, 629 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio CL App. 1993); Brown v.
Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1993); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1994) (Washington
courts retain modification jurisdiction, even though the party awarded custody moved to California
legally and properly some nine years earlier, thus, making California the "home state").
191. Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d 476,478-79 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987); Sheila L. on Behalf
of Ronald M.M. v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210, 220-21 (W. Va. 1995); Sams v. Boston, 384
S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1989).
192.. See La. R.S. 13:1702(AX2) (1983), and the clear language of the PKPA. See e.g., Krier
v. Krier, 676 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (jurisdiction to modify only when other state
declines or loses jurisdiction); In re Marshall, 663 N.E.2d 1113 (111. Ct. App. 1996) (jurisdiction
obtains when another state declines to exercise it). See also J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz.




a. What Constitutes an Emergency?
Emergency jurisdiction is available when it is necessary to protect a child,
present in the state, from abuse, threatened abuse, mistreatment or neglect.'93
An emergency was found, for example, where evidence consisted of the child's
testimony that the mother (living in Washington, with the child-home state; and
with most of the significant connection and evidence in Washington) was an
alcoholic. 9 ' It was shown that the mother drank to the point of intoxication
on a daily basis. She did not rise in the morning until after the children had
dressed themselves, prepared breakfast and left for school. She earned no
income. She often "borrowed" the eldest daughter's babysitting money. She
used foul language. She would not allow the children to attend church. She
usually left the children alone from 6:00 p.m. until midnight.'" A Louisiana
Court of Appeal heard testimony from a child's paternal grandparents and
paternal aunt that they had often seen unsanitary and filthy conditions in the
home. There was, some evidence of abuse and inattentive health care. This was
held sufficient for emergency jurisdiction in Louisiana. " On the other hand,
a finding on non-marital cohabitation is insufficient.'97
Child Abuse Proceedings: The UCCJA generally applies in child abuse
proceedings.'9 It was applied under a South Dakota Child Abuse Act when,
during his children's visit, a father brought an action after suspecting abuse by
their non-resident mother.'"
b. When May It Be Invoked-Dangers and Abuses?
Emergencyjurisdiction is important to protect children, but, unless courts are
careful, it is easily abused. When this basis is abused, children and parents are
193. UCCJA § 3(aX3), 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988); e.g., Minn.Stat. § 518A.03(IXc) (1990); cf.
Sarrajiwazwaz, No. C7-96-1533, 1997 WL 88940 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997); D'Agnese v.
D'Agnese, 468 S.E.2d 140, i44 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (mistreatment or abuse actual or threatened).
194. Stuart v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
195. Id. at 1280.
196. Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
197. In re MM., 474 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. CL App. 1996).
198. See, e.g., In re Shoshana B., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115. 120, 121 (Cal. CL App. 1995); G.B. v.
Arapahoe County Court, 890 P.2d 1153 (Colo. 1995); In re E.A. & N.A., 552 N.W.2d 135, 138
(Iowa 1996); Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24, 30-31 (Miss. 1991); Simons v. Montgomery County
Children's Servs., No. 16020, 1997 WL 102015 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1997); Zappitello v. Moses,
458 N.W.2d 784 (S.D. 1990); Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 723 n.12 (Utah CL App. 1990); but
see Orange County v. Roy T., 571 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that New
York's UCCJA specifically excludes state child protective proceedings).




abused. Two bases of jurisdiction require the physical presence of the child:
emergency jurisdiction and when no other state has jurisdiction.2 0° The
commissioners who wrote the model UCCJA emphasized that emergency
jurisdiction was meant to be applied only in serious emergencies: "[tihis
extraordinary jurisdiction is reserved for extraordinary circumstances." ''
Although the UCCJA authorizes use of "emergency powers in cases of genuine,
immediate, substantial, threatened physical [or sexual] harm to the child ...
those powers are limited . ..22 and temporary. ° ' Courts, of course, must
not take lightly allegations that a child is in danger, yet courts must be careful.
Extremely liberal application of emergency jurisdiction would be license to
unscrupulous would-be custodial parents to take their children and make false
allegations of emergency in a state in which a "satisfactory" custody decision
may result.2' Asserting jurisdiction on the unsubstantiated and self-serving
claim of emergency encourages the very evils that the UCCJA and the PKPA
were promulgated to combat. Thus, more than a conclusory allegation is
required."' Even if a court has doubts about the legitimacy of the claim of
emergency, once it decides that one exists and a foreign court has obtained
emergency jurisdiction, it must defer to that state's courts. 206 When there are
allegations that the child has been abandoned, neglected, abused, abandoned, or
threatened with harm, jurisdiction should be asserted to protect the child.20 7
The ease with which such allegations are made and their frequency in custody
disputes presents a dilemma. The frequency of false allegations and the fact that
expansive application of emergency jurisdiction erodes the anti-child-snatching
purposes of the law. To allow emergency jurisdiction to be abused would
200. La. R.S.13:1702(A)(3), (A)(4) (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2)(C), (D) (1994).
201. UCCJA § 3 (commissioners' note), 9 U.L.A. 124 (1988).
202. Murphy v. Danforth, 915 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Ark. 1996) (must be genuine emergency, may
only be temporary-enough time to travel with child to proper forum to seek permanent
modification); In re Shoshana B., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115. 120, 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Hafer
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)); Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544
N.W.2d 93, 99-100 (Neb. 1996); Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570, 575 (La. 1982).
203. E.g., Murphy, 915 S.W.2d at 702 (no permanent modification should be made on basis of
emergency; only for so long as it takes to travel with the child to proper forum); In re Shoshana B.,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120, 121; Flores v. Saunders, 674 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
In re M.M., 474 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. App. 1996); In re E.A. & N.A., 552 N.W.2d 135, 136, 138 (Iowa
1996); In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Dillon, 409 So. 2d at 575; Harris
v. Simmons, 676 A.2d 944, 950-51 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1996); S.L. v. R.C.M., 872 S.W.2d 573
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994); cf Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 949 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
204. See Ex Parte J.R.W., 667 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1994),-as modified, rev'don other grounds, 667
So. 2d 88 (Ala. 1995); Sheila L. on Behalf of Ronald M.M. v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210, 222
(W. Va. 1995).
205. Douglas v. Douglas, 528 So. 2d 699, 702 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
206. E.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 493. N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 474 A.2d 1124, 1128-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); cf D'Agnese v. D'Agnese, 468 S.E.2d
140, 144 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
207. UCCJA § 8(c), 9 U.L.A. 251 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1702(A)(3Xi), (ii) (1983).
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"thwart the very purposes for which the PKPA [and the UCCJA were enacted
and would] cause havoc... given the frequency with which allegations of abuse,
particularly allegations of sexual abuse, become part of child custody litiga-
tion. 20 s
Because it is so tempting for a parent to abduct a child, then to allege an
emergency or danger of imminent harm in an attempt to justify the act and to
obtain jurisdiction,20 ' it is important to construe emergency jurisdiction
carefully and rigorously. One jurisprudential attempt at solution has been to
require that any alleged emergency be serious, significant, immediate, and based
on credible evidence2' 0 Also, jurisdiction is temporary. It must be asserted at
the time there is a danger to the child21' and applies only if and when the child
208. Ex Parte J.R.W., 667 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1994), as modified, rev'd on other grounds, 667 So.
2d 88 (Ala. 1995); Lemond v. Lemond, 413 N.E.2d 228, 245 (Ind. 1980) (per curiam) ("Only where
there is substantial evidence, not simply conclusory assertions of an emergency, can emergency
jurisdiction ... be [properly] invoked."); Sheila L, 465 S.E.2d at 222; David C. Minneman,
Annotation, Abandonment and Emergency Jurisdiction of the Court under § 3(a)(3) of the UCCJA
and the PKPA, 5 A.L.R. 4th 788, 806-07 (1992).
209. E.g., Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24,29 (Miss. 1990) (noting that it was well aware of "the
national problem of interstate parental child kidnapping ... [and, therefore, has] strongly enjoined
that our chancery courts turn a deaf ear to the pleas of those who wrongfully bring children into this
state") (citing Laskosky v. Laskosky, 504 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1987); Owens v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d
231, 239, 243, 245-46 (Miss. 1985), among other cases). Curtis held that bringing a child into
Mississippi in contravention of a valid out-of-state custody decree prevents the timing of"home state"
jurisdiction to begin and also requires that the evidence of "significant connection" and well-being
of the child be extant as of the time the child was brought to the state. Curtis, 574 So. 2d at 30.
210. See, e.g., Murphy v. Danforth, 915 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Ark; 1996) (must be genuine
emergency, may only be temporary--enough time to travel with child to proper forum to seek
permanent modification); Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570, 575 (La. 1982); Curtis, 574 So. 2d at
31 (error to continue to exercise jurisdiction after it became apparent that there was no clear and
present danger to children); Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d 93, 99-100 (Neb. 1996)
(emergency jurisdiction limited and temporary, designed to protect the child from abuse); Curtis v.
Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 723 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emergency jurisdiction continues only so long as
to find proper forum); In re A.LH., 630 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993) (emergency jurisdiction continues
only so long as to find proper forum).
211. E.g., Murphy, 915 S.W.2d at 702 (holding that no permanent modification should be made
on basis of emergency; only for so long as it takes to travel with the child to proper forum); In re
Shoshana B., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 120, 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); In re E.A. & N.A., 552 N.W.2d
135, 138 (Iowa 1996); Dillon, 409 So. 2d at 575; In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 726-27 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1995); Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d
945,949 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); J.L.H. v. J.H., 507 N.W.2d 641 (Neb. CL App. 1993); In re A.L.H.,
630 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993) (permanent custody should not be determined on the basis of emergency
jurisdiction); Sheila L, 465 S.E.2d 210. See also Shook v. Shook, 651 So. 2d 6 (Ala. Civ. App.
1994); McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 1996) (emergency jurisdiction reserved for
extraordinary circumstances); Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 638 (Del. 1993); Nelson v. Nelson,
433 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Bendav. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989); D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 127, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bodenheimer,
supra note 168, at 225-26 ("This special power to take protective measures does not encompass
jurisdiction to make permanent custody determinations or to modify the custody decree of a court with
continuing jurisdiction."). But see Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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has urgent, immediate, and serious needs requiring assertion of jurisdiction."
It obtains until arrangements are made to allow the state with home state or
significant connection jurisdiction to hear the case, so long as that is consistent
with the well-being of the child." 3 In these limited circumstances emergency
jurisdiction will trump all the others.
Jurisdiction is retained by the state that had jurisdiction in the first place,
even if there is an emergency. 1 4 The other state takes temporary jurisdiction,
to be applied until arrangements can be made to protect the child for the
litigation to occur where the evidence of the conduct and the child's best interest
exists." Courts, therefore, should strictly construe the emergency jurisdiction
provision2' and apply it sparingly." 7 The Colorado Supreme Court noted:
212. Renno, 580 So. 2d at 949 (citing Dillon, 409 So. 2d 570). See also other authority in supra
note 119.
213. See e.g., Dillon, 409 So. 2d 570; Atkins, 623 So. 2d 239; Renno, 580 So. 2d at 949; Stuart
v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); J.L.H. v. J.H., 507 N.W.2d 641 (Neb. CL App.
1993); In re A.LH., 630 A.2d 1288 (VL 1993) (permanent custody should not be determined on the
basis of emergency jurisdiction); Sheila L, 465 S.E.2d 210. See also Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d
634, 638 (Del. 1993); Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1124 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 127, 128 (Utah CLt. App. 1990); Bodenheimer, supra note 168. at
225 ("This special power to take protective measures does not encompass jurisdiction to make
permanent custody determinations or to modify the custody decree of a court with continuing
jurisdiction.") (Professor Bodenheimer was the rapporteur for the UCCJA).
214. See, e.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Kelly v. Gervais, 567
So. 2d 593 (La. 1990).
215. E.g., Ex Parte J.R.W., 667 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1994), as modfied, rev'd on other grounds, 667
So. 2d 88 (Ala. 1995); Lemond v. Lemond, 413 N.E.2d 228, 246 n.15 (Ind. 1980); E.H. v. Marion
County Dept. of Public Welfare, 612 N.E.2d 174, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Sheila L, 465 S.E.2d
210; Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 723 (Utah CL App. 1990).
216. E.g. Severo P. v. Donald Y, 490 N.Y.S.2d 439, 444 (N.Y. Fain. CL 1985) (the UCCJA
in the area of emergency jurisdiction will be strictly construed; "[lIt must be shown that the child will
be harmed physically or emotionally if jurisdiction is not exercised .... ).
217. KLW v. TWC, 586 So. 2d 4 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d Ii,
15 (Colo. 1980) (child's hyperactivity and adjustment disorder, without evidence of physical or
emotional abuse, did not warrant emergency jurisdiction); Nelson v. Nelson, 433 So. 2d 1015, 1018
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986); Milenkovic v. Milenkovic, 416 N.E.2d 1140, 1146 (I1. App. Ct. 1981)
(example of proper exercise of emergency jurisdiction, wherein father had shot and killed mother
during pendency of divorce action, and court awarded temporary custody to a neighbor); Piedimonte
v. Nissen, 817 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Hache v. Riley, 451 A.2d 971, 975 (NJ. 1982)
(emergency jurisdiction confers only a temporary jurisdiction to make protective measures); Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 458 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) ("The 'emergency' basis for acquiring
jurisdiction requires that the petitioner demonstrate that the subject child will somehow suffer
emotionally or physically if jurisdiction is not exercised."); Magers v. Magers, 645 P.2d 1039, 1042
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (court properly affirmed the action of the trial court in assuming emergency
jurisdiction and granting the father temporary custody on condition that he file an action in Texas,
where the alleged abuse occurred); Sheila L. on Behalf of Ronald M.M. v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d
210 (W. Va. 1995); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); In re A.E.H., 468
N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1991). Justice Calogero of the Louisiana Supreme Court summarized use of the
emergency jurisdiction as follows: "We construe this emergency provision as permitting a state,
otherwise without jurisdiction over a visiting child or her non-resident mother, to take jurisdiction
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"[t]he exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction should be limited to those cases
where there is substantial evidence of a grave emergency affecting the immediate
welfare of the child.... Generally, judicial relief in such cases should not
extend beyond the issuance of temporary protective orders pending the
application to the court of the rendering state for appropriate modification of the
custody decree." ''
Of course, courts must take care to protect children within their borders.
Thus, some jurisdictions construe the emergency provision liberally, focusing
attention on the potentially dire consequences of declining jurisdiction."' If
it turns out that no emergency actually existed jurisdiction should be relinquished
in deference to the home state or the state of the initial award.220 Notwith-
standing a correct decision by a lower court to assume emergency jurisdiction to
protect a child, it is error to exercise subject matter jurisdiction after it should
reasonably have become apparent that there was no longer any clear and present
danger to the children that could arise from permitting adjudication in the courts
of the state that issued the initial custody decree.2"'
Courts in states facing a potential emergency should contact their counter-
parts in sister states to discuss the proper place to protect the children. Attention
should be focused on certain factors: (1) whether another state is or recently had
been the child's home state; (2) whether another state has a closer connectioh
with the child and his or her family or with the child and one or more of the
contestants; (3) whether substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily
available in another state; (4) whether the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate; and (5) whether the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court of this state would contravene any of the purposes of the UCCJA.22
in a custody matter only if the immediate needs of the child require it because the child has been
abandoned or otherwise mistreated, abused, or neglected." Dillon, 409 So. 2d at 575. See generally
Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, §§ 13.11, 13.17.
218. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. 1980) (citations omitted).
219. Curtis, 789 P.2d at 723.
220. Id.
221. See id. The Court also held that the courts have no power under the Protection From
Domestic Abuse Act to render decisions inconsistent with the UCCJA. See also Murphy v. Danforth,
915 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Ark. 1996) (explaining that no permanent modification to a custody order
should be made on the basis of emergency; only for so long as it takes to travel with the child to the
proper forum) (The trial court correctly refused emergency jurisdiction.); Dillon, 409 So. 2d at 575;
In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So. 2d 239 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1993); Renno, 580 So. 2d at 949; In re J.L.H., 507 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Neb. Ct. App.
1993); In re A.L.H. 630 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Vt. 1993) (permanent custody should not be determined
on the basis of emergency jurisdiction); Sheila L, 465 S.E.2d at 223. See also Shook v. Shook, 651
So. 2d 6 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Alaska 1996) (emergency
jurisdiction reserved for extraordinary circumstances); Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 638 (Del.
1993); Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1124 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Kasper v. Kasper,
792 P.2d I18, 127, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bodenheimer, supra note 168, at 225-26.
222. Renno, 580 So. 2d at 948.
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c. Where Must the Emergency Exist?
In 1982, the Louisiana Supreme Court suggested in dicta that an
emergency condition must exist in the asylum state, before the emergency
jurisdiction will allow Louisiana to hear the case. 23  The Louisiana
Supreme Court has since modified this position somewhat.2  In 1985,
it deemed the provision for emergency jurisdiction applicable when "the
child is physically present in this state and has been subjected to
mistreatment or abuse which necessitates the exercise of emergency
jurisdiction," and "aprima facie case supporting the exercise of jurisdiction
has been established." '225 In 1990, it held that a "Louisiana court
normally would not have jurisdiction based on mistreatment of the child
which occurred in Canada.. .. However, if the situation is so extreme
that the immediate safety of the child is threatened by a return to
Canada, then the Louisiana court has jurisdiction to take evidence to this
limited extent. .226
d. Emergency Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack
Can a parent in one state collaterally attack, in that state, the decision
of a court in a sister state to assert emergency jurisdiction? A Minnesota
Court of Appeal held that a domiciliary of Minnesota, the home state of
the child, has the authority to question whether a Louisiana trial court
properly exercised emergency jurisdiction.227 A collateral attack, however,
is limited only to a finding that the matter of jurisdiction was fully and
fairly litigated and finally decided in the court that originally rendered the
decision. 2 1s
223. Dillon, 409 So. 2d at 575. Other states have adopted this position as well. See
Nelson v. Nelson, 433 So. 2d 1015, 1017-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). But see Stuart v.
Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277, 1282 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Blakesley, supra note 112, at 308-
16.
224. Kelly v. Gervais, 567 So. 2d 593, 594 (La. 1990).
225. Burr v. Boone, 477 So. 2d 692 (La. 1985) (noting that, "[u]nlike the hypothetical situation
described . .. in Dillon v. Medellin, [supra] ... , a prima facie case supporting the exercise of
jurisdiction has been established.").
226. Kelly, 567 So. 2d at 594 (citing Stuart v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987),
and limiting Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982) to situations in which a child is not in
need of immediate protection)); Renno, 580 So. 2d at 949.
227. Nazar v. Nazar, 474 N.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
228. J.D:S. v. J.L.S. v. Superior Court, 893 P.2d 749, 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Conteras, J.,
dissenting) (citing Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life, 455 U.S. 691, 102 S.
Ct. 1357 (1982)). Cf Chaddick v. Monopoli, 677 So. 2d 347,349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Harris,
J., concurring) (collateral attack ofjurisdictional decision per UCCJA is precluded, even though the
ruling may be erroneous on the facts and law). J.D.S. was vacated for other reasons. See Sturgill
v. Franks, No. CV-94-01488-SA/PR, 1994 WL 718861 (Ariz. June 29, 1994).
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e. Emergency Jurisdiction and the PKPA
The PKPA provides for emergency jurisdiction in an initial custody
situation,229 but not for actions to modify extant custody orders, when one of
the parties remains in the state that rendered the original order." ° This is
consistent with the idea that emergency jurisdiction is temporary.231' A court
may not modify an extant custody order, even if it has emergency jurisdiction,
unless it satisfies the two prongs of the PKPA modification test: (1) the second
(forum) state must have jurisdiction as would permit it to make an initial custody
determination; and (2) the first state must have lost or deferred its jurisdic-
tion.12 This is consistent with and reinforces the UCCJA rule that emergency
jurisdiction is temporary.
4. Default or "Vacuum" Jurisdiction- When No Other State Has
Jurisdiction or Has Relinquished It
The fourth basis ofjurisdiction also requires the child's presence in the state.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1702(A)(4) provides: "[1f it appears that no other
229. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (cX2XC) (1994), provides that "[a) child custody determination
made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if--) such court
has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and (2) one of the following conditions is met: ... (C)
the child is physically present ... and ... it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child."
230. E.g., KLW v. TWC, 586 So. 2d 4, 4-5 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (holding that the Alabama
courts are bound by the PKPA to enforce a sister state's custody determination rendered consistently
with the PKPA, and that Alabama has no authority to modify such an order, even when there is
evidence of an emergency, because "the PKPA does not recognize an emergency as granting
modification authority."); Stanley v. State, 567 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) ("[tlhe PKPA
does not recognize an emergency as granting modification authority; rather, it expressly states that
a sister state's judgment can only be modified as provided in § 1738A(f)").
231. See e.g., In re S.L., A.C., D.C., R.A. & L.P. v. R.M.C., 872 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. CL App.
1994); cf. Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 950 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (emergency jurisdiction
would be approved based on extreme circumstances, but temporary, and trial court should have
communicated with "home state," Michigan, to decide which court would be preferable); Breneman
v. Breneman, 284 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (after child's testimony of beatings
established emergency jurisdiction, the court went beyond issuing a temporary order and changed
custody permanently to petitioning father); Nazar, 474 N.W.2d 206 (holding that a Minnesota Court
can question the Louisiana court's assertion of emergency jurisdiction, but not if established
emergency jurisdiction is valid); Vorpahl v. Lee, 298 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) ('The
trial court... based its exercise of jurisdiction on sec. 822.03(lXc). This section provides that if
a child is physically present in the state and is, in some way, neglected or dependent, the court may
assume jurisdiction. In the present case, the trial court correctly determined that it could exercise
jurisdiction under this section. Because of the mother's abduction of them, both children were present
in this state and were placed in need of the court's intervention to determine the question of custody
and to provide for their protection. Furthermore, the alleged instances of abuse, which occurred in
their father's home, supports the trial court's finding that the children were neglected and
dependent.").
232. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (0 (1994); Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 722-25 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). This is discussed in detail below.
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state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with
Paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court
assume jurisdiction." '
C. Continuing Jurisdiction and Default Jurisdiction
1. The Nature and Primacy of Continuing Jurisdiction
The state in which the original custody order was rendered retains
jurisdiction, as long as a party (contestant) remains there and minimal contacts
with the child continue, unless and until it either relinquishes or loses jurisdiction
under its own laws." 4 The PKPA has been held by the United States Supreme
Court to require state courts to give full faith and credit to custody decrees of
sister states, so long as the decree to be enforced has been entered in compliance
with the PKPA.)S A decree entered upon a statute inconsistent with the PKPA
or the UCCJA, or rendered without considering those acts or inconsistently with
them, is not owed full faith and credit. 3' Once a court of one state renders a
custody decree consistent with these acts, there are only limited exceptions
permitting another state to modify that decree.237 Modification is possible only
233. See, e.g., Dillon v. Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570, 575 (La. 1982); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 653 So.
2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
234. Id. at 741-43; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(cX2XA), (E), (d) (1994). see also D.B. v. P.B., 692 So.
2d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Murphy v. Woemer, 748 P.2d 749, 750-51 (Alaska 1988); Blanco v.
Tonniges, 511 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Neb. 1994) (continuing jurisdiction of the original awarding state
is exclusive and a defect in the law does not allow parties unilaterally to waive jurisdiction, unless
the court in the decree state relinquishes it); Ganz v. Rust, 690 A.2d 1113, 1118 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997) (the PKPA has been held by the United States Supreme Court to require state courts
to give full faith and credit to custody decrees of sister states, so long as the decree to be enforced
has been entered in compliance with the PKPA); Bowen v. Shurtliff, 629 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993); Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1993); G.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65, 68-71 (Okla.
1990); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1994) (holding that Washington courts retain
modification jurisdiction, even though the party awarded custody moved to California legally and
properly some nine years earlier, thus, making California the "home state."); Michalik v. Michalik,
494 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Wis. 1992). Cf. Lalonde v. Monschein, 673 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (La. App. 3d
Cir.) (stating that jurisdiction of state which rendered initial decree is lost when all parties have left
the state), reversed without explanation, Lolonde v. Monschein, 675 So. 2d 1061 (1996) (if no other
state has jurisdiction, this reversal seems incorrect); Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1991);
Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). Their laws must be consistent with the
UCCJA and the PKPA.
235. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 176, 108 S. Ct. 51 3,514 (1988); Ganz v. Rust, 690
A.2d 1113, 1118 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1997).
236. Ganz, 690 A.2d at 1117; cf Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,110-11,84 5. Ct. 242, 244-45
(1963) (stating that a decision or order made without subject matter jurisdiction may be collaterally
attacked). •
237. UCCJA § 14,9 U.L.A. 292 (1988). See, e.g., Kessenich v. Kessenich, No. FA 960532955,
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if the decree state has lost or relinquished jurisdiction. " UCCJA sections 13
and 14239 make this clear and the PKPA reinforces this rule. ° Jurisdiction
is lost if, at the time the action to modify is filed, none of the jurisdictional
prerequisites of the Act can be met.241' A state does not automatically lose
jurisdiction when it ceases to be the home state. 42 If one parent continues to
reside in the original decree state, it retains jurisdiction.2 3 As long as jurisdic-
tion has not been broken by wrongful conduct such as failing to exercise
visitation privileges or wrongfully retaining the child and is not relinquished by
state law or courts, the decree state retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction to
modify its custody decree. " A state may decline jurisdiction when another
1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June I 1, 1996); Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1991).
238. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 173SA(cXl), (d) (1994); UCCJA §§ 13, 14,9 U.LA. 276 (1988); La.
R.S. 13:1712 (1983) (recognition of sister state custody decrees); La. R.S. 13:1713 (1983)
(modification). E.g, Puhiman v. Turner, 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1994); Kessenich, 1996 WL 383353,
at *1 (fact that Connecticut had become home state and had more significant connection and
substantial evidence, was not enough to displace Michigan jurisdiction, when one party remained in
the latter state--Michigan graciously declined jurisdiction, however); Hazzard v. Ladurini, 691 So.
2d 12. 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("Idaho hs not determined that its continued jurisdiction is no
longer appropriate. No other Idaho statute has been cited.. . which terminates jurisdiction, and we
find no jurisdiction terminated by operation of the PKPA. . . . [W]e conclude that the trial court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction."); O.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65, 68-71 (Okla. 1990); Liska v.
Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (Utah CL App. 1995). q. Lyon v. Lyon, 618 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992); Garrett v. Garrett, 478 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1996); Henderson v. Justice, 478 S.E.2d 434,436 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Shadwick, 601
So. 2d 371,372-73 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992); Gay v. Morrison, 511 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1108 (1987); Payne v. Weker. 917 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo. Ct App. 1996)
(explaining that state retains jurisdiction where one parent continues to reside there--it loses
jurisdiction generally, when all parties have been gone for more than six months).
239. E.g., La. R.S. 13:1712, 1713 (1983).
240: PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994).
241. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. I 1738A(cXl), (d) (1994).
242. Ganz v. Rust, 690 A.2d 1113. 1117 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1997).
243. Id.
244. See La. R.S. 13:1702(AX3Xii) (1983); Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1996); McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Alaska 1996) (court may not modify
another state's custody decree if the latter court retains jurisdiction); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d
1327, 1331-32 (Fla. 1990); Rohlfs v. Rohlfs, 666 So. 2d 568, 570-71 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996);
Stuart v. Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Payne v. Weker, 917 S.W.2d 201, 204
(Mo. CL App. 1996) (explaining that the state retains jurisdiction where one parent continues to
reside there); Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Neb. 1996); Jackson-Ordia v. Ordia,
638 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (N.Y. Court must defer to Massachusetts' continuing
jurisdiction, per UCCJA and PKPA); Wilson v. Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); G.S.
v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 65, 68-71 (Okla. 1990); Dangler v. Dangler, No. 01-A-01-9504-CV00169, 1996
WL 93765 (Tenn. CL App. Mar. 6, 1996); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994).
Q. State v. Marshall Superior Court, 644 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ind. 1994) (stating that the court that issued
original custody order continues to have jurisdiction, preventing any other court from taking action
that would dislodge that jurisdiction or modify any of its decrees); Fuge v. Uiterwyk. 653 So. 2d 707
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44. 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting a
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state becomes home state, especially when it has been home state for a
significant period of time.245
Some courts have misconstrued the law.246 Some have held, for example,
that the UCCJA allows a court to modify another state's custody order if it has
become home state. 47 The language of the UCCJA is not as clear on this
point as that of the PKPA, discussed below, but it is clear enough. Section 13
provides that: "[T]he courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an initial
or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction
under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act .... 248
Section 14 elaborates: "(a) [I]f a court of another state has made a custody
decree, a court of this State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to
the court of this State that the court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under Uurisdictional rules substantially similar to the UCCJA]
or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of
this State has jurisdiction.... ." The Commentary to Section 14 states that "[i]n
order to achieve greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid forum
shopping,... other states will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the court
of another state as long as that state has jurisdiction under the standards of this
Act. In other words, all petitions for modification are to be addressed to the
prior state if that state has sufficient contact with the case to satisfy [the UCCJA
jurisdictional requirements] ..."'"
The PKPA makes the preeminence of continuing jurisdiction quite clear.
Maximum rather than minimum contacts with the state are required by the
UCCJA for initial custody awards.25 On the other hand, to retain exclusive
jurisdiction to modify the decree, minimum or slight contact with the state is all
"strong bias" toward allowing the state in which a decree has been entered to retain jurisdiction)
(citing Davis v. Davis, 281 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1981)). It is mandatory under the PKPA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(d) (1994), as noted by the concurring opinion in Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44. Shiver v. Shiver,
No. C-950239, 1995 WL 757838 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1995) (the issuing state retains jurisdiction
where it remains the residence of the child or one of the contestants); Kessenich v. Kessenich, No.
FA-960532955, 1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11, 1996) (stating that the fact that
Connecticut had become the home state and had the more significant connection and most evidence
were not sufficient for Connecticut courts to modify a Michigan custody decree, where former
husband continued to live in Michigan-Michigan graciously declined jurisdiction resolving the
problem). But cf In re Henry & Keppel, 922 P.2d 712, 713-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the
residence of one of the parties and exercise of visitation rights are not sufficient to retain
jurisdiction).
245. Ganz, 690 A.2d at 1117.
246. See, e.g., Kean v. Kean, 577 So. 2d 1152 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991) (holding that PKPA did
not apply because there had been no abduction).
247. See, Coombs, supra note 122, at 2398.
248. UCCJA § 13, 9 U.L.A. 276 (1988).
249. UCCJA § 14,9 U.L.A. 292 (1988); see application in J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz.
1995) (Arizona declining jurisdiction and Florida taking it).
250. E.g., UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 143 (1988); compare La. R.S. 13:1702 cmt. (1983). McDow
v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Alaska 1996).
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that is required."' The PKPA is even more explicit, clearly delimiting the
circumstances under which a court may modify another state's custody
decree.52 The PKPA creates a general rule similar to that found -in the
UCCJA, but more clearly indicated.
Jurisdiction over custody, therefore, is retained by the initial awarding court,
so that a petition for modification will be possible.5 Preeminence of continu-
ing jurisdiction is required by the PKPA and reinforced by the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution." The PKPA's language is more specific
than that of the UCCJA in limiting modification jurisdiction. The PKPA clearly
eliminates the possibility of concurrent application or dueling jurisdiction by
conferring exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the state which rendered the
initial decree.2" It provides: "[t]he jurisdiction of a court of a State which has
made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this
section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section
[requiring that the law of that state continue to provide jurisdiction consistent
with the PKPA] continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the
child or of any contestant.
2 56
Jurisdiction to modify is determined at the time of filing the motion. The
PKPA explicitly provides that jurisdiction continues in the state where the initial
custody order was rendered in compliance with the PKPA, as long as the child
or any contestant continues to live in that state and that state's law or courts do
not relinquish jurisdiction. 5 7  For retention of jurisdiction, the state's laws
must so provide in conformity with the PKPA. 2"8  The PKPA provides that a
"child custody determination" is consistent with the PKPA, if (1) the court
rendering it has jurisdiction under its own laws, and (2) one of the following
conditions exist: "(A) such state (i) is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or ... (E) the court has continuing
jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) ... ." Thus, if a state has jurisdiction
under its own law [1738A(c)(1)], and has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to
251. Compare UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988) with La. R.S. 13:1713 (1983).
252. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994); McDowv. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049,1052-53 (Alaska
1996); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994).
253. See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:1713 (1983) (initial or modification jurisdiction); PKPA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(d) (1994).
254. U.S. Const art. 6, cl. 2.
255. E.g., McDow, 908 P.2d 1049; Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991);
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118. 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
256. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (d) (1994). See, e.g., Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1070
(Wyo. 1992) ("(H]ome state status alone is not sufficient to confer modification jurisdiction on a state
that was not the original decree state when one of the parties continues to reside in the original
decree state.").
257. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (cX2XE), (d) (1994); McDow, 908 P.2d 1049 and authority
cited therein.
258. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(AXC)(1) (1994); Billingsley v. Billingsley, No. 96-3028, 1997
WL 136551, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1997) (Ifa court has taken jurisdiction in a manner
inconsistent with the UCCJA or PKPA, another state that properly has jurisdiction may assert it).
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subsection (d), as required by 1738A(c)(2)(E), any order issued by that state is
consistent with the PKPA, and is entitled to full faith and credit." 9 No state
may usurp jurisdiction and modify an extant custody order while the original
rendering state retains jurisdiction .21 The Louisiana UCCIA states: "[a) court
of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction
to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree .. ."6
Once a state exercises jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of the PKPA,
no other state may exercise jurisdiction,262 even if it would have been empow-
ered to take jurisdiction in the first instance; all states must accord full faith and
credit to the first state's custody decree.263 The effect of PKPA, sections
1738A(d) and 1738A(f), is to limit custody jurisdiction to the first state to
properly enter a custody order, so long as the above-noted two sets of require-
264ments are met.
Continuing jurisdiction is an essential part of the jurisdictional scheme.
Thus, PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) provides, "[t]he appropriate authorities of
every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as
provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another state."
Section 1738A(b)(3) provides further: "[c]ustody determination means a
judgment, decree or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation
259. Michalik v. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Wis. 1993) (citing Blakesley). Cf Back v.
Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991); Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). Cf
Lewis v. Lewis, 930 P.2d 770, 774 (Nev. 1997) ("Although California courts are undoubtedly
qualified to handle motions to modify child custody which were originally entered in another
jurisdiction.... continuing jurisdiction [in Nevada] over the present child custody matter [furthers)
the UCCJA's goals.") (citing UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988) and Bodenheimer, supra note 168,
at 214).
260. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (cX2XA), (E), (e) (1994); Murphy v. Woemer, 748 P.2d 749,
750-51 (Alaska 1988); Blanco v. Tonniges, 511 N.W.2d 555 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Wilson v.
Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44,46 (N.C. CL App. 1996); Shiver v. Shiver, No. C-950239, 1995 WL 757838
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1995); Boehn v. Shurtliff, 629 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993);
Brown v. Brown,. 847 S.W.2d 496,501 (Tenn. 1993); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024, 1032-33
(Wash. 1994) (Washington courts retain modification jurisdiction, even though the party awarded
custody moved to California legally and properly some nine years earlier, thus, making California
the "home state."); Michalik v. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Wis. 1993). Cf Vick v. Vick, 675
So. 2d 1324 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991); Cann, 850 S.W.2d
at 59. See also Lewis v. Lewis, 930 P.2d 770 (Nev. 1997) ("Although the California courts are
undoubtedly qualified to handle motions to modify child custody which were originally entered in
another jurisdiction .... continuing jurisdiction [in Nevada] over the present child custody matter
[furthers] the UCCJA's goals.") (citing UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988) and Bodenheimer, supra
note 168, at 214); Helen Donigan, Child Custody Jurisdiction: New Legislation Reflects Public Policy
Against Parental Abduction, 19 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1983).
261. La. R.S. 13:1702(A) (1983).
262. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d at 394.
263. Id. at 395 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 177, 108 S. Ct. 513, 515 (1988);




of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and
modifications...., 65  In other words, each state's courts owe full faith and
credit to the other state's custody orders made in accordance with the UCCJA
and the PKPA.266
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently held that: "[u]nder the combined
impact of [the UCCJA and the PKPA], the [Alaska court] may not modify the
Washington custody decree if the Washington court which issued it retains
[jurisdiction]. 267 The Court also correctly applied Washington law to deter-
mine whether Washington retained jurisdiction.268 Similarly, the Washington
Supreme Court held that a "court which enters a child custody decree continues
to have jurisdiction to modify that decree so long as one of the parties remains
in the state and so long as the child's contact with the state continues to be more
than slight., 269 The UCCJA has "a strong presumption that the decree state
will continue to have modification jurisdiction until it loses all or almost all
connection with the child. ' 270 It was insufficient to displace a Michigan court's
continuing jurisdiction, even where Connecticut had become home state and had
the most significant connection and most substantial evidence.27" '
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1712 and 1713 are typical promulgations of
UCCJA articles 13 and 14, pertaining to recognition and modification of other
state custody decrees, and correspond to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) and (f) [the
PKPA]. A court shall not exercise jurisdiction if there is a proceeding pending
or likely to become pending in another state, so long as it appears that the court
exercising jurisdiction is doing so properly under each act.2" This rule is
265. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (bX3), (0) (1994); see also Vick v. Vick, 675 So. 2d 1324
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
266. Rivazfar v. Rivazfar, 653 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
267. McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Alaska 1996) (citing Wanamaker v. Scott,
788 P.2d 712, 715 (Alaska 1990) ("Under the [PKPAI a non-decree state court may not modify a
custody order as long as the decree state has jurisdiction.")).
268. McDow, 908 P.2d at 1051 ("[w]hether the Washington court still has jurisdiction to modify
its decree is necessarily a question of Washington law (citing Bock v. Bock, 824 P.2d 723, 724
(Alaska 1992)).
269. Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024,1027 (Wash. 1994). See also Kumar v. Superior Court,
652 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Cal. 1982); Bodenheimer, supra note 168, at 214-15.
270. Greenlaw, 869 P.2d at 1033 (quoting Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Cal.
1982)).
271. Kessenich v. Kessenich, No. FA96053295S, 1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11,
1996) (mother in Connecticut with the children for four years; noting that Michigan graciously and
wisely declined to assert jurisdiction).
272. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1994); La. P-S. 13:1705(A) (1983). Cf. Miller v. Miller,
602 So. 2d 330, 334-35 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (finding that even though Indiana had become the
home state, Louisiana retained significant connection to the children and one of the parents who
resided in Louisiana. Also, since there was an extant custody order in Louisiana and one of the
parties remained here, jurisdiction continued in Louisiana. Also, since the mother had wrongfully
removed the children to Indiana, this requires Indiana courts to refuse to assert jurisdiction, which
they had done); Ashbum v. Ashbum, 661 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. CL App. 1996). C. Garrett v. Garrett,
478 S.E.2d 584, 584-85 (Ga. 1996).
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consistent with the policy of preventing continuing litigation in states with
concurrent jurisdiction, but may be unfair to given parties, including the child.
Jurisdiction in the original awarding state may be lost or declined, allowing
another state to assert it.2 Jurisdiction is lost, for example, when the child
and all of the parties move away from the original state."" Some courts hold
that they will not retain jurisdiction when they cease to be the home state,
especially if another has been home state for quite a while.2" An Oregon
appellate court recently held that the fact that a party remained in the original
decree state and had continued to exercise visitation rights was not sufficient for
that state to retain continuing jurisdiction or to prevent another state from
modifying the original decree." 6 It is not appropriate, however, for a state to
oust another from continuing jurisdiction, and the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed, recognizing the correct rule.277 The new home state may assert
jurisdiction only after the state that rendered the original order has a law which
provides that it loses jurisdiction or the courts of that state relinquish jurisdic-
tion.27 A state may not usurp jurisdiction to modify, even when it has become
home state and has the most significant connection with the child and the better
evidence relating to the child's best interests.
27 9
Rigorous continuing jurisdiction does prevent competing jurisdiction and
ongoing litigation for modification, but it sometimes is extremely unfair and
273. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(cX2)(E), (d) (1994). See,
e.g., application in J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995) (Arizona declining jurisdiction and
Florida taking it).
274. Cf Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Payne v. Weker, 917
S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the state retains jurisdiction where one parent
continues to reside there; it loses jurisdiction generally, when all parties have been gone for more
than six months).
275. It is the prerogative of a state to decline jurisdiction under these circumstances, especially
when the other state has been home state for a long period of time. Ganz v. Rust, 690 A.2d 1113
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). See recent incorrect interpretation (albeit dictum) of the Georgia
Supreme Court, in Garrett, 478 S.E.2d at 584-85 (which strained and incorrectly read the PKPA and
the UCCJA, because of the unjust and inappropriate results that derive therefrom).
276. In re Henry & Keppel, 922 P.2d 712, 713-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
277. In re Henry & Keppel, Nos. CAA89111, SC S43648, 1997 WL 799550 (Or. Dec. 18,
1997). See discussion infra and PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2XE), (d) (1994); Bryant v. Bryant,
1996 WL 150159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996); Payne, 917 S.W.2d 201. See also supra authority in note
260; UCCJA § 14,9 U.L.A. 292 (1988); Blanco v. Tonniges, 511 N.W.2d 555 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994).
278. Bryant, 1996 WL 150159, at 04-5; Payne, 917 S.W.2d at 204 (state retains jurisdiction
where one parent continues to reside there, but this is not conclusive and the state loses jurisdiction
when another becomes home state).
279. UCCJA, § 14,9 U.L.A. 292 (1988); PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(cX2XA), (B) (1994). See,
e.g., Blanco, 511 N.W.2d 555 (continuing jurisdiction of the original awarding state is exclusive and
a defect in the law does not allow parties unilaterally to waive jurisdiction, unless the court in the
decree state relinquishes it); Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1993); Greenlaw v. Smith,
869 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994) (Washington courts retain modification jurisdiction, even though
the party awarded custody moved to California legally and properly some nine years earlier, thus,
making California the "home state.").
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causes problems. It has frustrated some courts which recognize its inconsistency,
in certain circumstances, with the best interests of a given child and with due
process fairness.2 0 In frustration, these courts sometimes strain to read the
language to allow the home state or even the significant connection jurisdiction
to prevail.2"' The frustration and the decisions are understandable, but they are
incorrect and inconsistent with the language and spirit of the acts.
When original jurisdiction is lost or declined by the initial decree state, it
generally obtains in the state in which the child resides with the custodial parent,
in the significant jurisdiction state, or even the state in which the child resides
with a non-custodial caretaker, if no other state has jurisdiction.82 This will
not be true, however, if one of the parties unlawfully removed the child from the
legal custody of the other or committed some other wrongful act.2"3 Whether
the initial state retains jurisdiction is a matter of that state's law, as long as it is
consistent with the UCCJA and the PKPA. s4 The state having continuing
jurisdiction may choose to decline jurisdiction in equity and fairness because
another state is more appropriate or convenient for the litigation.8 5 The
legislature, of course, may provide that jurisdiction ceases when some event
occurs. Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that although it would
280. See, e.g., recent incorrect interpretation (albeit dictum) of the Georgia Supreme Court, in
Garrett v. Garrett, 478 S.E.2d 584, 584-85 (Ga. 1996) (which strained and incorrectly read the PKPA
and the UCCJA, because of the unjust and inappropriate results that derive therefrom).
281. Cf Garrett, 478 S.E.2d at 584-85 (which held that Alabama law had to apply under these
circumstances, but noted in dicta that Alabama law, which provided that the Alabama court retained
jurisdiction as long as one of the parties remained in the state, was inconsistent with the UCCJA and
the PKPA).
282. UCCJA § 3(aX2), (4), 9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988); Lalonde v. Monschein, 673 So. 2d 1075,
1077 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (grandparents had cared for the child for two years, no party lived in original
decree state, and both significant connection and substantial evidence were in Louisiana), reversed
with no explanation In 675 So. 2d 1061 (1996). Unless another state has jurisdiction consistent with
the UCCJA, this seems incorrect.
283. See UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 251 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1707(b) (1983): "[T]he court shall
not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without
consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical custody
of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary
relinquishment of physical custody." This declinatory provision is discussed infra. See also Jones
v. Jones, 925 P.2d 1339 (Alaska 1996); Young v. Young, 670 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
284. See. e.g., Bock v. Bock, 824 P.2d 723, 724 (Alaska 1992); Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d
1024, 1027 (Wash. 1994).
285. Discussed in detail in Section VII B, infra. See UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988); e.g.,
La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983); see also Cal. Fain. Code. § 3407(d) (West 1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.1316
(West 1997); La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 714 (Cal. 1994); Yurgel
v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990); Rohlfs v. Rohlfs, 666 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1996) ("As the Yurgel court recognized 'there may be circumstances in which equity and fairness
require the courts of Florida to decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction because another state is the
more appropriate forum."); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717, 718 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993)
(jurisdiction relinquished by Florida court), same case new issues, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1995); Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1987); Wilson v. Wilson, 465
S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
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normally have jurisdiction where one of the parties to a Connecticut custody
order remained in Connecticut, its law required relinquishment of jurisdiction
when another state had become "home state." ' 6
2. A Sad, But Ultimately Favorably Decided Case: Fuge v.
Uiterwyk
A long, drawn-out affair of rancorous litigation and decided abuse of the legal
system to the detriment of the children through manipulation ofjurisdictional rules
is all too representative. Happily, a Florida court ultimately deferred to Louisiana
courts to save the children. A Florida court had properly and authoritatively
exercised jurisdiction to divorce a couple and awarded custody in a consent
judgment which ordered "shared custody." The judgment allowed the mother to
come to New Orleans with the children. The sad train of litigation provides some
valuable insight into child custody jurisdiction law and its dangers as well as its
proper resolution. Ultimately Louisiana, which became the home state, was able
to assert jurisdiction only because the Florida decree court which had primary
jurisdiction declined to assert it. The courts in this litigation recognized the
development of some important rules relating to child custody and visitation.
Louisiana had long since become the children's home state. 87 Ms. Fuge
filed in Louisiana to increase alimony and child support, to modify the Florida
custody order, and to have Mr. Uiterwyk held in contempt for failure to pay
alimony or support, and for his failure to abide by an injunction against his
bringing custody and visitation proceedings in Florida. Mr. Uiterwyk filed
an exception to Louisiana's jurisdiction on the basis of the UCCJA and the
PKPA. 2"  The Louisiana courts correctly held that Florida would normally be
the only state whose courts could properly assert jurisdiction as the state that
rendered the original order. Notwithstanding the fact that Louisiana had become
the "home state" by this time, Louisiana's courts would not be able to assert
jurisdiction but for the fact that the Florida court had declined to do so."'
Louisiana courts clearly could not have done so, except for the Florida
relinquishment.
Even though Louisiana had become home state and had significant
connection and substantial evidence, Florida retained jurisdiction. We have seen
286. Bryant v. Bryant, No. 307677, 1996 WL 150159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996); see also Payne
v. Weker, 917 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (state retains jurisdiction where one parent continues
to reside there, but this is not conclusive and the state loses jurisdiction when another becomes home
state).
287. See Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) and Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613
So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (This is the decision that focuses most especially on the
jurisdictional issues.).
288. Fuge, 613 So. 2d at 722, 723.
289. La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983).
290. Fuge, 613 So. 2d at 720.
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how the UCCJA and PKPA read together make it clear that once a custody order
is rendered properly under a state law substantially similar to the UCCJA, that
state retains jurisdiction as long as one of the parties remains there and the state
has not lost or relinquished jurisdiction under its law."' The original Florida
consent judgment had provided that the mother could come to Louisiana and that
Florida would relinquish jurisdiction after one year. Thus, inasmuch as the
mother had come to Louisiana and more than a year had passed, Florida had
"deferred" to Louisiana jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the fact that the father had
remained in Florida where the original decision had been rendered, Louisiana
properly had jurisdiction, not because a new home state had arisen or because the
more significant connections existed in Louisiana, but because Florida had
relinquished jurisdiction.292 Had the Florida court refused to defer to Louisiana
jurisdiction, the Louisiana courts would not have been able to hear the case.
- The Fourth Circuit, in Fuge, correctly noted in dicta that home state
generally predominates, but that continuing jurisdiction of another state prevails
if the law is substantially similar to the UCCJA (now all states). This trumps
home state or significant connection jurisdiction. The PKPA which applies by
definition to these circumstances leaves no doubt.293 The PKPA, preempting
any inconsistent law or interpretation, in effect requires state courts to interpret
ambiguous language in their UCCJA to be consistent with the PKPA. Fuge
signals what attorneys must do to protect their clients in relation to jurisdiction,
which, unfortunately, ofttimes becomes the dispositive substantive factor.
3. Continuing Jurisdiction in the International Arena
The preeminence of continuing jurisdiction even applies to international
cases 294 where a custody order has been rendered under a law consistent with
the UCCJA. gs Courts ought to apply the UCCJA generally to international
cases. Although there is divergent opinion on this point,' the trend is to
291. See, e.g., authority in PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(cX2)(E), (d) (1994), on continuing
jurisdiction, infra.
292. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994); La. R.S. 13:1712-1713 (1983).
293. Fuge, 613 So. 2d at 718.
294. See. e.g., Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1995).
295. In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706 (Cal, 1994); Ruppen v. Ruppen, 614 N.E.2d 577 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993) (deferred to Italy); In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995);
Koester v. Montgomery, 886 S.W.2d 432 (rex. Ct. App. 1994) (UCCJA applies internationally, at
least as far as due process notice and similar requirements are concerned). We will consider the
international aspect of child custody jurisdiction infra.
296. Compare Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that
the UCCJA does not apply between New Jersey and Morocco) with the New Jersey Supreme Court's
ultimate reversal, holding that the UCCJA applies internationally, Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d 1319
(NJ. 1996); see also other decisions favoring international appllication: In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d
706 (Cal. 1994); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting foreign resident's argument that UCCJA does not apply to international custody disputes);
Black v. Black, 657 A.2d 964 (Pa. Super. Ct.), app. denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 1995) (applying
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apply the Act.297 Although the definition of "states" which are subjects of the
UCCJA includes: "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia .. .,,2 the
policies and purposes of the law clearly are broad enough to be applicable
internationally.299
For example, in a California decision, In re Stephanie M., a California
Family Court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, held that the California courts
had jurisdiction, under the UCCJA, to determine the custody of a minor Mexican
national.3"' The minor, although a Mexican national, had resided in California
for several years with her parents, also Mexican nationals. The Court stated that
one of the primary purposes of the UCCJA is to "avoid the disruption to the life
of a child involved in relitigation of custody matters. . . [O]nce a custody order
is entered by a court with jurisdiction under [the UCCJA], that court has
continuing exclusive jurisdiction [which prevails over any other basis].""3 2 The
court also held that no treaty or other source of international law precludes
California courts from asserting jurisdiction in a case properly brought.
California was "home state" and the state "with the most significant connection"
to the parents and the child and substantial evidence relating to the child's well-
being. A Pennsylvania Court held that the term "state" in section 2 (10) may
apply to foreign nations as well.3"3 Some courts construe the UCCJA to apply
internationally only when a foreign custody order is at issue.3 Other states,
as we have indicated, apply the general policies and purposes to all custody
jurisdiction disputes, including those in the international context."0 The latter
seems to be the better approach. The debate over international application is
presented below in section X.
UCCJA internationally). See general discussion of the application of UCCJA principles to
international cases, infra at Section X.
297. See, e.g., Ivaldl, 685 A.2d 1319. Other examples include: Ganz v. Rust, 690 A.2d 1113,
I118 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997); Dincer v. Dincer, 701 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. 1997); Noordin v. Abdulla:
947 P.2d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Since 1995, some courts have held that the UCCJA applies
internationally. Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (emergency
jurisdiction applied despite father's pending action in Turkey); Black, 657 A.2d at 964.
298. UCCJA § 2 (10), 9 U.L.A. 134 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1701(10) (1983).
299. See UCCJA §§ 1. 23, 9 U.L.A. 123-24, 326 (1988).
300. In re Stephanie M.. 867 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. See also Mendez v.
San Diego County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 513 U.S. 937, 115 S. Ct. 337 (1994).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Black v. Black, 657 A.2d 964. 970 (Pa. Super. Ct.), app. denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa.
1995).
304. E.g., Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Koons v. Koons,
615 N.Y.S.2d 563, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
305. E.g., Black, 657 A.2d 964 (applying UCCJA to international child custody disputes and
construing the definition of "state" to encompass foreign nations); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706;
Zenide v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. Rplr. 2d 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Ruppen v. Ruppen, 614 N.E.2d
577, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Dincer v. Dincer, 666 A.2d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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IV. SCOPE OR COVERAGE OF THE UCCJA & INTERACTION WITH
PKPA-ADOPTION, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, GUARDIANSHIP
(TUTORSHIP), AND VISITATION
A. General
The PKPA and the UCCJA govern interstate child custody disputes in
virtually any form.3° The PKPA is not limited to abduction cases; it covers
the same subject matter as the UCCJA.3°0 There is some disagreement among
the states over whether the UCCJA covers termination of parental rights,
guardianship, and adoption.'SU A strong majority of states, however, consider
these proceedings to be covered.3" Some related subsidiary issues, such as
306. The language of UCCJA § 2, La. R.S. 13:1702 (1983). and the PKPA § 8(bX3) (1994),
on what is a custody dispute or determination provide for this. Also, La. Ch.C. arts. 307, 310. See,
e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 867 P.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (adoption); State
ex rel Torres v. Mason, 848 P.2d 592, 595 (Or. 1993); see, e.g., Guardianship of Gabriel W., 666
A.2d 505, 508 (Me. 1995); In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Mich. Ct. App.), aff'd,
502 N.W.2d 649 (1993) (applying the UCCJA to the adoption); In re Baby Girl _ v. Michael _
& Becky _, No. 17467, 1992 WL 139363, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("We find nothing in the
UCCJA indicating a parent's action to withdraw her consent to the adoption of her child is a custody
proceeding within the meaning of the UCCJA."); In re Adoption of Child by T.W.C. and P.C., 636
A.2d 1083, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); In re Wonderly's Guardianship, 423 N.E.2d 420,
423-24 (Ohio 1981). But see La. Ch.C. art. 310; J.D.S. & J.L.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz.
1995). Most other states also consider adoption to be covered by the UCCJA. Brossoit v. Brossoit,
36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (guardianship); State ex rel Torres v. Mason, 848 P.2d 592
(Or. 1993) (adoption is subject to UCCJA). See also Gribkoff v. Bedford, 711 P.2d 176, 177-78 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985); In re A.E.H., 468 N.W.2d 190, 200 (Wis. 1991) (termination of parental rights);
Waller, supra note 12, at 284 (guardianship/tutorship).
307. See erroneous decision in Kean v. Kean, 577 So. 2d 1152 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
Correct decisions include: Wilson v. Gouse, 441 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1994); Renno v. Evans, 580 So.
2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Palricia R. v. Andrew W., 467 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. Fain. CL 1983).
308. See. e.g., In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 196 (applying the UCCJA to the
adoption); In re Baby Girl, 1992 WL 139363, at *6 ("We find nothing in the UCCJA indicating
a parent's action to withdraw her consent to the adoption of her child is a custody proceeding within
the meaning of the UCCJA."). But see La. Ch.C. art. 310; J.D.S. & J.L.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732
(Ariz. 1995). Most other states also consider adoption to be covered by the UCCJA. J.D.S. & J.LS.
v. Superior Court, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (The UCCJA applies rather than the interstate
placement compact.); Brossoit, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 (guardianship); State ex rel Torres, 848 P.2d 592
(adoption is subject to UCCJA).
309. E.g., J.D.S., 893 P.2d 749 (the UCCJA applies rather than the interstate placement
compact); Brossoit, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 (guardianship); Foster v. Stein, 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); In re Adoption & Change of Name of Weathersby, 833 P.2d 1297, 1299 n.4 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992) ("[W]e join the majority of states, which have reached the [conclusion that adoption
proceedings and the jurisdictional conflicts related thereto come within the coverage of the
UCCJA].") (citing In re Adoption of B.E.W.G., 549 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)); In re
Termination of Parental Rights of Steven C., 486 N.W.2d 572, 573 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Ex rel
Torres, 848 P.2d 592 (adoption is subject to UCCJA). See generally Annotation: What 7 pes of
Proceedings or Determinations are Governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 78 ALR 4th 1028, 1047-50 (1990)
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contempt, have been held by some courts not to be covered.310 Child abuse
cases, in which custody is also at issue, are covered."'
The PKPA rectifies any conflict in interpretation because, as federal law
covering the same subject matter, it controls. The PKPA restates the UCCJA
jurisdictional provisions, principles and elements, and mandates that the states
give full faith and credit to sister state custody decrees."' The Supremacy
Clause also requires that where there is a conflict of policy or interpretation
between the UCCJA and the PKPA, the latter preempts and controls."'
B. Termination of Parental Authority and Adoption
In custody cases, as opposed to those on termination and adoption, parental
rights and relationships generally are not fully severed." Even in custody
proceedings, let alone those on adoption and termination, substantive due process
is implicated." 5 Joint custody or at least continuing visitation are often
available in custody arrangements. Custody orders are open to modification.
Thus, a parent is not necessarily legally "cut off' from his child as in adoption.
Input into, even legal authority over, the child's life may continue. Adoption is
even more clearly laden with due process implications; it is definitive and
irrevocable. No residual rights or interests remain. Adoption permanently severs
all parental rights, authority, and generally terminates the parent-child relation-
ship. Yet, this important event is often determined in the guise of jurisdiction,
where no consideration is given at all to constitutional and moral issues. It is
(majority of states consider adoption and termination of parental rights to be covered).
310. E.g., Snisky v. Whisenhut, 864 S.W.2d 875 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (reaffirmed Atkins v.
Atkins, 623 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), but held that non-child custody or related
issues-visitation, adoption, etc.-the PKPA does not apply); Dyer v. Surratt, 466 S.E.2d 584 (Ga.
1996). But see Gladden v. Whaley, No. CA 94-1199, 1995 WL 734093 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 6,
1995) (holding that the PKPA will preempt, if the contempt issue is combined with a PKPA type
issue, such as visitation).
311. Simons v. Montgomery County Children's Servs., No. 16020, 1997 WL 102015 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 7, 1997).
312. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1994). The jurisdictional bases are listed in the PKPA as
triggers for and conditions of enforcement of custody orders. Courts, however, must give full faith
and credit to properly-issued sister state custody orders. This makes the PKPA functionally a
jurisdictional statute. See Waller, supra note 12, at 283.
313. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2; e.g., Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1992); Shute v.
Shute, 607 A.2d 890, 892-93 (Vt. 1992); Linda M. Demelis, Interstate Child Custody and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National Standard, 45 Hastings
L.J. 1329, 1340 (1994); but see Archambault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Mass. 1990)
(PKPA does not preempt).
314. Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860, 861-62 (Ga. 1996).
315. Id. Cf. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga .1995) (quoting In re Suggs, 291 S.E.2d
233, 235 (Ga. 1982), to the effect that the parental right to rear their children is fundamental and
"should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances."). See also Blackburn v.
Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825-26 (Ga. 1982) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753, 102
S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982)).
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also clear that even custody decisions have a significant impact on, and
significantly interfere with, the parent-child relationship for the one who is not
the primary custodian."'
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, in the limited setting of adoption,
the court should prefer an adult who has a significant psychological relationship
with the child from the child's perspective (the "psychological parent") over any
other claimant (including a natural parent). 7 This is a wholesale adoption (so
to speak) of the psychoanalytical institution, "the psychological parent.""'
Many courts apply it virtually as a shibboleth in custody decisions or even
adoption proceedings, even claiming that "[tJhere is little disagreement within the
profession of child psychology as to the existence of the phenomenon of the child
psychological parent relationship and its importance to the development of the
child." 9 Yet, this "doctrine" is not correct merely because it emanated from
renown psychoanalysts. It has its serious detractors. 32 0  Even within the
community of psychiatrists and psychologists, there is serious debate over the
"psychological parent" and what is best for a child in the family dissolution
context.32' The "psychological parent doctrine" is controversial, even within
the social, behavioral, and medical sciences, and much of the dire consequences
indicated by its proponents (when the "psychological parent" is not awarded
custody) are not supported by the data.' 2 The Group for the Advancement of
316. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d at 861-62. The scheme has been held not to apply to disputes over
unborn children. E.g., Wilner v. Prowda, 601 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that the
court had no subject matter jurisdiction to order mother of unborn child not to move out of state).
317. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1012-17 (La. 1988) (noting, at p. 1013, that "to award
custody to a person who is a 'stranger'to the child would unnecessarily risk harming the child where
the other claimant has, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, fulfilled the child's psychological needs
for a parent as well as his physical need.") (emphasis added).
318. Goldstein et al., supra note 73, at 19 (promoting a psychoanalytic vision of the best
interests of the child).
319. In re J.MP., 528 So. 2d at 1014; see also Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn.
1985) (citing Goldstein et al., supra note 73, at 31-35). E.g. Klaff, supra note 59, at 348; Martha
F. Leonard, M.D. & Sally Provence, M.D., The Development of Parent Child Relationships and the
Psychological Parent, 53 Conn. BJ. 320. 326 (1979); Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment
or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 1117, 1121-22 (1976).
320. E. Waters & D.M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment Theory: The Child's
Best Interests and the Risks of Doing the Right Things for the Wrong Reasons, in Symposium: The
Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 485, 505 (1983-84).
321. See, e.g., authority in supra note 233.
322. Waters & Noyes, supra note 320, at 505 (The psychoanalytic view of parent-child
relationships is extremely controversial within the social, behavioral, and medical sciences and much
of the dire consequences indicated by the so-called psychological parent theory are not supported by
the data.); Peggy Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, in Symposium: The
Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 485, 557 (1983-84); Guggenheim, supra note 14, at 549 (The psychological parenting theory
as espoused in Goldstein, et al. sometimes used, if not as a pretext, as a justification for seizure of
children from those people who have the least political power in the U.S.; it also provides unintended
1998]
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Psychiatry's prestigious Committee on the Family produced a volume on this
subject, noting:
The evidence and our own experience lead us to what can be called
the family perspective on divorce and custody. Briefly, that perspective
rests on the following concepts. A couple that comes together to form
a family and raise children creates for those children something that is
more than the sum of its parts-more than the dyadic relations one-on-
one with mother and separately with father. We find no evidence for
the existence of a single "psychological parent" with whom the tie is
critically more important than with the rest of the network.
The relationships with mother and father, and with grandparents and
others as well, constitute an emotional universe that, especially in the
early years, forms a pattern for the child's later relations.
If, in the crisis of divorce, one part of that universe is cut off,
labeled as bad, and becomes unavailable, there will be adverse
consequences for the child's view of himself and of the people he will
relate to later in life.
Even if the person who is cut off is a very ambivalently held parent
with whom contact is difficult and painful, our experience and the
evidence convince us that the later ability to put that relationship in
emotional perspective is better served through contact than through
separation.323
There is not much doubt that disruption of the parent-child relationship
carries significant risk and may do serious harm. The disagreement relates to
how great the risk is and how much harm may be done. However valuable it
might be, the psychoanalytic vision of the "psychological parent" should not be
definitive; it should not provide a shibboleth for a judge or allow psychoanalysts
to make the legal decision.324 Nevertheless, the analysis should occur. But it
never does in the jurisdictional setting; even worse in the jurisdictional setting
the bases of jurisdiction become a shibboleth for a shibboleth.
incentives for agencies to prolong the separation of parent and child.).
323. Committee on the Family 6f the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, New Trends
in Child Custody Determinations 80-81 (1980). See also Davis, supra note 322, at 569.
324. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988). For further discussion of this in
relation to adoption, see Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, Chs. 5, 8, 12; Davis, supra
note 322, at 557 ("In sum, the inconclusiveness of separation research undermines the notion that
the continuity of care is entitled to the nearly single-minded focus it has been given in our efforts to
reform foster care systems." (emphasis added)); see also Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History:
Reflections Upon "In the Best Interests of the Child, " 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1096 (1988).
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C. Visitation & Guardianship
The UCCJA is applicable to visitation 32 and guardianship (tutorship)
cases. 26 Also, like in custody cases, the court that issued the original custody
order (whether temporary or permanent) retains jurisdiction as long as one of the





A. Overview of Initial Constitutional Questions
1. Custody Jurisdiction, Due Process and In Personam Jurisdiction
Until 1953, when May v. Anderson.. was decided, there were virtually no
limitations on state court jurisdiction over custody. Jurisdiction was based on
presence of the child and domicile. The benefit of this was a superficial
simplicity, although in many ways it was too simple, failing to recognize the
legitimate interests of other states in the child's care and welfare.329  In this
permissive atmosphere, state courts were aggressive in asserting initial and
modification jurisdiction in custody cases,3 even in cases in which it was
clear that courts in other states actually had already asserted jurisdiction." '
325. E.g., La. Ch.C. art. 310; La. IKS. 13:1701(2), 1702(AX1)(1983); UCCJA § 2(2),9U.L.A.
133 (1988); Kessenich v. Kessenich, No. FA960532955, 1996 WL 383353 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
11, 1996); Kemp v. Sharp, 409 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 1991); Ruckstuhl v. Corley, 462 S.E.2d 795, 796
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Girau v. Girau, 545 So. 2d 670, 673 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989). Cf. Chapoteau
v. Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
326. E.g., La. Ch.C. art. 310; In re A.N.P., No. 77255, 1997 WL 126808 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar.
21, 1997); Guardianship of Gabriel W., 666 A.2d 505, 508 (Me. 1996); Wambold v. Wambold, 651
A.2d 330, 332 (Me. 1994); In re Guardianship of Wonderly, 423 N.E.2d 420, 423-24 (Ohio 1981);
In re Guardianship of Walling, 727 P.2d 586, 590 (Okla. 1986).
327. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994); La.R.S. 13:1705, 1712, 1713 (1983); Fuge v.
Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717, 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (Florida courts relinquished jurisdiction);
same case, other issues, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (lawyer father held in contempt and
denied visitation for vicious ongoing litigation that harmed the children). See also Brossoit v.
Bmssoit, 36 Cal. Rpt'. 2d 919, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (it was an abuse of discretion upon the facts
for trial court to decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of California UCCJA); In re Booty, 665
So. 2d 444, 447 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995); Cronin v. Camilleri, 648 A.2d 694 (Md. CL App. 1994)
(court may decline jurisdiction on the basis of the UCCJA); Watkins v. Watkins, 462 S.E.2d 687,
688 (N.C. CL App. 1995) (trial court properly considered issues relating to parties' conduct, but
findings did not support its decision to relinquish jurisdiction).
328. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953).
329. Leslie J. Harris et al., Family Law 766 (1996) and authority cited therein.
330. Clark, supra note 5, at 320-21; Coombs, supra note 88, at 718; Stansbury, supra note 2,
at 827.
331. Coombs, supra note 88, at 718. See, e.g., Minick v. Minick, 149 So. 483, 492 (Fla. 1933)
(jurisdiction asserted despite potential jurisdiction elsewhere); Omer v. Omer, 193 P. 1064, 1065
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The child custody arena was awash in inconsistent decisions and competing
jurisdiction. Uncertainty prevailed and litigation, sometimes vicious and
devastating to both parents and children, was rampant. Clearly, there was a need
for something to be done.
The courts eventually concluded "that the welfare of children demanded
greater flexibility [than that offered by a strict domicile basis for jurisdiction),
and other grounds for custody jurisdiction arose.""3 2 The states needed to
develop an approach emphasizing restraint and comity in order to minimize
potential conflicts and harm to children. This was advocated by some schol-
ars,333 adopted by some courts,33' and by the Restatement (Second) of the
Conflict of Laws. 3  Courts of most states, however, did not really embrace
the idea of deference, comity, or restraint sufficiently to ameliorate conflict and
confusion.336 This chaotic history, combined with the difficulty of the issues
involved, caused considerable confusion, conflicting legislation, decisional law,
and commentary over child custody jurisdiction. 37 In fact, the chaos actually
provided an incentive for one parent to snatch children in the custody of the
other parent and then take the children to another state to seek or to modify
custody.33 Thus, even if one has seemingly clear rules on jurisdiction-over-
custody questions, those rules seem to be a two-edged sword as to what is best
(Kan. 1920) (jurisdiction asserted despite litigation already pending in another state); Berlin v. Berlin,
235 N.E.2d 109, 112 (N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840, 89 S. Ct. 118 (1968) (welfare of child
best served by ignoring prior grant of custody to father by a Maryland court and entering award of
custody to mother).
332. Katz, supra note 93, at 13; see also Robert A. LeFlar, American Conflicts of Law § 243,
at 490-92 (3d ed. 1977) (criticizing the 1934 Restatement Conflict of Laws rule that domicile is the
only basis for custody jurisdiction). Inasmuch as a custody case focuses on what is best for the child,
those situations in which a child is endangered demand the exercise of jurisdiction to protect the
child, even though a court would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the parties. Both the UCCJA
§ 3(a)(3Xii) commissioner's note, 9 U.L.A. 122-24 (1988), and the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. 1738A
(c)(2)(CXii) (1994), recognize this "emergency" jurisdiction, but limit it to serious emergencies.
333. Stumberg, supra note 88, at 62.
334. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (Cal. 1948) (requiring the lower courts to
defer to the courts of other states when those states have a more substantial interest in the child); see
Coombs, supra note 88, at 719.
335. See Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws, § 79 (1971) (adopting the California approach
and citing the wide acceptance of it among the states); Berlin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 44; In re Sagan, 396
A.2d 450. 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). See generally Coombs, supra note 88, at 719.
336. Coombs, supra note 88, at 719.
337. One commentator noted: "Child custody decisions afford no better than a quicksand
foundation for analysis of jurisdiction (footnote omitted]. No two ever seem quite alike. Rules
purporting to define judicial jurisdiction and to establish finality for prior decisions fade into thin air
when they are contradicted by facts affecting the child's welfare. Such facts, and variant conclusions
subjectively derived from them by triers of the facts, are as influential in multi-state cases as in
one-state cases, with the result that choice-of-law rules are often not mentioned and jurisdictional
rules may be given merely incidental importance." LeFlar, supra note 332, § 243, at 490. See, e.g.,
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. CL 840 (1953); Sampsell, 197 P.2d at 750.
338. See Katz, supra note 93, at 11-13.
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for a given child caught in the maelstrom." 9 For example, at the time when
domicile was the only basis for jurisdiction over a child, courts which had the
greatest opportunity to protect the welfare of the child did not have jurisdiction.
Sincere advocates for a particular vision of "the best interests of the child"
sometimes damaged children and parents. Interest groups, promoting indepen-
dent agendas, caused harm.
3. The Feds to the Rescue?-The Domestic Relations Exception and
Related Problems
The so-called "domestic relations exception" has had a confused history.
Neither the judiciary nor the commentators have uniformly embraced any
consistent rule.340 Scholars disagree and federal circuits conflict over its
content and application.34" ' The United States Supreme Court has not issued'
any clear guidance in more than fifty years. Even the decision on the scope of
the PKPA in Thompson v. Thompson342 was tentative and did not help much.
The Thompson Court tried to reconcile the nature of the PKPA's preemptive
jurisdiction and the various state versions of the UCCJA, 43 hoping to resolve
the issues while avoiding the domestic relations fray by maintaining staunch
abstention doctrine.3" The Supreme Court held that "[the PKPA] is most
339. For detailed analysis of the "best interests of the child doctrine," see Blakesley, Louisiana
Family Law, supra note I, Chs. 8, 12.
340. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction:
Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 669, 670 (1995).
341. See id.
342. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
343. See Ira H. Lurvey, Good Intentions, Bad Law, 18 Fam. Adv. (No.2) 10 (Fall 1995).
344. The "abstention doctrine had its origin in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
It is where the federal system will abstain voluntarily from asserting jurisdiction, when that would
'interfere with state policy in an important matter of local concern."" See Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689, 112 S. Ct 2206 (1992) (reaffirming and limiting the domestic relations exception to
certain "core cases," but not elucidating which were the "core cases" nor providing boundaries for
jurisdiction). The "fountainhead" of the exception is dictum, reiterated at the beginning of the
Barber decision. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584 ("[Wle disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in
the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either
as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce .... ") This was dictum, because
the Court took jurisdiction. The three dissenters, who disagreed with taking jurisdiction at all,
ruminated over their belief that there were certain matters, especially those relating to the family, that
were the special enclaves of state authority. The Barber dictum was reinforced in In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 10 S. Ct. 850 (1890); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. CL 1098, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 214. 63 S. CL 1442
(1943); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 20 S. Ct. 58 (1899); Farkas v. D'Oca, 857 F. Supp 300
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); IA [Part 2] Moore's Federal Practice 0.203[2]. For analysis of the abstention
doctrine in the family law arena, see Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the
United States, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 835 (1995); Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, §§ 12-13;
Ann C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787 (1995); Stein, supra note 340,
at 669; Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Dim'rsity Jurisdiction, 83
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naturally construed to furnish a rule of decision for [state] courts to use in
adjudicating custody disputes and not to create an entirely new cause of
action."3 s4  It held that the PKPA provides no federal jurisdiction and
establishes no federal cause of action. Federal courts are not to resolve interstate
jurisdictional disputes over child custody. 46
The UCCJA has ambiguous language which state courts are left to resolve.
They do so inconsistently. Thompson provided that the PKPA is supreme; the
PKPA controls state law where there is conflict and indicates proper interpreta-
tion of state UCCJAs 47 but no federal courtroom was made available to
interpret conflicts, disputes, or divergent interpretations. Although many courts
finally understand and accept federal interpretive control, 4' some still do
not.349 Thompson has caused lobbying and some internecine warfare among
various factions of the family law bar.35 Some want to generate new federal
legislation expanding the scope of the PKPA to provide a federal cause of action
and to resolve jurisdictional disputes among states."' Others urge termination
of PKPA supremacy and concomitant preemption, allowing the various UCCJAs
to play on equal footing.3"2
The law has provided some deterrence of child abduction. While still
rampant, it now may incur serious penalties. In addition to causing a state court
to refuse jurisdiction, it is now a federal felony.' 3 In addition, it is generally
extraditable."" This means that the foreign nation with which the United
States has an extradition treaty is obligated to extradite the abductor parent back
to the United States.' A positive effect of this, discussed more fully below,
relates to the international application of the UCCJA. Since the international law
of extradition applies, the policies and elements of the PKPA and the state
UCCJA are appropriately applicable, on the basis of a fortiori logic. 6 Also,
abduction has been held to provide a basis for a Section 1983 claim. 5 7 For
Colum. L. Rev. 1824 (1983); Symposium: 1994 Invitational Conference on Courts and Jurisdiction
in Federal States: The United States, Canada and Australia, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 835 (1995).
345. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183, 108 S. Ct. at 518; Lurvey, supra note 343, at 10.
346. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183, 108 S. Ct. at 518.
347. Lurvey, supra note 343, at 10.
348. E.g., Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
349. E.g., Kean v. Kean, 577 So. 2d 1152 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
350. Lurvey, supra note 343, at 10.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993, Pub.L. 103-173, § 2a, 107 Stat. 1998
(1993) (codified as 18 U.S.C. 1204 (1993)) (up to 3 years imprisonment).
354. See Blakesley, The International Legal System: Cases and Materials Chs. !, 3 (4th ed.
1995); Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human Liberty, supra
note 1, Ch. 4.
355. See generally. Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law & the Protection of Human
Liberty, supra note 1, Ch. 4 (on extradition).
356. See infra discussion in Section X of this article.
357. See generally Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law & the Protection of Human
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example, in 1993, a federal district court held that it had jurisdiction to hear a
mother's claim under Section 1983 against her former husband and the police
who helped him to abduct the couple's child from school, even though the father
had obtained a temporary court order to obtain custody."' At the hearing,
however, no violation of the mother's rights was established."' These
remedies and deterrents of child abduction are valuable and positive.
B. The Sanctity of the Parental Parent-Child Relationship-Scrutiny of the
Termination of Parental Rights and Authority: The Parent-Child
Relationship is Fundamental and Sacrosanct
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held (5-4) that, despite the
fundamental nature of the right to rear one's children, the due process clause
does not require that counsel be provided to indigent parents)36 The decision,
however, was based on the nature of the right to counsel, applicable only to loss-
of-liberty in the criminal setting, rather than on due process and parental-child
interests. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, argued, nevertheless, that parents have
an absolute due process right to counsel in termination proceedings, because of
the fundamental nature of what is at risk. 6 The dissent and majority agreed
with the Court's past decisions that this interest is fundamental,36 reemphasiz-
Liberty, supra note 1, Ch. 4. If child abduction is a crime punishable with the required amount of
imprisonment-which it is in the federal system (International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of
1993) and in most states--extradition is possible. Id.
358. E.g., Rubin v. Smith, 817 F. Supp. 987 (D.N.H. 1993); on reconsideration, 919 F. Supp.
534 (D.N.H 1996) (no evidence of any violation of the mother's rights was found).
359. Id. at 542.
360. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 31, 101 S. Ct.
2153, 2161-62 (1981) (The right to rear one's children is a "commanding one," but does not
command appointment of counsel.). This should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id.
The right is "fundamental" in constitutional terms, having a "value so essential to individual liberty
in our society that ... [it justifies judicial review of] the acts of other branches of government [using
the strict scrutiny standard]." Rohn E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 388 (4th
ed. 1991). For example, see Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 377
(1995) (Parents have a fundamental "liberty interest" or right to rear their children free from undue
state interference.); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); J.B. & L.B. v. Washington
County, 905 F. Supp. 979, 987 (D. Utah 1995), appeal docketed, No. 93-CV-1038 (10th Cir. 1995)
(right to familial association).
361. Id. at 35, 101 S. Ct. at 2163-64. Louisiana law calls for the appointment ofcounsel, as a
matter of statutory interest and constitutional due process, although, once counsel has been appointed,
due process has been held not to require that the parent necessarily be present in court or that he or
she have the opportunity to communicate. with counsel. See generally La. R.S. 13:1702(C) (1983);
In e Johnson, 465 So. 2d 134 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ granted, 467 So. 2d 529, affirmed, 475 So.
2d 340 (1985); In re A.E. & J.D., 448 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). See generally Wendy
Schomskin Good, Comment, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights in Louisiana: Unravelling
the Statute, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 1045 (1984). Moreover, counsel is clearly not required in the
jurisdictional setting.
362. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 38-39, 101 S. Ct. at 2159-60, 2165-66.
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ing that it is "among those essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."363 It occupies "a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality
of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility .... 364
In 1982, this time for the majority in Santosky v. Kramer, Justice Blackmun
reiterated the importance of parental right to rear and the parent-child relation-
ship.36 He held that clear and convincing evidence is required for a state to
sever this "fundamental liberty interest": 3 "
In Lassiter, it was "not disputed" that intervention to terminate the
relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplishedby
procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause .... The
absence of dispute reflected this Court's historical recognition that
freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment .... [This
interest] in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody...
Yet, this interest is often ignored, even lost without a moment's consideration,
in the jurisdictional setting, under circumstances in which it is next to impossible
to litigate in a fair setting. We will now analyze this failure to consider the
constitutional impact of the UCCJA.
C. The United States Supreme Court Has Avoided the Fray Since 1953
Until 1953, state courts were virtually free of federal limits to their power
to set their own jurisdictional standards in custody cases. In 1953, the Court
announced that the Constitution required personal jurisdiction over the defendant
in custody actions. 68 May has been criticized for holding that a state did not
owe another state's custody decisions full faith and credit.36 9 It has also been
criticized harshly with the claim that the Court considered children's interest in
stability to be inferior to those of their parents, 37 0 and treated children like a
363. Id. at 38, 101 S. Ct at 2165.
364. Id.
365. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
366. Id. at 753, 769, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95, 1403.
367. Id. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95 (footnotes omitted). See also Burge v. City of San
Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953), whire Chief Justice Traynor eloquently makes the same point.
Also, Justice Dennis, formerly of the Louisiana Supreme Court and now on the federal Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, reiterated the point that the right is a "commanding one." In re A.C., 643 So. 2d
719, 726 (La. 1994) (emphasis added) (vigorous dissent by Dennis, J.) (citing Blakesley, Louisiana
Family Law, supra note 1, at § 8.37), on rehearing, 643 So. 2d 743 (1994).
368. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534, 73 S. Ct. 840, 844 (1953); Coombs, supra note 88,
at 736. For criticism of May v. Anderson, see Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051.
369. See Leslie J. Harris et al., supra note 329, at 767, and authority cited therein.
370. Megan Clark, Note, A Proposal to End Jurisdictional Competition in Parent/Non-Parent
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plot of ground, chattels or cash."' Valid reasons for criticism of May ex-
ist,172 including substituting mere conclusion for analysis, some insensitivity to
children's interests, and ignorance of how custody cases work,3" perhaps even
on the requirement of in personam jurisdiction but not on the judicial duty to
insist on substantive due process in these cases. On that, all it did is to say that
the issue of child custody and the welfare of children are at least as important as
monetary issues, and jurisdiction ought to meet the same standards of fairness.
Since 1953 the Court has not deigned to stir again the muddy waters of child
custody jurisdiction. We argue that they should be stirred again and suggest that
in some circumstances the UCCJA and PKPA do more harm than good and may
be unconstitutional.
Many decisions simply assume constitutionality of the UCCJA, simply
parroting the policy choice of the UCCJA drafters without critical scrutiny."'
For example, a California appellate court, in Marriage of Leonard,"' which is
blindly followed by many decisions in other states, held that in personam
jurisdiction is not required in UCCJA matters. These decisions assume simply
that Shaffer v. Heitner"' held that neither in personam jurisdiction nor
"minimum contacts" are required in the so-called "status" cases."' Many state
courts have plainly refused to follow May or have interpreted it restrictively.3"
Shaffer, however, simply exempts matters of status, of necessity, from a unitaiy
standard of jurisdiction.'79 Also, Shaffer merely noted that "[we] do not
suggest that jurisdictional doctrines.., governing adjudications of status ... are
Interstate Child Custody Cases, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 65, 76 (1994).
371. See, e.g., Philip S. Welt, Adop$ion and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really
"Strangers Without Rights "?, 1995 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 165, 215 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 541,73 S. Ct. 840, 847 (1953) (Jackson, J. dissenting)); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble
to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L. Rev. 379 (1959); Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 72, at 1041-45;
Homer H. Clark, Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. I, 12, 40 (1992). See also
Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Mayer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 99, 1041-50 (1992).
372. Such as not having considered good state or even United States constitutional caselaw on
subject, such as International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945), or
Justice Traynor's excellent opinion in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948). See
Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051.
373. Clark, supra note 371, at 12, 40.
374. E.g., In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907-08 (Cal. CL App. 1981).
375. Id.
376. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 nn.30 & 37, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2582-83 nn. 30 & 37
(1977).
377. See In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 907-98 (quoted and followed blindly by
most of the decisions holding that in personam jurisdiction is not required). See infra authority in
notes 410-412, 417.
378. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. 1993); Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d
306, 319 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980); and further authority cited in Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 72, at
1043; Clark, supra note 5, at 782.
379. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 nn.30 & 37, 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83 nn. 30 & 37; Friedrich K.
Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrottlng, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1027, 1027 n.3 (1995).
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inconsistent with the standard of fairness . .. "' Some language in Shaffer
might allow an inference that it allows derogation from in personam jurisdiction
in status cases, but the holding does just the opposite! Shaffer held that
"minimum contacts" are not required, but did not hold that in personam
jurisdiction, is not required. Even if Shaffer had not called for other means of
providing for in personam jurisdiction in "'status" cases, it is not a custody
decision and clearly ought to be distinguished.
Shaffer does not bear out the suggestion that it allows custody jurisdiction
decisions without due process fairness. Shaffer has a progeny of at least twelve
major opinions from the United States Supreme Court and more below, which
have produced at best an unsatisfactory body of law that is extremely difficult
for jurisdiction scholars to organize, synthesize, and comprehend. If the
decisions trouble the experts, they must represent a genuine thicket for those who
deal with jurisdictional issues only occasionally."' Reading Shaffer to except
child custody matters from the requirement of some form of in personam
jurisdiction or other substantive due process fairness is not within Shaffer's
holding and is inconsistent with constitutional law and policy relating to both
child protection and parental authority and interests. 82 There may be other
ways to establish in personam jurisdiction, more congenial to the purposes of
child custody and which will still promote UCCJA values. 3
We saw how the United States Supreme Court, in May v. Anderson, held
that in personam jurisdiction is required for custody cases."' This decision has
never been overruled, although it has been criticized by commentators.38s In
fact, the Court reinforced May in Burnham v. Superior Court.16  Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion in Burnham,387 joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
380. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208, 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.30.
381. Juenger, supra note 379, at 1027 n.6 (citing William M. Richman, Understanding Personal
Jurisdiction. 25 Ariz. St. LJ. 599, 600-02 (1993) (footnotes omitted)); Pamela J. Stepfiens,
Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle 19
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 105 (1991); Russel J. Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the
Tubes, 23 Tex. Int'l L.J. 55 (1988).
382. See discussion of these matters infra.
383. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
384. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (holding that if in personarnjurisdiction is required
for a court to make an impact on a person's vested property interests, a fortiori, it should be
applicable to significant impacts on a parent's liberty interest in rearing his or her child).
385. See, e.g., Brigitte Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody
and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229, 248 (1979); Bruch, supra note
6, at 1051; Hazard, supra note 37 1. See also Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L.
Rev. 1207, 1232-34 (1969); Leonard 0. Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 381-88 (1980); Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws
526 (1982).
386. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
387. Id. at 607, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
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Justice Kennedy, suggests that they uphold May v. Anderson's " rule that
matters of child custody require personal jurisdiction." 9 Some academics have
criticized this view,3  but their criticism seems to be based on a belief that
values the protection of "children" in the abstract and deterrence of child-
snatching over protection of any particular child. Thus, they are willing to
accept the reality that sometimes a child in a given custody dispute will be
injured, for the better good of children in general. A given child is expendable
for the "good" of children and society. Ultimately, this is immoral nonsense.
It ignores a real constitutional and personal imperative protecting both a child's
and the parents' interest in having a legal relationship, unless serious harm to the
particular child will result therefrom. A jurisdictional statute should:not be used
to violate these interests.
D. Status Exceptions and Child Custody Jurisdiction-Another Reading of
Shaffer
In 1979, Professors Bodenheimer and Kneely-Kvarme noted that:
Shaffer acknowledged some exceptions to the International Shoe
standard, including some "status" determinations .... Status has been
defined as a "relationship between two persons, which is ... not
terminable at the mere will of either and with which the State is
concerned. Marriage is a status... and so too is the relationship of
parent and child, whether natural or adoptive. Accordingly, the
Restatement [(2d)] of Conflict of Laws [§§ 69-79 (1971)] and legal
literature classify child custody proceedings and adoptions as status
proceedings.39'
The concept of "status" in a child custody proceeding implies more than the
state's concern with the relationship of the parties. It encompasses the right and
obligation of the state in its parens patriae role to consider the welfare of a
child. 392  It also encompasses the primordial and constitutional interest of
parents to rear their children and that this is generally also in the children's best
interest.
The California court in Leonard,93 however, cited the drafters of the
UCCJA as authority for the proposition that the UCCJA is more important than
the parent-child relationship. This assumes that application of the UCCJA is a
388. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953).
389. Burnham, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (requiring significant connection with the state
for an absent parent or transient jurisdiction over a parent who is served process while in the state).
390. E.g, Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051 (citing Scoles & Hay, supra note 385, at 526); and
Bodenheimer, supra note 385, at 1232-34; Ramer, supra note 385, at 381-88.
391. Bodenheimer and Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 385, at 246.
392. Id. (other citations omitted).
393. In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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virtual concomitant of the best interest of the child and due process. That
assumption is a substantial and debatable leap of faith. There is more reasonable
authority for the proposition that the parent-child relationship is constitutionally
fundamental39 and is also in the best interest of the child. 95 It is evident
that custody decisions significantly interfere with family life, even ultimately lead
to termination of parental access and authority.3a Rigorous due process
standards, therefore, should apply.39 To assume away summarily the entire
constitutional analysis does disservice to children, to parents, and to the purposes
of the UCCJA. Thus, the decisions that allow jurisdiction without any due
process analysis misread Shaffer v. Heitner in many important and dangerous
ways.39
8
E. The Constitution and the Scope of the UCCJA
Litigious tugs-of-war over children are no good. The UCCJA and the PKPA
were designed to stop them and have helped.399 Notwithstanding the success
and improvement in the law, we have noted applications of the UCCJA and the
PKPA which are unfair and unconstitutional. Although the "best interest of the
child standard" does not have constitutional dimensions,'0 parental interest in
rearing their children does.'0 ' Because of this, the constitutionality and fairness
394. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 92 S. Ct. 1209', 1212-13 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-19, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1533-35 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S. Ct.
1274, 1280 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66, 64 S. Ct. 438,441 (1944); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995) (quoting In re
Suggs, 291 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1982), to the effect that the parental right to rear their children is
fundamental and "should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances."). See
also J.B. & L.B. v. Washington County, 905 F. Supp. 979, 986 (D. Utah 1995), aff'd, No. 95-4197,
1997 WL 618842 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1997); In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); Blackburn v.
Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-
95); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 n.3 (Tenn. 1993) (liberty interest).
395. See Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, Chs. 1, 5, 8, 12, 13.
396. Watkins v. Watkins, 466 S.E.2d 860, 861-62 (Ga. 1996).
397. Id.; ef Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995) (quoting In re Suggs, 291
S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1982), to the effect that the parental right to rear their children is fundamental and
"should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances."). See also Blackburn,
292 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95).
398. E.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569; In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903,
907-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), which has quite a large progeny.
399. Analysis of the history leading up to the need for the UCCJA follows below.
400. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1993) (holding that the best
interest of the child standard, in the setting of parental vs. foster care and custody, "is not an absolute
and exclusive constitutional criterion for the government's exercise of the custodial responsibilities
that it undertakes, which must be reconciled with many other responsibilities.").
401. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442
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of the UCCJA and the PKPA must be addressed. Constitutional questions may
be asked and answered in a manner consistent with the best interest of the child
and possibly even with the UCCJA. It remains possible that a law could be
written that could satisfy the purposes of the UCCJA, the PKPA and due process.
As they now are read, they do not! The UCCJA, the PKPA, and child custody
jurisdiction generally do not immediately call constitutional issues to mind. They
should. What is best for a given child presents controversial and controverted
issues in the substantive custody hearing and even within and among the social,
behavioral, and medical sciences. The literature on what is best for particular
children after separation of parents is not satisfactory. Studies on the conse-
quences of separation and the "broken home" do not provide much guidance." 2
Many studies are blatantly dogmatic and ideological." 3 Such dogmatism and
ideology has seeped into aspects of UCCJA application. I argue in this section
that constitutional issues and risks arise in many UCCJA decisions. It is
dangerous to allow the important interest of child rearing to be interrupted or
destroyed under the guise of a jurisdictional decision. Yet this happens.
Protecting children in custody matters substantively is based on the "best interests
of the child" test. This is a noble goal, but the vagueness and subjectivity
inherent in this standard make it risky as a guidepost.4 The issue is difficult
enough to resolve in the substantive arena; the difficulty and harm are exacerbat-
ed when effectively done in the guise of jurisdiction. When the ultimate impact
on the children and the functional conclusion to the issue occurs in a jurisdiction-
al setting, the problem becomes insidious and ever more troublesome.
Today, the UCCJA of most states covers adoption and termination
proceedings.'" The Louisiana Children's Code article 307, for example,
(1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. CL 625 (1923); Burge v. City of San Francisco, 262
P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953); Blackledge v. Blackledge, 652 So. 2d 593, 595 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995).
402. Clark & Glowinsky, supra note 72, at 1034 (citing, e.g., Chambers, supra note 72, at 478,
480-86).
403. Consider and compare Goldstein et al., supra note 73 with Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note
73, at 310, 311 and Wallerstein & Blakeslee, supra note 73). Also compare Solnit, supra note 73
with the other articles cited supra note 14.
404. For further analysis and critique of the "best interests" test, see, e.g., Blakesley, Louisiana
Family Law, supra note 1, § 12.13-12.36 (especially § 12.36, "Dangers of the Best Interests Test"),
§ 8.36-8.41 (Adoption).
405. E.g., La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983); La. Ch.C. arts. 307, 310; Stubbs v. Weathersby, 892
P.2d 991, 994 (Or. 1995); Gainey v. Olivo, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Ga. 1988); Noga v. Noga, 443 N.E.2d
1142, 1143 (III. App. Ct. 1982); In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 867 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Kan. 1995).
Some states exclude adoption from coverage by the UCCJA: see In re Johnson, 415 N.E.2d 108,
110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Foster v. Stein, 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). But see Adoption
of A.D.P., 932 P.2d 51 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996). See also PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1994); La.
Ch.C. arts. 307, 310; J.D.S. & J.L.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732, 739 (Ariz. 1995). Most other states
also consider adoption to be covered by the UCCJA. E.g., Ex rel Torres v. Mason, 848 P.2d 592,
593 (Or. 1993) (adoption is subject to UCCJA); Arteaga v. Texas Dep't of Protective Servs., 924




provides that a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over adult parties in cases involving the care, custody, or control of
a child, including adoption. Many of the worst problems in the child custody
jurisdiction arena arise in cases ofjurisdiction to terminate parental authority and
adoption. The model UCCJA did not indicate whether it applied to adop-
tion,'"' but the drafters did note that it was intended to cover "habeas corpus
actions, guardianship petitions, and other proceedings available under general
state law to determine custody.
'4 7
Even though due process requirements are stronger for adoption and
termination of parental authority, courts have considered the requirements of the
UCCJA to be the only prerequisite to jurisdiction. Therefore, in personam
jurisdiction or some other due process protection are not required,O' despite
the reality that the substantive decision is often determined, at least functionally,
at the jurisdictional stage. It ought to be clear that the parent-child relationship
is important enough that it should not be decided at the jurisdictional level. Yet
this is done continually, with virtually no consideration of the constitution,
personal impact, or wisdom of doing so.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, recognized the necessity of in
personam jurisdiction at least where termination ofparental rights is at stake for
a non-domiciliary.0 9 The Court explained the "general rule" that in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident parent is not required for certain "status"
determinations, such as custody under the UCCJA, so long as the nonresident
parent receives sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard.4'0 This "status"
exception was explained by the Texas Supreme Court, which noted that "a family
relationship is among those matters in which the forum state has such a strong
interest that its courts may reasonably make an adjudication affecting that
relationship even though one of the parties to the relationship may have had no
personal contacts with the forum state."'11 It seems clear, therefore, that,
because of their functionally substantive impact on fundamental interests, the
UCCJA and the PKPA are unconstititional as applied in certain circumstances,
at least where it is virtually impossible for a party to litigate custody in the place
in which jurisdiction obtains under the Act. Yet that individual's right to rear
his or her children and the children's right to be reared by them are no less at
stake than they are for the person who is in the "jurisdictional state" who has all
406. UCCJA § 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 117 (1983 & Supp. 1997).
407. See Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note i, § 13.03 and authority cited therein.
See also Brossoit v. Brossoit, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 923-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
408. In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) is typical. See also La.
Ch.C. art. 310 (applying the UCCJA to termination cases).
409. In re Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1299 (Haw. 1996).
410. So procedural due process is generally the only concern. Id. (citing, e.g., Balestrieri v.
Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 563, and n.I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)); In reMarriage of Leonard, 175
Cal. Rptr. at 912; In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992); Martinez v. Reed, 490 So. 2d 303,
306 n.l (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
411. In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992).
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the benefits of litigating at home. The constitutionality of these laws, neverthe-
less, has generally been assumed by courts and scholars without much analy-
sis."' A few states have solved this part of the problem, by providing that
subjecting oneself to UCCJA jurisdiction does not implicate a person to the
court's general personal jurisdiction."
Failure to balance interests is probably unconstitutional when jurisdiction is
allowed under circumstances that make it impossible or extremely difficult and
clearly unfair for the out-of-state party to litigate. The unfairness is even more
serious because the party's relationship with his children are at stake. The party
is coerced to choose to submit to jurisdiction in a state that has no in personam
jurisdiction. Then he is required to travel long distances, to expend immense
sums, and to submit to litigation in a state (often a hostile forum) in which he
has never had any contact, and has few or no evidentiary or support resources.
Custody and many other substantive issues are determined in an extremely unfair
setting. Such circumstances would not meet the standards of International
Shoe"' for litigation of monetary issues or even of Kulko v. Superior
Coure" for child support litigation. Yet, it is considered appropriate in child
custody cases, despite the holding of May v. Anderson which held that in
personam jurisdiction was required."" Yet, generally, jurisdiction to adjudicate
child custody or visitation does not require in personam jurisdiction or any
substantive due process analysis.""' The decisions that have addressed jurisdic-
tion and due process have generally held that in personam jurisdiction requires
"minimum contacts" based upon cases such as International Shoe' s and Kulko
v. Superior Court. 9 It could be argued that they substantiate May.
If the parent chooses to fight for custody of his or her children, his
appearance, in many states, triggers full-blown in personam jurisdiction for
litigation of other issues (child support, alimony, property division, for example)
in a place in which litigation would not have been allowed for reasons of due
412. See Infra discussion at notes 428-430 and accompanying text. Some courts have actually
held that in personamjurisdiction is not required if the UCCJA applies. E.g. Balesbrieri v. Maliska,
622 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that personal jurisdiction not required under
UCCJA, but interprets in personam jurisdiction to be based solely on "mininum contacts"); In re
Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 912; In re M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988)
(termination of parental rights case--this is clearly wrong, but contains a comprehensive discussion
of the issue).
413. Fitzgerald v. Wilson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
414. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
415. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-92, 98 S. CL 1690, 1696-97 (1978).
416. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843-44 (1953) (discussed infra). It
could be argued that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584 (1977) and Kulko,
436 U.S. at 91-92, 98 S. Ct. at 1696-97 affirm May on this point.
417. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (but to hear other issues such as finances, etc.,
it will be required that the nonresident parent raise it); William P. Hogoboom et al., California
Practice Guide: Family Law § 4:19.5 (1996).
418. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154.
419. Kulko, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690.
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process and fairness. '20 Forcing a parent to choose between losing access to
his children, by not litigating custody, or litigating custody in a hostile forum and
thereby triggering in personam'jurisdiction, is inappropriate. Thus, the courts
hold that this submission to jurisdiction to argue custody (when the jurisdictional
state has jurisdiction per the UCCJA) allows consideration of at least some, if not
all, incidental issues. Obviously, making a special appearance to argue against
jurisdiction does not submit a person to the court's general jurisdiction to allow
consideration of other issues.""
Some incidental matters perhaps may properly be considered. For example,
child support may provide an interesting issue which may be related enough to
child custody to allow in personam jurisdiction when child custody or visitation
are litigated pursuant to the UCCJA, at least in some circumstances. The Alaska
Supreme Court held in 1997 that:
Alaska is currently exercising personal jurisdiction over [the father]
under the UCCJA and PKPA for child custody and visitation-related
issues. Texas [the state that issued the original custody and support
orders] no longer has jurisdiction over any issues since all parties have
moved away. Given the interrelatedness of custody and visitation with
child support issues, given that all parties have left the marital domicile,
and given that [the father] is already before the Alaska courts [per the
UCCJA], it would not violate "traditional notions of fair play and
420. See, e.g., Yount v. Mulle, 470 S.E.2d 647, 649 (Ga. 1996) ("Here, the party contesting
personal jurisdiction of the Georgia court is the plaintiff, who made the... choice to avail himself
of the courts of this state... Having invoked this state's jurisdiction... he could not then renounce
it for a related cause unfavorable to him ... (child support] .... The fact that the UCCJA may have
prescribed that [he] ... bring the action ... in Georgia ... does not alter this."); Tataragasi v.
Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239,245 (N.C. CL App. 1996) (pursuant to UCCJA, personal jurisdiction over
defendant not required). See also McCaffery v. Green, 931 P.2d 407,413-14 (Alaska 1997) (holding
that at least the support issue may be addressed, as it is so intertwined with the UCCJA, and the
mother had no other place in which to address the support issue-thus distinguishing Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978)-but making a broader statement in dicta that
the exercise of UCCJA jurisdiction implicates in personam jurisdiction); Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622
So. 2d 561,563-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (in personam jurisdiction is not required, if the UCCJA
applies); Department of Human Servs. v. Pavlovich, 932 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Okla. 1996). Cf. In re
Marriage of Harper, 764 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Mont. 1988) (trial court must determine jurisdiction over
custody or visitation pursuant to the UCCJA, but may still determine child support issues). But see
Puhlman v. Turner, 874 P.2d 291, 295, 297 (Alaska 1994) (holding that being forced into court to
enforce a visitation judgment does not create contacts for jurisdiction over other issues); and
dissenting opinion on McCaffery, 931 P.2d at 408, 412 (arguing that it is incorrect to suggest that
the existence of UCCJA jurisdiction affects the fairness analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment).
But see Fitzgerald, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (where this problem is solved by providing that subjecting
oneself to UCCJA jurisdiction does not implicate a person to the court's general personal
jurisdiction).
421. Chaddick v. Monopoli, 677 So. 2d 347, 349-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concurring
opinion) (special appearance to challenge UCCJA jurisdiction prevents second "bite at the apple" for




substantial justice" to exercise personal jurisdiction over [him] on child
support issues.... 42
The UCCJA and the PKPA, therefore, may cause harsh, unfair results
to both parents and children. Should in personam jurisdiction be required
in matters of child custody jurisdiction? Are the UCCJA and the PKPA
worthy substitutes? We will also consider what the full impact of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause ought to be in custody cases.'23 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires only that a state give the same deference and
effect to a sister state's law or judgments that it gives to its own.424
As we have seen in the historical parts of this article, courts of states to
which children had been removed felt justified in asserting jurisdiction,
even to modify a sister state's custody decree.42 Inconsistencies were
the inevitable result of attempts to struggle with staid notions of
jurisdiction in an era of tremendous mobility and rampant family
strife.
4 26
Perhaps in personam jurisdiction may be put aside if a state has a
compelling interest to do so that outweighs a parent's fundamental interest in
rearing his or her child. 27 Such a decision, however, comports with due
process balancing. When balancing does occur, it must include analysis of the
particular circumstances and evaluation of the compelling state interest as
weighed against the individual parental interest in rearing her child and the
child's fundamental interest in being reared by her parent. This is virtually never
done.
422. McCaffery, 931 P.2d at 415.
423. Coombs, supra note 88, at 718; McGough & Hughes, supra note 93, at 21. In 1982, the
United States Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to make a significant impact on
interstate child custody jurisdiction law and state court jurisdiction over non-domiciliary citizens
generally. However, in this controversial case, Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 970, 102 S. Ct. 2232 (1982), cert.
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S. Ct. 776 (1983), where a Louisiana court of appeal chose to ignore
a Texas custody decree, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari, only to dismiss it later,
without hearing.
424. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254,264, 11 S. Ct. 773,776(1891); Murchison, supra note
2, at 1077. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is found in Article IV, section I of the United States
Constitution. See also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192, 83 S. Ct. 273, 276 (1962); New York v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15, 67 S. Ct. 903,905-06 (1947) (Florida custody decree was modifiable
by a Florida court; hence, New York courts could also modify it. This case did not decide directly
the question of the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on custody cases); Lewis v. Lewis, 404
So. 2d 1230, 1232 (La. 1981).
425. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, Ch.I 3; Clark, supra note 5, § 12.5, at 458;
Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 352; Murchison, supra note 2, at 1077.
426. Clark, supra note 5, § 12.5; Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 345-49; Murchison, supra note
2, at 1076-77.




F. The Need for a Constitutional Requirement of In Personam Jurisdiction or
Some Alternative Due Process Protection
The policies underlying due process and, perhaps, in personam jurisdiction
are pertinent to the interests involved in both the custody and custody jurisdiction
setting. It is worth spending some time at least considering whether some form
of in personam jurisdiction is appropriate and constitutionally necessary, or
whether there is a proper alternative sufficient to satisfy substantive due process.
A hypothetical scenario may help to illustrate. Suppose a couple, married and
domiciled in Alaska with three children, break up. Suppose one party legally
leaves Alaska with the children without an award of custody. She comes to live
in Louisiana, where she stays for six months and files for divorce and custody.
Louisiana is the "home state," hence the UCCJA and the PKPA allow Louisiana
courts to award custody, even without personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
parent. The award may be ex parte, as long as the Alaska parent receives proper
notice. The parent who remained in Alaska faces a "Hobsen's Choice." He
must submit to Louisiana jurisdiction if he wishes to fight for custody.
Otherwise he faces a default judgment. If he has never been to Louisiana and
has no contacts or support there, it is unfair to force the "Hobsen's Choice" and
the litigation would be unfair. In addition, submitting to Louisiana jurisdiction
to fight for custody allows other issues incidental to divorce (alimony, property
division, etc.) to be decided by the Louisiana court, which otherwise would not
have jurisdiction to do so because it would be so unfair. It is surprising that in
personam jurisdiction or some due process fairness alternative is not re-
quired. 2 ' Generally, however, the due process issues have been left largely
unanalyzed by most courts and commentators.429 On the other hand, a few
courts have recently held that while child custody and visitation jurisdiction arise
through the UCCJA and do not depend on in personam jurisdiction, a nonresi-
dent parent can appear in the forum court to contest custody or visitation without
subjecting himself to the court's general personal jurisdiction. 30 This resolves
the problem of being required to litigate other issues, which could not be
litigated but for the UCCJA. It does not resolve the unfairness of
428. See, e.g., Yount v. Mulle, 470 S.E.2d 647, 649 (Ga. 1996) ("[The party contesting
personal jurisdiction of the Georgia court is the plaintiff, who made the... choice to avail himself
of the courts of this state .... Having invoked the state's jurisdiction ... he could not then
renounce it for a related cause unfavorable to him (child support] .... The fact that the UCCJA may
have prescribed that [he] bring the action in Georgia ... does not alter this."); Tataragasi v.
Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239, 245 (N.C. CL App. 1996) (personal jurisdiction over defendant not
required).
429. Cf Bruch, supra note 6; but see Blakesley, supra note 112, at 347-49.
430. Fitzgerald v. Wilson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (raising a point other
than a UCCJA point will concede in personam jurisdiction and amount to a general appearance);
Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (in personam jurisdiction is not
required if the UCCJA applies); Department of Human Servs. v. Paulovich, 932 P.2d 1080 (Okla.
1996). See also Hogoboom et al., supra note 417, § 3:139, § 4:19.5.
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requiring a person to litigate a fundamental matter like custody and the
parent-child relationship in a distant place where the party has no contact
or support.
VII. EXPECTING Too MUCH AND PROVIDING Too LITrLE?-DOES THE
UCCJA PROVIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION? DOES IT ELIMINATE THE NEED
FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION? CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS IN THE UCCJA AND
THE PKPA AS THEY ARE APPLIED
A. General
We have seen that the UCCJA and the PKPA are seriously flawed when they
are read to allow a court to render a default custody judgment when there is no
personal jurisdiction or other substantive due process protections. In addition to
being inherently unfair, this creates a power in the "jurisdictional" parent (often
obtained merely by being the winner of the race to the courthouse) to control
litigation, the child and the other parent. It may be abused, harming everyone
concerned. This power allows, perhaps promotes, obduracy and recalcitrance.
Thus, the UCCJA and the PKPA may be harmful, violate their foundational
principles, and are unconstitutional in certain circumstances. No decision has so
declared.
A summary of the overly optimistic claims and incorrect assumptions about
these laws is in order. Some of the best scholars in the arena, who are right to
promote the UCCJA so zealously for the value it has, also should question
whether it is as good as it ought to be. They correctly note that the UCCJA has
been assumed constitutional by the courts.'' This is true as we have seen; the
courts have merely and amazingly assumed their constitutionality without serious
analysis. The laudable goals such as deterring child-snatching and avoiding
constant jurisdictional wrangling seem to overwhelm careful scrutiny of the
mechanism designed to promote them. The policies are laudable, but the law
must be questioned, as applied to some circumstances. In fact, the UCCJA and
the PKPA have not fully attained the wishes of the drafters as to these righteous
and laudable goals.
B. Some of the Overly Optimistic Assessments and Some Errors
1. Incorrect Application of the "Status Exception "
It is assumed without question that the UCCJA meets due process concerns
and standards based on the confusing ideas in Shaffer v. Heitner's footnote 30,
431. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051-52 (citing Scoles & Hay, supra note 385, § 15.39, at 544
("The case law ... now overwhelmingly assumes or proclaims the constitutionality of the
UCA.")).
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which indicates that the "status exception" be applied to child custody jurisdic-
tion cases.432 It is as if the UCCJA is seen as a substitute for substantive due
process or that the latter is not required.33 This does not even follow from
Shaffer's footnote 30, which simply states that: "[the majority] does not suggest
that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in the text, such as the
particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the
standard of fairness." '4  This dictum provides no authority for the proposition
adhered to by the staunch advocates of UCCJA status quo-that the UCCJA
under all circumstances is so wise and good for children and society that it either
automatically comports with or does not have to comport with rules of in
personam jurisdiction and due process.4" This assumption is erroneous and
dangerous both to parents and to children. First, the language in the footnote
was dictum. Second, it does not even say what they claim it says. Finally, the
law does not fulfill its original purposes as well as it could, but it does violate
fundamental interests of parents and children in the circumstances discussed in
this instant article.
Professor Bruch is among the best of the excellent scholars who argue that
due process requirements are either automatically met or do not need to be met
in the child custody jurisdiction arena. She argues, for example, that the UCCJA
is constitutional and that it is appropriate to ignore due process requirements in
favor of avoiding a "jurisdictional tug-of-war" to protect children.436 She also
argues that the UCCJA provides a solution which allows "the best possible place
to litigate--a place with the most information about the child and possible
custodial arrangements.""' This may be how it ought to be; it might have
been the intent of Professor Bodenheimer (Rapporteur) and the other draft-
ers. 3 This assessment, however, is more optimistic than real.
The language of the UCCJA and PKPA do not even suggest this. For
example, the "home state" basis of jurisdiction predominates over the "best-
interest," "significant connection," and "substantial evidence" bases. 39 Thus,
the optimistic claim is untrue, even on the face of the law; often the "ideal"
place, where the most evidence is available for the best interest of the child, is
not the jurisdictional place. Jurisdiction is often obtained on the basis of being
the first to file." In initial custody actions, where there is concurrent jurisdic-
432. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051-52. The "status exception" will be discussed below.
433. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051-52.
434. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30, 97 S. CL 2569, 2582 n.30 (1977).
435. See, e.g, Bruch, supra note 6. at 1051-52 (citing Scoles & Hay, supra note 385, § 15.39,
at 544; Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, supra note 385, at 240-41.
436. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051.
437. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051.
438. Bodenheirner, supra note 385, at 1221-31.
439. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994); La. UCCJA, R.S. 13:1705, 1712, 1713 (1983).
440. UCCJA § 6. 9 U.L.A. 219 (1988); see, e.g., D'Agnese v. D'Agnese, 468 S.E.2d 140 (Va.
Ct. App. 1996); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
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tion, jurisdiction obtains on the basis of priority of filing."' Sometimes this
is consistent with due process; sometimes it is not. Simply looking at the results
of many cases makes it clear that often the jurisdictional decision works harm to
the child and violates both the parent's and the child's interests. This is done in
the name of jurisdictional clarity or expediency. Thus, although the overall idea
of the UCCJA is important and can be most valuable, it is necessary to analyze
it more carefully and to see if it can be modified more fully to accommodate
substantive due process.
In addition, although "home state" predominance does promote the values
of preventing jurisdictional conflicts, continuous litigation, and child snatching,
in some circumstances, it is neither fair nor beneficial to the child or to the
child's other parent. In this sense the jurisdictional rules sometimes make a
given child expendable to benefit children in general or to deter child snatching
and ongoing litigation. Do we promote a policy that is better for children
generally, but detrimental to a given child? This seems ultimately unhealthy and
destructive of the purported goals of protecting children.
Similarly inconsistent with the optimist's claims, and often extremely unfair
and harmful, is the reality that under the UCCJA and PKPA schemes, the place
where an original custody order is rendered retains jurisdiction, as long as a party
remains in that state and that state's law provides jurisdiction." 2 Thus, often'
the jurisdictional state will not be the one with the more significant connection
to the child and the custodial parent or the one in which the more substantial
evidence regarding the child's well-being exists.443 It may not even be the
home state. Moreover, the jurisdictional forum is sometimes miles away from
the other parent, the evidence and information relating to the child's well-being.
We have seen that significant connection is secondary to home state jurisdiction.
2. Declining Jurisdiction on the Basis of a Party's Misconduct or Forum
Non Conveniens
Another misconception or erroneous claim relates to the inconvenient forum
and unclean hands aspects of the UCCJA.444 Although the UCCJA suggests
that courts relinquish jurisdiction to the more convenient and proper forum,445
this is not required. It is not a bar to jurisdiction, as sometimes claimed.446
Also, although their purposes are the same, the UCCJA and the PKPA are-not
identical. For example, the UCCJA contains a forum non conveniens clause, but
441. Gray v. Gray, 572 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
442. PKPA, 28 U.S.C. I 1738A (CX2)(E)(d) (1994).
443. E.g., Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 653 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (Had Florida courts not
relinquished jurisdiction, Florida would have retained jurisdiction.).
444. UCCJA §§ 7, 8. 9 U.LA. 233, 251 (1988).
445. E.g., id.; La. R.S. 13:1706, 1707 (1983).
446. See Bruch, supra note 6, at 1051-52.
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the PKPA does not."7 The PKPA does not mention a registry of custody
decrees and proceedings, nor does it- provide procedures for inter-
state-inter-court communications."' The UCCJA is intended to prompt a
court to decline jurisdiction where a court is either an inconvenient forum, " 9
or where the child has been brought to a state after abduction or other similar
wrongful conduct. 0  But again, this is not mandatory; hence the high risk of
unfairness in some circumstances.
The UCCJA provides specific criteria to guide the court in its discretion to
decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens and misconduct, such
as abduction.45 ' These are not grounds for a forum to disregard another
forum's jurisdiction, decree, or a pending proceeding. Louisiana's UCCJA, for
example, provides that jurisdiction may be declined due to inconvenient forum
or the asserting party's wrongful conduct.45
2
a. Inconvenient Forum
The inconvenient forum section is discretionary, although it is error not to
consider factors relevant to inconvenient forum.41 The UCCJA provides that
"[a] court which has jurisdiction under this Part to make an initial or modifica-
tion decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a
decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum ... and that a court of another
447.' See UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983) (forum non conveniens
provision).
448. E.g., La. RS. 13:1705, 1706 (1983). For more on differences and similarities, see
Blakesley, supra note 112.
449. UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983); see also Cal. Fam. Code. §
3407(a) (West 1994)); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.1316 (West 1997); In re Stephanie M., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
595, 603 (Cal. 1994); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990); Rohlfs v. Rohlfs, 666
So. 2d 572 n.8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) ("[als the Yurgel court recognized 'there may be circumstances
in which equity and fairness require the courts of Florida to decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction
because another state is the more appropriate forum."); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613 So. 2d 717, 718 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1993) (jurisdiction relinquished by Florida court), same case new issues, 653 So. 2d
707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1987);
Wilson v. Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44,45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Lustig v. Lustig, 560 N.W.2d 239 (S.D.
1997).
450. La. R.S. 13:1707(a) (1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.1318 (West 1997). See, e.g., Fuge v.
Uiterwyk. 613 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); see also In re Custody of T.B., 1994 WL 49591
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Koons v. Koons, 615 N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
451. The UCCJA provides that a state having jurisdiction may decline to exercise it, when a
party has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible
conduct. UCCJA §§ 7 (inconvenient forum), 8 (wrongful conduct), 9 U.L.A. 233, 251 (1988); La.
R.S. 13:1706, 1707 (1983). See Janik v. Janik, 542 So. 2d 615, 618-19 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989);
Ehsani v. Ehsani, 519 So. 2d 288, 291 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). See also Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 613
So. 2d 717 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
452. La. R.S.13:1706, 1707 (1983).
453. Lustig v. Lustig, 560 N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 1997).
[Vol. 58
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
state is a more appropriate forum. ,,4." The factors to be considered for
inconvenient forum include: 4"
5
(1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; (2) if
another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or
with the child and one or more of the contestants; (3) if substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training and personal relationships is more readily available in another
state; (4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less
appropriate; and (5) if the exercise of the jurisdiction by a court of this
state would contravene any of the purposes stated in section L4s6
When it works as intended it is quite beneficial. For example, when an Illinois
Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of a custody action on the basis of forum
non conveniens.4" The parents were living with their children when the action
for divorce was filed, but by the time the court vacated its divorce judgment and
ordered a new trial (because it decided that the wife was incompetent), both
parties and their children had been living in Massachusetts for several months.
To require them to return to Illinois for litigation would require that they find
alternate care for their children (who are living with the father) and would
separate the wife from her co-guardian sister and familiar medical facilities in
Massachusetts. Thus, Massachusetts was found to be the better forum to "serve
the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice. 458 Massachusetts had
acquired a substantial interest in the outcome. It was eminently proper for the
Illinois court to defer to Massachusetts.
b. A Party's Misconduct
i. General
Even the so-called "unclean hands" element of the UCCJA is no more than
a suggestion that a court "may decline" jurisdiction "[i]f the petitioner. .. has
wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar
reprehensible conduct.., the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this
is just and proper under the circumstances."459 Shocking cases arise, such as
454. UCCJA § 7,9 U.L.A. 233 (1988) (emphasis added); La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983); see also Calif.
Farn. Code. § 3407(a) (West 1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.1316 (West 1997); In re Stephanie M., 867
P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990); Mancusi v. Mancusi, 519
N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1987); Wilson v. Wilson, 465 S.E. 2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
455. La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983); cf Janik v. Janik, 542 So. 2d 615, 618 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
456. UCCJA § 7(c), 9 U.L.A. 233 (1988); La. R.S. 13:1706(C) (1983); cf. Janik. 542 So. 2d
at 617; Shaw v. Shaw, 735 P.2d 96, 97-98 (Wash. CL App. 1987).
457. In re Clark, 597 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Il. App. Ct. 1992).
458. Id. at 243.
459. UCCJA § 8(a), 9 U.L.A. 251 (1988); La.R.S. 13:1707(a) (1983) (emphasis added); Fla.
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In re Marriage of Hudson,' 0 where a father was held bound by a custody
award to the mother who had abducted their child. The UCCJA bases were met
and the forum state did not decline jurisdiction. The award was made at a
hearing that the father was unable to attend. It was held in a state to which the
mother had run after abducting the children' 6' and with which the father had
no relationship or contacts at all."62 Yet, the father was required to litigate
custody in that state and, ultimately, to lose custody of his children.
Such cases cause us to question the optimistic assessment that "... the
UCCJA is a fine example of the ways that constitutional doctrine can be shaped
through legislation in the service of sound policy .... ",46' Even the policy of
deterring child abduction was not met. In reality, so much of such importance
to the happiness and well-being of parents and children is at stake,'" that some
consideration of due process must be required. Euphoria over the good that the
acts do is not sufficient. The UCCJA provides insufficient protection for parents
and children. Their constitutional liberty interests are given short shrift.'65
Some courts avoid this pitfall and protect protagonists somewhat by
interpreting the terms "wrongful" or "reprehensible behavior" to include a
"taking" or a "retention" of a child in violation of a parental or concomitant
"right."4 66 They further hold that to be wrongful or reprehensible, the taking
or retention does not have to be in violation of an outstanding "order" or
"decree,"nor is it a defense that no order or decree has been entered. Jurisdiction
will be declined when the conduct is 'so objectionable that a court ... cannot
in good conscience permit the party access.. ,,,4.. Unfortunately not all
jurisdictions do the same.
Stat. Ann. § 61.1318 (West 1997). E.g., Young v. Young, 670 So. 2d 689,691-92 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1996) (cannot take the child from partner and come to Louisiana to "get the home field advantage
when custody was decided").
460. In re Maniage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. App. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1202
(1983).
461. So here it does not even promote the policy to deter abductions.
462. See Coombs, supra note 88, at 749. See also the discussion in Helen P. Garfield, Due
Process Rights of Absent Parents in Interstate Custody Conflicts: A Commentary on In re Marriage
of Hudson, 16 Ind. L. Rev. 445 (1983).
463. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1053.
464. The UCCJA generally applies to adoption and to termination of parental rights proceedings.
See, e.g., La. Ch. Code arts. 307, 310; La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201
(1996); In re L.S., 943 P.2d 621 (Okla. 1997); Gainey v. Olivo, 373 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Ga. 1988); Noga
v. Noga, 443 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (III. App. Ct. 1982); In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 867 P.2d
1074, 1077 (Kan. 1995); Foster v. Stein, 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. 1990); Stubbs v. Weathersby, 892
P.2d 991, 994 (Or. 1995). Some states exclude adoption from coverage by the UCCJA, see In re
Johnson, 415 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
465. See Wasserman, supra note 82, at 819-23 (arguing that the status exception should neither
apply to divorce nor to custody jurisdiction); Blakesley. Louisiana Family Law, supra note 1, Chs.
1,13.
466. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 925 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Alaska 1996).
467. Id. at 1343 (citing Stokes v. Stokes, 751 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Alaska 1988)); Williams v.
Zacher, 581 P.2d 91, 94 (Or. 1978).
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Other states, like California, Nevada, Utah and Washington, have added a
requirement that, in circumstances in which the court declines to exercise
jurisdiction based upon petitioner's wrongful conduct (UCCJA section 8), the
person in the other state, having legal custody, must be notified and given an
opportunity to request return of the child or to request that petitioner appear with
the child in a custody proceeding in the other state.""s A party who has
wrongfully taken or retained a child has the opportunity and burden to show that
conditions in the other state are harmful to the child. 69
Thus, inconsistency and strife prevail among states in this arena. Some
states emphasize the anti-child abduction aspect, while others emphasize the
child-protection aspect of the law."7" Often, unfortunately, forum chauvinism
and prejudice still seem to thrive in the atmosphere of concurrent jurisdic-
tion.47' Courts having jurisdiction under the UCCJA and PKPA often assert
it and render a decision favoring their domiciliary, simply because the person is
their domiciliary.' One state may be the home state and another the state
with the more significant connections with the child and the more substantial
evidence.
ii. "Punitive Decrees"
A punitive decree is one that transfers custody from the parent who violated
the UCCJA by removing a child from the.jurisdiction, or wrongfully retaining
the child, or committing some other violation of a court's order, to the other
parent who did not violate the law. Although such "punitive decrees" deter child
snatching, a debate rages over whether they ought to be allowed. Many suggest
adoption of a special rule not requiring recognition of punitive decrees. 73
Some courts have followed this special rule, refusing to enforce decrees that were
468. See Cal. Fam. Code § 3408 (West 1989); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-8 (3), (4) (1996);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.27.080 (3), (4) (West 1997).
469. Id.
470. For discussion of the schizophrenic nature of the UCCJA, see Blakesley, supra note 112,
at 302-04; Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra note I, Ch. 13.
471. The depth of prejudice and chauvinism favoring residents is shown in Salisbury v.
Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("We conclude that the Tennessee decree,
as modified .... is entitled to enforcement by the state of Texas, which we would point out would
still be a province had Tennesseans not fought at the Alamo."), cited and quoted in Waller, supra
note 12, at 275 n.20.
472. See Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d at 768.
473. Brigitte Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal. L. Rev.
978, 1003-09 (1977) ("Punitive decrees, decrees transferring custody to the other parent when a
parent has left the local jurisdiction or otherwise has disregarded a court's authority on a custody
matter, should be abolished as they restrict interstate movement and often cause the very problems
that the UCCJA was meant to correct."); but see Helen Donigan, Child Custody Jurisdiction: New
Legislation Reflects Public Policy Against Parental Abduction, 19 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1983)
(criticizing the rule of non-recognition of punitive decrees).
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issued in response to a party's failure to comply with court orders,474 even
though this policy has a potential for abuse and promotes child snatching."'
Many courts which retain the punitive decree rule apply it with circumspec-
tion. 76 For example, it was held that "[a] punitive decree, issued in response
to a custodial parent's flight with the child from a jurisdiction, is not favored
unless it is 'just and proper under the circumstances.""' " "Generally, ...
temporary [emergency] custody orders, because of their temporary nature, should
not be deemed punitive."' s They hold the punitive decree principle to be
narrow; sister state decrees are considered punitive only if the state changes or
awards custody, without regard to the interests of the child solely to punish one
parent for disregarding its authority. 79
Sometimes, declining jurisdiction is quasi-mandatory, unless required in the
interest of the child. Section 8(b) provides that "the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify [an extant] custody decree of another state if the petitioner,
without the consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed
the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
physical custody, ifjust and proper under the circumstances."8 0 Even here,
therefore, the decision to decline jurisdiction is discretionary."'
X. INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON CHILD ABDUCTION
A. Issues and General Thoughts
Do the UCCJA and the PKPA apply to circumstances arising out of or in
relation to foreign countries? Is any deference owed to the laws of foreign
countries? Is that deference based on customary international law? On United
States Law? On comity? Between 1973 and 1993, the United States State
474. See, e.g., Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599, 605 (Iowa 1980).
475. See In re Lemond, 395 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (decree awarding custody
to mother in Hawaii not "punitive"); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360, 1367 (Me. 1983)
("This principle, however, is narrow; foreign decrees are punitive only if a sister state changes or
awards custody, without regard to the best interest of the child, solely to punish one parent for
disregarding its authority."); Brooks v. Brooks, 530 P.2d 547, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (order held
punitive as effort to discipline mother for interference with father's visitation right, and thus subject
to judicial inquiry).
476. E.g., Rock v. Rock, 475 S.E.2d 540, 545-46 (W. Va. 1996).
477. Slidell, 298 N.W.2d at 605.
478. Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Okla. 1981).
479. Rock, 475 S.E.2d at 546; Spaulding, 460 A.2d at 1367; Bodenheimer, supra note 473, at
1003-09.
480. UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. 251 (1988) (emphasis added); La. R.S. 13:1707 B (1983); Janik
v. Janik, 542 So. 2d 615, 618-19 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
481. UCCJA §§ 7, 8, 9 U.L.A. 233-34, 251 (1988).
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Department received reports of 4,563 children having been abducted by parents
from the United States and taken to a foreign country.8 2 Foreign countries
report similar statistics. Although the UCCJA and the PKPA may apply to
circumstances arising in and in relation to foreign countries, historically, these
problems have been addressed at the national level. There is a split of opinion
among the various states, however, over the extent to which the UCCJA applies
to international circumstances. There is no doubt that it applies to foreign custody
or related judgments.48 3 Whether it applies beyond that is debated, but the better
view is that the UCCJA applies to international disputes. 48 ' Although there is
divergent opinion on this point,"5 the trend is to apply the acts." 6
B. UCCJA Section 23-Requirement to Promote the Policies of the UCCJA
in the International Arena
UCCJA section 23 provides: "The general policies of this Part extend to the
international arena. The provisions of this Part relating to the recognition and
enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and
decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institutions
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.""" The same goes
for the general policies and purposes of the UCCJA and the PKPA noted in
482. Tom Harper, The Limitations of the Hague Convention and Alternative Remedies for a
Parent Including Re-Abduction, 9 Emory int'l L. Rev. 257, 258 (1995).
483. E.g., UCCJA § 23, 9 U.L.A. 326 (1988), La. R.S. 13:1722 (1983).
484. See. e.g., Winton-lbanez v. Ibanez, 690 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (trial
court properly declined jurisdiction in favor of the home state, France); Horlander v. Horlander, 579
N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (there is "no difficulty in applying the provisions of the UCCJA
[to foreign circumstances)"); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal. 1994); Zwerling v. Zwerling, 636 N.Y.S.2d 595,
600 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1995); L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Weisbaden, Germany, R.B. and A.B., 568
N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. Fain. CL 1991). Q. Suki v. Kovacs, No. CIV.A95-6805, 1995 WL 631969, at
*I (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995) (applied Hague Convention and UCCJA); Journe v. Journe, 911 F. Supp.
43 (D.P.R. 1995) (party had waived rights under Hague Convention on Child Abduction, but the
UCCJA applied); Kaplan-White v. White, 220 A.2d 424, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
485. Compare lvaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that
the UCCJA does not apply between New Jersey and Morocco) with its reversal by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Ivaldi v. lvaldi, 685 A.2d 1319 (N.J. 1996), and with Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d
at 704 (rejecting foreign resident's argument that UCCJA does not apply to international custody
disputes); Black v. Black, 657 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. Ct.), app. denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (1995)
(applying UCCJA internationally); In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d at 713. See general discussion of
the application of UCCJA principles to international cases, Infra at Section X.
486. See, e.g., In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d at 713; Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239,
246 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (emergency jurisdiction applied despite father's pending action in Turkey);
Black, 657 A.2d at 966.
487. La. R.S. 13:1722 (1983);see e.g., McFaull v. McFaull, 560 So. 2d 1013,1014-15 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1990). Other states so provide as well. E.g., Horlander, 579 N.E.2d at 94; L.H. v. Youth
Welfare Office of Weisbaden, Germany, R.B. and A.B., 568 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1991).
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Section 1 of the UCCJA.88 Although it is obvious that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not apply to foreign countries, comity and specific legislation
in the United States do. Parental kidnapping is a federal felony, calling for up
to three years imprisonment." 9 It is also a felony in most (if not all) states.
The federal felony (and likely the state crimes as well) provide at least three
affirmative defenses: (1) custody or visitation award to defendant pursuant to the
UCCJA; (2) flight from a pattern of domestic violence; and (3) defendant had
physical custody (e.g., proper visitation) and failed to return the child for reasons
beyond his control."0 Does the UCCJA or any other state or federal law call
for relinquishment of jurisdiction in cases wherein the only connection with the
state is the fact that one of the parents abducted the children and now resides
there."' This section will show that the cases which hold that the UCCJA and
the PKPA apply internationally are correct. The UCCJA itself provides
that its policies and principles of the UCCJA require state courts to accept
or to relinquish jurisdiction in international situations, based upon principles
of the UCCJA."9  This is discussed in detail below in the section on
UCCJA section 23, which requires the courts to decide cases to promote
the policies and principles of the UCCJA, even in the international
arena.
493
488. Winton-lbanez v. Ibanez, 690 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (the general
policies of the UCCJA apply internationally).
489. Pub. L. No. 103-173, 107 Stat. 1998, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994). The problem
with this felony is that it (probably unconstitutionally) makes it a felony to abduct a child from the
United States or to retain (abroad) a child who has habitually been in the United States. It shows
the importance of international abductions, but inanely does not include even United States citizens
(let's say parents in the State Department assigned abroad) whose children are abducted by the other
parent and brought to the United States from abroad. There are many other circumstances where the
equal protection clause is breached here, but that is another paper. The bottom line may be that the
statute itself, given its chauvinistic (thus vote getting) nature will not be helpful, unless it has been
held unconstitutional and expanded to cover abductions from abroad where children are brought to
the United States.
490. 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994) provided that the defendant make reasonable efforts to notify the
other legal custodian of the problem within 24 hours of the end of his visitation period.
491. In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (applying La. R.S.
13:1702(3)(i) to situation relating to Canada); see also In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal.
1994).
492. UCCJA § 23,9 U.L.A. 326 (1988). See, e.g., Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d
700, 704-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting foreign resident's argument that UCCJA does not apply
to international custody disputes and expressly holding that Minnesota's UCCJA does so apply). The
Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the UCCJA first to file rule and the rule that jurisdiction obtains
if the foreign law does not conform to the UCCJA (citing Nazar v. Nazar, 474 N.W.2d 206, 208
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991)). See also, e.g., In re Fischer, 666 So. 2d at 725 (applying La.R.S.
13:1702(3Xi) to situation relating to Canada); see also In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d at 713.




1. The Policies of the UCCJA-Applicable to Cases Involving Foreign
Nations
As important as any judicial decision applying the UCCJA to international
circumstances is the UCCJA itself; its language, policy and underlying principles
are applicable internationally. The policies of the UCCJA and the PKPA do not
depend upon any national factor."94 Deterrence of child abduction, continued
and harmful litigation over child custody, and forum shopping are not mere
domestic issues. These policies formed the very foundation of the laws'
promulgation. Child snatching and the other abuses that the UCCJA and the
PKPA are aimed at deterring are encouraged when state courts ignore the
international application of the UCCJA. Just because it requires a treaty to bind
another country to act does not mean that domestic law does not obtain. This
is why the UCCJA extends internationally. This would occur with or without
Section 23. Any limitation of the law to domestic litigation encourages child
snatching, abuse of children for purposes of forum shopping, and continuing
litigation under circumstances that make it much harder for parents to protect
themselves. It should not be the policy of the Louisiana law to encourage
parents to snatch their children, whether this is prior to or after a custody decree,
and run to Louisiana. Yet this is what a state does when it refuses to apply the
UCCJA to international circumstances. Decisions recognizing state jurisdiction,
where another nation is clearly the "home state," has "significant connection"
with the child and the parents, and "substantial evidence" regarding the issue of
custody and the best interest of the child unwittingly promote the risk of harm
to children.
Many courts that have considered the issue have held that the term "state"
in the UCCJA may include a foreign state.495 Very few appellate level courts
have held that the UCCJA does not apply to foreign states. Virtually all of those
states did not include the equivalent of Section 23 (the international application
494. It is true that the PKPA has been read to be a Full Faith and Credit law, but that does not
mean that its purposes are limited to notions of Full Faith and Credit.
495. See, e.g., Zenide v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(considering France the "home state"); Stock v. Stock, 677 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding UCCJA to apply to international custody dispute-Switzerland and Florida);
Horlander v. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (applying UCCJA to the question
of whether France or Indiana is the "home state"); McFaull v. McFaull, 650 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1990) (extending UCCJA to the international arena allows treatment of Leningrad,
Russia, as a city within a "state" under the terms of the UCCJA); Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d at 704
(applying the UCCJA to international custody disputes); Jvald, 685 A.2d at 1323; Black v. Black,
657 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (a foreign country may be considered "home state" per
UCCJA); Adkins v. Antapara, 850 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (home-state analysis
applies between domestic and foreign state); Middleton v. Middleton, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va.
1984) (England is equivalent of "home state'). But see Klien v. Klien, 533 N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988) (Israel may not be considered "home state" pursuant to UCCJA.).
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of UCCJA policy) in their law.496 The analysis of these courts count the
absence of Section 23 as crucial.
2. Louisiana: McFaull v. McFaull
Not many Louisiana decisions, nor those in other states, have considered the
international application of the UCCJA. In a recent Louisiana case, however, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the UCCJA is applicable to international
circumstances.497 The mother and father were married in Leningrad in 1985.
The father had resided in New Orleans and the mother in Leningrad since then.
The father visited Leningrad several times and the couple lived together in New
Orleans for almost two months in 1987. The mother gave birth to the child in
Leningrad on February 6, 1988. The father visited mother and child in
Leningrad, where he stayed for about nine months. After that, the family lived
together in New Orleans from February to May 1989. Then the mother and
child returned to Leningrad. They returned to New Orleans and again lived
together there from December 21, 1989 for about four months. Thus, Louisiana
did not become the "home state" under the terms of the UCCJA. The last time
the mother attempted to leave Louisiana with the child, father had them removed
from the plane (which had stopped in New York on the way to Leningrad). The
father had the child brought back to New Orleans. The mother followed. In any
action for custody or visitation, the initial question is whether the court has
jurisdiction (subject matter legal authority) to make the custody determina-
498tion.
The majority held that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1702(A)(4) [UCCJA
section 3(A)(4)] confers jurisdiction, notwithstanding the failure of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:1701(10) to include foreign countries in its definition of
"states." Although no state had become "home state" because of the parent's
frequent moves, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal clearly and correctly held
that the UCCJA applies; UCCJA section 23 [Louisiana Revised Statutes 1722]
along with Louisiana Revised Statutes 1702(A)(4) provide jurisdiction, even
under international circumstances, when no other state would have jurisdiction
pursuant to law similar to the UCCJA.4' The concurring opinion argued that
496. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
("Since Missouri has not adopted § 23 ... , it is clear that the legislature did not intend the word
'state' as used in [the jurisdictional section] to include a foreign country."); Schroeder v. Vigil-
Escalera Perez, 664 N.E.2d 627, 636-37 (Ohio Com. P1. 1995) ("While some states have extended
the general policies of the UCCJA to the international arena, Ohio has not promulgated similar
provisions in its adoption of the UCCJA.").
497. McFaull v. McFaull, 560 So. 2d 1013 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); see also Noordin v.
Abdulla, 947 P.2d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (UCCJA applies to international custody disputes by
virtue of RCW 26.27.230 (Wash. statute identical to La. UCCJA, La. R.S. 13:1722J); Dincer v.
Dincer, 701 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. 1997) (exactly the same under identical Pennsylvania UCCJA).
498. McFaull, 560 So. 2d at 1014-15.
499. Id. at 1014.
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the significant connection basis also provided jurisdiction. 5°° On the other
hand, it could have been argued, perhaps, that the father unlawfully brought the
minor back to Louisiana, thus allowing the court to refuse to assert jurisdiction.
That, also, would have been a proper application of the UCCJA. At any rate, the
policies of the UCCJA apply to international circumstances as does the law
itself.501 The UCCJA was correctly applied to this international case.
The court noted that ". . . the general policies of the UCCJA ... extend to
the international area ... ."501 The drafters of the UCCJA clearly intended that
it apply internationally. The policies of combatting child abduction, forum
shopping, multiple and continuous litigation, and chauvinistic decisions which
feed the evils for which the UCCJA was promulgated, all are promoted, indeed
incited, when state courts do not apply the principles of the UCCJA to the
international arena. This is why Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1722 [UCCJA
section 23] provides for such international application. To do otherwise would
allow crossing international borders to defeat the purposes of the law: "[T]he
general policies of the UCCJA ... extend to the international area. . .. "','
Failure to apply the UCCJA may cause children to suffer the "strain of life on
the run, . . . life in an atmosphere of instability and insecurity, without any
access to the other parent," and will damage children, causing them to lose any
chance "to develop a sense of belonging and whose personal attachments ... are
cruelly disrupted, [so that the child] may well be crippled for life."' " These
harmful effects are incited when state courts do not apply the principles of the
UCCJA to the international arena. This is why the UCCJA provides for such
international application. To do otherwise would allow crossing international
borders to defeat the purposes of the law.
The amount of respect given a decree from a foreign nation is enhanced by
the new Hague Convention which we will discuss immediately below. European
Countries, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, have entered into another
convention that provides rules for the recognition and enforcement of child
custody decrees by nations party to the convention. Article 23 of the Strasbourg
Convention provides that non-European nations may accede to the Convention
by invitation. 5
500. Id. at 1014-15.
501. UCCJA § 23,9 U.L.A. 326(1988); La. R.S. 13:1722 (1983); McFaull, 560 So. 2d at 1014-
15. Other states so provide as well. See. e.g., In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal. 1994);
Horlander v. Horlander, 579 N.E.2d 91.94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547
N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. CL App. 1996); L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Weisbaden, Germany,
R.B. and A.B., 568 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1991).
502. La. R.S. 13:1722 (1983); McFaull, 560 So. 2d at 1014.
503. La.R.S. 13:1722 (1983); McFaull, 560 So. 2d at 1014.
504. McFaull, 560 So. 2d 1013.
505. Council of Europe: European Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, May 20,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 273.
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Although no full faith and credit is owed foreign laws, Louisiana's and many
other states' choice-of-law rules require that the jurisdiction having the more
important policy stake in the case should have its laws apply.' This applies
to the international as well as the domestic arena and, of course, it includes the
law relating to jurisdiction. Furthermore, comity, although not mandatory, calls
for nations, and therefore United States states, to give similar respect to other
nations' laws. As long as the law of the foreign nation is not anathema to
custody law. in the United States state, it ought to be given comity or the
equivalent to full faith and credit. This is especially true in the custody arena,
where to do otherwise will injure children and allow them to be pawns of parents
who happen to have some international connection. This is precisely why the
UCCJA was drafted as it was.
Thus, when a state court takes jurisdiction in a situation in which a foreign
nation is the home state, or which has the more significant connection and where
the more substantial evidence is found, that court violates the UCCJA! The fact
that the home state or the significant connection or the substantial evidence
happen to be in a foreign nation is irrelevant to the issue of the UCCJA's
application. Moreover, to take jurisdiction when a child has been removed from
his home state or the state in which he has resided for a significant period of
time (enough to be the home state) or from the place where all the evidence
relating to the well-being of the child, fosters child abduction and the abuse of
the child that goes along with using international borders as the means of
avoiding the responsibility that custody law places on the courts and the parents
or other parties in interest. The court is not only violating the very essence of
the Louisiana UCCJA, it is facilitating, indeed participating in, the abuse. The
purposes and policies of Louisiana law require that deference be given to the law
of a foreign state under circumstances such as that in McFaull v. McFaull,s7
discussed below.
International application is consistent with the comments of the original
rapporteurs of the UCCJA. For example, in their comment to Section 23, they
note that the Act's general policies, as delineated in UCCJA section 1, "are to
be followed when some of the persons involvedare in a foreign country or a
foreign custody proceeding is pending.... ." Thus, the narrow reading of Section
23, to make it limitative, is wrong. Such a reading does a disservice to the
purposes of the UCCJA and the families involved. The general purposes of the
Act are further accomplished by international application~sos Reading the terms
of the UCCJA in pai materia makes it clear that its policies and rules apply to
506. La. Civ. Code arts. 3519-3522.
507. McFauil, 560 So. 2d 1013.
508. lvaldi v. ivaldi, 685 A.2d 1319, 1325 (N.J. 1996); see also Linda Silberman, Hague
International Child Abduction Convention: A Progress Report, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 209, 249
n.199 (1994) ("The principles of the UCCJA may be used to locate the litigation in the child's home
state to recognize and/or enforce a foreign decree.").
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any state, domestic or foreign.'" This conclusion comports with the central
policy of the UCCJA: to assure that custody litigation occurs in the place where
the child and his or her family have the closest connection.10 There can be
no doubt that a foreign state is both a "state" and a "place" and that the central
policy applies whether the child is removed to a foreign state or to a domestic
one.
51!
3. The Counter Argument
Many courts hold that the UCCJA only applies when there is an extant
custody decree. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in December,
1996, held that the UCCJA applies to international circumstances."' It noted
that, at first blush, the statutory language suggests that the Act applies to custody
disputes between residents of different states and not to such disputes when one
party resides in a foreign country. The Act describes the jurisdiction ... in
relation to jurisdiction of other "states." In addition, legislative findings assert
that the UCCJA's purpose is to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with
courts of other "states." The Act's definition of "states" does not explicitly cover
foreign "states", noting that it covers "any state, territory, or possession of [the
United States], the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Colum-
bia." But there is no indication that the list is exclusive. Moreover, the purpose
and policy section relating to "international application" could well be read to
extend the definition of "state" to any state, including foreign states."1 3 This
section extends the "general policies of [the UCCJA] to the international arena."
4. Proposed Replacement for the UCCJA Makes International
Application Even More Explicit
The proposed revision of the UCCJA, the Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which is currently being considered by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,""4 explicitly provides
that all of its provisions apply to the international arena. California courts, for
example in In re Stephanie M., held that they had jurisdiction to determine the
custody of a minor (Mexican national) under the UCCJA.515 The minor,
although a Mexican national, had resided in California with her parents (also
Mexican nationals). The court stated that "[one of the primary purposes of the
UCCJA is to] avoid the disruption to the life of a child involved in relitigation
509. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d at 1323.
510. Id. at 1323. See Neger v. Neger, 459 A.2d 628, 633 (N.J. 1983).
511. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d at 1323.
512. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d at 1322-25.
513. UCCJA § 23, 9 U.L.A. 326 (1988).
514. Draft, Uniform State Laws., Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (1996).
515. In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994).
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of custody matters ... once a custody order is entered by a court with
jurisdiction under [the UCCJA]." 6 The California Court also held that no
treaty or other source of international law precludes California courts from
asserting jurisdiction in a case properly brought, but that the prerequisites of the
UCCJA were applicable.517 California was the "home state" and the state
"with the more significant connection" to the parents and the child, and with
substantial evidence relating to the child's well-being. The UCCJA leaves no
doubt but that its policies and principles apply in international cases. Is
jurisdiction limited to cases in which a custody order is issued in another
country? Section 23 so states, but the policies transcend the language. It could
certainly be read to mean that at least where a custody order has been issued.
This would seem to be required to promote the policies of the UCCJA.
C. The Hague Convention
1. General
The UCCJA and the PKPA are not the only laws on international jurisdiction
over child custody. In 1980, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction was formed to complement our UCCJA and PKPA
in the international arena.5 The Hague Convention is different from the
UCCJA and PKPA in that it does not formulate recognition and enforcement
standards, but requires the prompt restoration of the custody that existed before
the alleged abduction." 9 Accession to the Convention is not possible, unless
and only to the extent that, it is accepted by the other party-states on an
individual basis. When a nation is not formally a member of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law of 1980, a prerequisite to automatic
acceptance into the Convention fold, accession to the Convention is effective
between the acceding state and other party-states which officially accept its
accession.
516. Id. at 716 (In this case, the foreign court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction over any
"connection jurisdiction" under the act.).
517. Id.
518. October 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980); Hague International Child Abduction
Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10498 (1986); Department of State, Treaties in Force 328 (1989); Exec.
Order No. 12,648, 53 Fed. Reg. 30, 637 (1988). The full Convention and State Department analysis
of it may be found in 51 Fed. Reg. 10494-10516 (1986). See generally ABA, International Child
Abductions: A Guide to Applying the Hague Convention, with Forms (2d ed. DeHart, 1993).
519. See Martin J. Bodzin, Comment, International Parental Child Abduction: The Need for
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Custody Decrees, 3 Emory J. Int'l Dispute Res. 205, 212
(1989); Brigitte Bodenheimer, Explanatory Comments on the Preliminary Draft Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1979), reprinted In Joint Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Child
and Human Development of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong. 346 (1980).
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2. United States Enabling Legislation Giving Force to the Hague
Convention
With regard to nations not party to the Convention, the respect afforded
custody decisions varies from state to state and from fact situation to fact
situation, although the available cases show a willingness to recognize foreign
decrees based on laws which comport with or approximate UCCJA standards.
The United States ratified the Hague Convention in 1986. It went into effect in
1988, upon the enactment of its enabling legislation, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). 20 This Act provides that it "shall apply
to any child who was habitually resident in a contracting state immediately
before any breach of custody or access rights."'' The Convention also ceases
to apply when an abducted child reaches the age of sixteen years.5" ' The
Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming found that the Child
Abduction Remedies Act does not stand alone.' 3 The Act in itself provides
no substantive rights, stating that it "empower[s] courts in the United States to
determine only rights under the Convention....,52 4
Thus, the Act is a procedural mechanism provided to allow a petitioner
access within the United States to those remedies provided under the Hague
Convention.' 2 ' Though the Act does allow a petitioner to seek remedies under
other international agreements, the court found that this was not the same as
allowing a petitioner from a state which is not party to the Hague Convention to
apply the Remedies Act to obtain the return of a child who was also habitually
resident in the same state not a party to the Convention prior to the abduction.
The Remedies Act also provides the courts with authority to fashion provisional
remedies [42 U.S.C. § 11604(a)]. But providing authority for provisional
remedies does not provide authority to fashion permanent remedies under the
color of the Remedies Act or the Convention.' 6 Passing enabling legislation
and incorporating the Hague Convention into United States domestic law did not
create rights and remedies broader than those available under the Convention.
Of course, absent treaties and enabling legislation, foreign country custody orders
are recognized and enforced by way of comity. The amount of respect given a
decree or order from a foreign nation varies from state to state in the United
States and from fact situation to fact situation, although the available cases
suggest that there may be an emerging willingness to recognize foreign decrees
based on laws which comport with or approximate UCCJA standards.
520. Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (1988), codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610(1994).
521. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
1, art 4 (emphasis added).
522. Id.
523. In re Moshen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D. Wyo. 1989).
524. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(bX4) (1994); In re Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D. Wyo. 1989).
525. In re Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. at 1065.
526. Id. at 1065 n.3.
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3. The Underlying Policies of the Convention and the Enabling Act
The Convention's stated objective is "to secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State," and "to ensure that
rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States. ' 527 Article 19 of the
Convention and Section 2(b)(4) of the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act 28 empower a court of a Contracting State to determine the merits of an
alleged abduction, but not the merits of the underlying custody claims or
issues.529 The Hague Convention's underlying policy is essentially to secure
a swift return of an abducted child to the state in which he or she was an
habitual resident, without undertaking a full investigation of the case's
merits. 30 Thus, it and its enabling legislation are aimed at curbing internation-
al child abduction by providing judicial remedies to restore the status quo ante.
State courts iave held that the UCCJA applies to provide deference to custody
awards from foreign countries."'
4. How It Works
The remedies of the Hague Convention may be invoked when two threshold
issues have been satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. 33 First, the
moving party must establish that she or he had lawful custody rights in the child
when the child was wrongfully removed or retained. Second, the removal or
retention must be from the child's "habitual residence." Articles 3 and 5(a) of
the Convention provide that the removal gr retention is wrongful when "(a) it is
in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person. . . under the law of the
state in which the child was a habitual resident immediately before the removal
or retention; and (b) at the time of the removal or retention, those rights were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but
for the removal or retentiot."
Thus, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the removal was wrongful. Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the
other party, who must prove: (1) by clear and convincing evidence, that there
is a grave risk that return of the child will expose the child to physical or
527. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
1, art. 1, (a), (b); Merideth v. Merideth, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991).
528. 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1994).
529. Id.; Merideth, 759 F. Supp. at 1434.
530. Lynda R. Herring, Comment, Taking Away the Pawns: International Parental Abduction
and the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Corn. Reg. 137, 146 (1994).
531. E.g., Ruppen v. Ruppen, 614 N.E.2d 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (deferred to Italy's
jurisdiction); Zenide v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (Texas custody order
was not enforceable because Texas should have deferred to French award.).
532. In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1995).
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psychological harm;... (2) that return of the child "would not be permitted by
the fundamental principles of the requested State, relating to the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms;""" (3) by a preponderance of the
evidence that the proceeding was commenced more than one year after the
abduction and the child has become settled in its new environment; "' or (4)
by a preponderance of the evidence that the other parent was not actually
exercising custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or that he had
consented to or acquiesced in the removal or retention. "
5. Choice of Law
Custody rights are determined by the law of the child's "habitual residence."
Note, as a threshold constitutional matter, due process requires that proper notice
of Hague Convention proceedings be given so that the other parent can appear
or otherwise inform the court of his or her position on the issues involved. 37
6. Definitions and Interpretations
a. Habitual Residence
"Habitual residence" is a term left undefined in the Convention and in the
United States' implementing legislation, apparently leaving the issue to be
decided upon the facts and circumstances of the case."3 United States courts
have held that the terms of the Convention are to be construed narrowly.5
39
A leading British decision defined "habitual residence" as follows:"
[T]here may be. a degree of settled purpose [to reside in the place].
The purpose may be one or there may be several. It may be specific or
general. All that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose.
That is not to say that the propositus intends to stay where he is
indefinitely. Indeed his purpose while settled may be for a limited
period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family
533. See Hague Convention, supra at article 13b; 42 U.S.C. § ! 1603(eX2XA) (1994); Friedrich
v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993), on appeal of remanded decLrion and stay of return
order, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996).
534. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
I, art. 20; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(eX2XA) (1994).
535. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects ofinternational Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
I, art. 12; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(eX2XB) (1994).
536. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
I, ar. 13a; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2XB) (1994).
537. Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
538. Merideth v. Merideth, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991).
539. E.g., Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995).




or merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a
choice of regular abode, and there may well be others. All that is
necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient
degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.s"
In addition, the term "habitual residence" has been found to mean about the same
thing as "ordinary residence.5 142 "Habitual residence" under the Convention
and the United States Act does not include "coerced residence. ""54 Does the
UCCJA also apply to cases in which a child is in a United States state, after
having been removed from a foreign nation in which the child had lived for
more than six months? What if the child had been wrongfully taken from one
state to another, where the child has lived long enough to make it "the habitual
residence"? The UCCJA and the PKPA provide that a state in these circum-
stances has discretion not to assertjurisdiction, barring exceptionalcircumstances,
even if it had become the "home state."54 4 The same principles and logic
behind them ought to apply to the international arena. Some decisions, deciding
issues relating to visitation violations and the Hague Convention, have held that
the child did not have to be returned to a foreign country when a parent
had violated the other parent's visitation rights.54 s  The Massachusetts
Supreme Court based its decision, not on wrongful removal or retention per se,
but on the fact that it interpreted the Convention not to cover visitation
rights.5 "
b. Coercion
"Coercion" means that the parent was forced to remain in the country and
was forced "by means of verbal, emotional and physical abuse, [such as to
remove] any element of choice and settled purpose.5 47
541. Id., quoted in Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (N.D. Iowa 1993). and
in Harris et al., supra note 329, at 790.
542. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369.
543. In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Utah 1993).
544. See discussion supra and UCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. 219 (1988) (emphasis added):
If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or
has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances. Unless required in the
interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree
of another state if the petitioner [without consent of the other party] has improperly
removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child....
545. Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).
546. Id.
547. In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. at 367-68; cf. Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374,




"Wrongful removal" occurs when the child is removed from his habitual
residence in a manner or under circumstances that contravene another's valid
custody rights.548 Those custody rights actually must. have been exercised at
the time the child was removed.4 9
d. Exceptions
There are exceptions (or defenses) to the return of a child who has
been wrongfully removed; for example, if there is a grave risk of physical
or psychological harm or otherwise that would place the child in an
intolerable situation if the child is returned."0 An appellate court in
New Jersey interpreted this not to allow a father to prove that the child
would suffer severe psychological trauma from being uprooted and removed
from the father's home."' The court suggested that Convention article
13(b)
was not intended to deal with issues or factual questions which are
appropriate for consideration in a plenary custody proceeding.
Psychological profiles, detailed evaluations of parental fitness, evidence
concerning lifestyle and the nature and quality of relationships all bear
upon the ultimate [substantive custody] issue. The Convention reserves
these considerations to the appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual
residence.. . . Nevertheless, it is clear that Article 13(b) requires more
than a cursory evaluation of the home jurisdiction's civil stability and
the availability there of a tribunal to hear the custody com-
plaint .... ."2
Another interesting "exception" is the so-called "fugitive disentitlement"
exception, which a fugitive from United States justice (fled a criminal conviction
or its equivalent) is disentitled to access to United States courts." 3 What does
this mean? What is the scope of the Hague hearing? The New Jersey court
continued:
548. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(c)(IXA) (1995); In re
Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1995).
549. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 9, Ch.
1, art. 3; In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556.
550. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(eX2)(A) (1994); Nune-Escudero, 58 F.3d 374; Rydder v. Rydder, 49
F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Shoshana B. v. Shelley B., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 118 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
551. Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
552. Id. at 334-35, quoted and discussed in Harris et al., supra note 329, at 791-92.
553. Citing In re Prevot, 59 F.3d at 561-67 (The father had taken flight from the United States
because he was in violation of probation terms.).
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[T]o hold... that the proper scope of inquiry precludes any focus on
the people involved is ... too narrow and mechanical. Without
engaging in an exploration of psychological make-ups, ultimate
determinations of parenting qualities, or the impact of life experiences,
a court in the petitioned jurisdiction, in order to determine whether a
realistic basis exists for apprehensions concerning the child's physical
safety or mental well-being, must be empowered to evaluate the
surroundings to which the child is to be sent and the basic personal
qualities of those located there...ss4
Does this mean that a hearing similar to one based on emergency jurisdiction
under the UCCJA is called for? Something less? Something more? Was the
court concerned with the sophistication of the "requesting" nation's legal system?
Its political stability? Its laws relating to women and children? The other nation
involved here was Quebec, Canada, so that might indicate that these concerns
were not significantly at issue.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed domestic and international child custody jurisdiction law,
considering some of the vexing problems that it causes."' We have noted the
improvement that the PKPA and the UCCJA have wrought as compared to when
all that was required was presence or domicile."" Child custody disputes are
so volatile and the parents have such a tendency to move to different and
separate jurisdictions that the problems are still complex and difficult.
Difficulties, even harm, still face children, parents, and the legal system. In
addition to the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, the UCCJA and the
PKPA should apply to international circumstances because the situation there is
similar to, or worse than, that in the United States prior to the promulgation of
the UCCJA and the PKPA. Notwithstanding the value of current child custody
jurisdiction law, I have also criticized it, noting situations in which it is
extremely unfair, so that principles of substantive due process should apply.
554. Id. (emphasis added).
555. See, e.g., Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law & the Protection of Human
Liberty, supra note I, Ch. 3; Blakesley, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, Ch. I, in
International Criminal Law (1998, at press), supra note 1; Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, supra
note 1, Ch. 13.
556. See generaly history discussion, Infra. 2 Beale, supra note 2, § 144.3; Goodrich, supra
note 2, § 132, at 358; Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 117 (1934). But see Ehrenzweig, supra note
2, at 347-48; Murchison, supra note 2, at 1076; Stansbury, supra note 2, at 820-25 (arguing that the
traditional approach and rationale did not even explain decisions, which were often whimsical and
chauvinistic).
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